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Abstract
Today’s arms race between the attackers and defenders of computer systems seems
like a never ending story. Traditionally, the battle has been fought outside the
computer’s operating system kernel, but in recent years the advent of kernel level
malware has moved the battlefield inside the operating system, thus incapacitating
many of the before trusted security mechanisms. When this happens the operating
system can no longer be trusted, and new kinds of security tools must be developed.
This thesis looks at the potential of virtualization as a platform for performing
integrity checking of a running operating system’s kernel. In theory, the use of
virtualization should make it possible to establish a platform of trust in the system,
even when the kernel of a virtualized guest kernel has been subverted.
The idea of monitoring an attacked system from a different protection domain
than the attacked system is not new. The use of virtualization brings some extra
benefits though: High visibility to the monitored system and good protection from
outside attackers. Traditional computer surveillance systems have been forced to
compromise between these two properties.
The reader is in this thesis introduced to the concept of kernel level malware,
virtualization techniques and the internals of the Linux kernel. An architecture
designed to address some of the problems surrounding the integrity checking of
a running kernel, is presented. The details of this architecture is discussed, and a
working prototype putting the architecture to the test against a suite of real attacks,
is constructed.
i
ii
Preface
This report presents the results of our master thesis “Using virtual machines for
integrity checking”. It is written as part of our Master degrees in Computer Science
at the University of Oslo. The work presented is based on a problem presented by
security community at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The
problem statement was given to us by our daily supervisor at FFI, Ane Daae Weng.
In addition to havingWeng as our daily supervisor, professor Chunming Rong from
the University of Oslo has been our main supervisor.
The work with this thesis has opened our eyes to many new and exiting topics
within the area of computer security. Although the work with this thesis has been
challenging, it has been immensely educating. Our knowledge of virtualization
and kernel level malware was as best superficial at the beginning of this work. Our
C and Python programming skills have also been thoroughly tested. In general our
interest in the field of computer security has increased dramatically, and we will
both continue down this path in our professional careers.
We would first use this opportunity to thank our families for putting up with
us during the work on this thesis. We would also like to thank our two supervisors
Ane Daae Weng and Chunming Rong for their valuable inputs along the way. A
special thank also to Ronny Windvik, project manager at FFI, for his inputs on our
work. We would also like to thank Bryan D. Payne of the XenAccess project. His
innovative work has helped us a lot with the implementation of our prototype. At
last we also feel that we owe the XenSource community in general a special thank.
The Xen virtualization technology is a complex piece of software, and their input
and guidance have been very helpful to us.
Oslo, May 1st 2007
Trond Arne Sørby Mads Bergdal
iii
iv
Contents
Abstract i
Preface ii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 Preliminary phase - literature study . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Design and implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.3 Experimenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.4 Discussion and evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 The scope of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I Background 7
2 Integrity of computer systems 9
2.1 Definition of terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The fight for integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.3 Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.4 Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Research efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1 Code attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2 Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
v
vi CONTENTS
3 The Linux operating system 17
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 The Linux Kernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.1 Kernel modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.2 Memory management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.3 Virtual memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.4 Context switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.5 Interrupt handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.6 System calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 The virtual file system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4.1 Common File Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4.2 Proc - a special file system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4 Malicious kernel code 31
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 The threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Types of rootkits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.1 User mode rootkits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.2 Kernel mode rootkits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 Detecting kernel mode rootkits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5.1 Preventing entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5.2 Searching for anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5.3 Hidden files and processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5.4 Hidden kernel modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5.5 Integrity checking the kernel memory . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.6 Discussion of the detection methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5 Virtualization 41
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2 Virtual machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.3 Hardware-level virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.3.1 Virtual machine monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.3.2 Virtual machine environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3.3 Virtualization techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.4 Virtualization solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4.1 VMware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4.2 Xen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4.3 Parallels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
CONTENTS vii
5.4.4 KVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.5 Virtualization and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.5.1 Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.5.2 Software reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6 The Xen virtualization technology 51
6.1 Architectural overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2 Xen - the hypervisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.2.1 CPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.2.2 Event channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.2.3 Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.2.4 Xenstore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.2.5 Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.3 Domain 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.3.1 Xend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.3.2 xm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3.3 libxc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.4 Note on performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.5 Notes on security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
II Contributions 61
7 Requirements, architecture and design 63
7.1 Research context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.2 General requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.3 General model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.3.1 The architecture’s support for the general requirements . . 67
8 Chili - an integrity checking framework 71
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.2 Description of the Chili framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2.1 Console . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2.2 Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2.3 Admin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2.4 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.2.5 OS library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.2.6 Inspector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.3 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
8.4 Choice of language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.4.1 SWIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
viii CONTENTS
8.5 XenAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8.5.1 Limitiations of XenAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8.6 Use of the chili framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8.6.1 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.6.2 Setting the user domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.6.3 List domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8.6.4 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8.6.5 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9 Constructing targets and policies 83
9.1 Example targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.1.1 KernelText . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.1.2 SysCallTable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.1.3 ServiceRoutineArray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.1.4 IDT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.1.5 Proc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.1.6 MemoryArea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.2 Example policy modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
9.2.1 The __kernel_vsyscall policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
9.2.2 The IDT policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
9.2.3 The kernel text policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
9.2.4 The system call policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
9.2.5 The proc policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
9.3 System calls - a case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
10 Testing the framework 91
10.1 Preparing the Chili framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2 Test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2.1 Chilirootkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2.2 Adore-ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.2.3 Override . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.2.4 eNYeLKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.2.5 mood-nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
11 Discussion and evaluation 99
11.1 Virtualization as a platform for integrity analysis . . . . . . . . . 99
11.1.1 Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
11.1.2 Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
11.1.3 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
CONTENTS ix
11.1.4 Weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attack surfaces . . . . . . 101
11.1.5 Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.1.6 Summarizing the virtualization platform . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.2 Integrity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.2.1 Integrity verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.2.2 What to check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
11.2.3 Dynamic data structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
11.2.4 Kernel modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
11.2.5 False positives and false negatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.2.6 Summarizing the integrity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.3 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.3.1 Enhancing the prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.3.2 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
11.3.3 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
11.3.4 Kernel synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.3.5 Boot process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.3.6 Placing integrity agents within the monitored host . . . . . 110
12 Conclusion 113
12.1 Summary of the work conducted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
12.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.2.1 Research subquestion 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.2.2 Research subquestion 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.3 Final comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A Loadable kernel modules 117
A.1 Making a module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.2 Compiling the module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.3 Inserting the module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.4 Removing the module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B VFS objects 123
B.1 The Superblock Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 The Inode Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.3 The Dentry Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B.4 The File Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
C Installation of Xen 127
C.1 Base system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
C.2 Xen hypervisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
C.2.1 Grub configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
x CONTENTS
C.2.2 Booting Xen dom0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C.3 User domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
C.4 Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
D Description of some rootkits 131
D.1 Adore-ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
D.2 SucKIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
D.3 mood-nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
D.4 Override . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
D.5 eNYeLKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
E Chili source code 135
E.1 console.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
E.2 engine.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
E.3 admin.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
E.4 oslibrary..py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
E.5 inspector.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
E.6 policy.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
E.7 IDTMonitor.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
E.8 SyscallMonitor.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
E.9 ProcMonitor.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
E.10 KernelVsyscall.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
E.11 target.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
E.12 SysCallTable.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
E.13 sct_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
E.14 sct_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
E.15 sct_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
E.16 ServiceRoutineArray.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
E.17 sr_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
E.18 sr_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
E.19 sr_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
E.20 IDT.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
E.21 idt_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
E.22 idt_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
E.23 idt_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
E.24 Proc.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
E.25 proc_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
E.26 proc_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
E.27 proc_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
E.28 KernelText.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
CONTENTS xi
E.29 kernel_text_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
E.30 kernel_text_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
E.31 kernel_text_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
E.32 MemoryArea.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
E.33 memory_area_target_data.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
E.34 memory_area_target_data.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
E.35 memory_area_target_data.i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
E.36 Libca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
E.36.1 Libca.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
E.36.2 Libca.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
E.36.3 override.diff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

List of Figures
2.1 Malicious kernel malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Computer system structure [63] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Kernel memory layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Dynamic memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 Syscall table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Invoking a system call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.6 The system call chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 Issuing a write() call [51] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.8 Interaction between processes and VFS objects [32] . . . . . . . 28
4.1 Rootkits and their techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1 Computer system structure [63] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2 Hardware-level virtualization [63] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.3 Type I virtual machine environment [48] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.4 Type II virtual machine environment [48] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.5 A kvm based architecture [43] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.1 Xen architecture [60] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2 x86 protection rings [44] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3 Xen and the protection rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.4 Split device driver diagram [62] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.1 General architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.2 General architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.1 Chili architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.2 Chili architecture with monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.3 Chili initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.4 Chili initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.5 Setting the active user domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
8.6 Chili listing domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8.7 List of targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8.8 List of policies and (de)activation of policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.9 Un-pausing a paused domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.1 The system call mechanism and the policies protecting it. . . . . . 89
10.1 Initialization of Chili . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10.2 Guest domain loading the chilirootkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.3 Chili responding to chilirootkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.4 Chili un-pausing paused domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.5 Chili reacting to Adore-ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.6 Chili reacting to Override . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.7 Chili reacting to mood-nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
11.1 Windows complexity as measured by lines of code [41]. . . . . . . 103
11.2 Integrity monitoring from dom0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.3 Integrity agent placed inside domU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
List of Tables
3.1 Process specific entries in /proc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1 General requirements of an integrity checking system [54] . . . . 64
xv

Chapter 1
Introduction
The topic for this master thesis is the verification of the integrity of an operating
system’s running kernel, focusing on the potential that virtualization technology
offers as a platform for integrity analysis.
Virtualization provides some highly desirable properties as a security platform,
as examplified by the recent research efforts using virtualization as a building block
for constructing intrusion detection systems (IDS) [37] [48]. Traditional IDS have
had to choose between the high attack resistance of a network-based IDS (NIDS)
or the high amount of machine state visible to a host-based IDS (HIDS). The use
of virtualization has made it possible to get the best from both these approaches:
a high attack resistance and the ability to directly inspect the hardware state of a
monitored host.
In this thesis, virtualization is utilized for the purpose of analysing the run-
time integrity of the operating system’s kernel. Both a general architecture and a
working prototype of such a system are presented.
Section 1.1 gives a brief background of the motivations underlying the the-
sis. In section 1.2, the thesis’ theme will be given a concrete representation in the
form of a problem definition. The methodology used in the thesis is described in
section 1.3. A structural view of the thesis is provided in the final section of this
chapter.
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1.1 Motivation
Millions of users worldwide rely on the correctness and security of their computer
systems. The networked world following the global adoption of the internet pro-
vides a tempting playground for people with malicious intent. Their motivation
may vary from the thrill of the challenge to the prospect of finanical gains.
The complexity of the general purpose operating systems of today, makes veri-
fying their security a daunting task. In fact, only the most specialized systems seek
to offer any kind of security guarantees [3], making the need constant patching of
security holes in the major operating systems seem natural.
While the ultimate goal is to prevent the system from being compromised,
the reality is that even the detection of a compromise is as big a challenge. The
possibility of the compromise staying undetected, raises serious questions about
the trust that can be placed in the system.
The kernel of an operating system provides the foundation for all the other soft-
ware running on the system including software tasked with ensuring the security
of the system, such as virus scanners, personal firewalls and host-based intrusion
detection systems. Because the detection mechanisms typically rely on the func-
tionality and data provided by the kernel, a compromise of the kernel can aid the
attackers in the deception of detection mechanisms by filtering their view of the
system. As a result, all data originating from a compromised kernel must be as-
sumed to be deceptive.
The ability to maintain undetected access to a compromised machine, has been
the motivation behind the development of much of today’s kernel-level malware.
As a result, recent years have seen increasingly sophisticated attacks directed at
the kernel. The amount of malware operating fully in kernel mode is steadily in-
creasing, making kernel-level malware gaining the attention of not only security
researchers, but of the computer industry at large [46]. Protecting the kernel seems
to be a increasingly important concern for operating system vendors, as exampli-
fied by the PatchGuard mechanism found in Windows Vista, aimed at protecting
vital kernel structures and code from unauthorized modification [24].
1.2 Problem statement
This thesis can be seen as a continuation of the work done by Tobias Melcher [54].
While Melcher provided a general model for integrity checking using virtualiza-
tion, the implementation of that model was limited to the integrity checking of
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files.
While the work of Melcher provided a starting point, the model needed to be
refined and improved, with a bigger emphasis placed on the in-memory representa-
tion of the kernel and its data structures. It was concluded that a further exploration
of the subject would necessitate the implementation of prototype capable of per-
forming integrity checks of the kernel’s memory space.
The problem statement given by our daily supervisor was thus very much cen-
tered around the implementation of a proof-of-concept integrity analyser:
Integrity checking of a running kernel using virtualization. What are the
possibilites and limitations in using virtualization as a platform for the integrity
checking of a running kernel? Given access to the in-memory representation of
the kernel, can its integrity be verified? The result of the work should include,
in addition to a written report, an implementation of a proof-of-concept tool for
integrity analysis.
1.2.1 Research questions
Based on the above problem statement, the main question of this thesis can be
formulated:
How can virtualization aid in the verification of the integrity of the memory of
an operating system’s kernel?
From the main question, two subquestions can be identified:
1. How can virtualization provide a platform for integrity analysis? The answer
must address both the functional requirements and the security implications.
2. Can the integrity of an operating system’s kernel be verified? An answer will
require a discussion of the integrity property and the preconditions required
for the verification of integrity.
1.3 Research methodology
The work conducted can be divided into four phases, a preliminary phase, a phase
of designing and implementing the prototype, an experimental phase and finally, a
phase for discussion and evaluation.
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1.3.1 Preliminary phase - literature study
The purpose of the preliminary phase was to gain an understanding of the problem
area.
A comprehensive literature study on the subjects of virtualization, operating
systems and kernel-level malware was conducted. The prior work of Melcher, and
the background material used therein, gave a starting point for the exploration of
the problem area.
1.3.2 Design and implementation
Following the litterature study, the design and implementation stage began. In this
phase, a model for virtualization-based integrity analysis was formulated based
largely on existing works. The requirements for an implementation was formu-
lated, and the technologies used in the implementation were decided upon.
The prototype is exposed to the internals of both the virtualization technology
and the operating system to be monitored, making the analysis of their implemen-
tation an integral part of the development of our system. Due to sparse documen-
tation of large parts of the virtualization technology, thorough code reviews were
needed for understanding its inner workings.
1.3.3 Experimenting
While the implementation phase focused on the construction of mechanisms, this
phase was all about putting the mechanisms to work. Integrity policies were cre-
ated and put to the test, and the experiences gained formed a basis for the later
discussion of the potential and limitations of the system.
The creation of tests to be performed, required both a thorough understanding
of the technical aspects of the system as well as a knowledge of the techniques used
in malware targetting the kernel.
1.3.4 Discussion and evaluation
In this phase the potential and limitation offered by the use of virtualization as
a platform for integrity analysis were discussed. Furthermore, the problems of
integrity analysis in general, and the approach taken by this thesis, was compared
with the approaches taken in other research. The discussions based themselves on
available research and the experiences gained from using the prototype.
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1.4 The scope of the thesis
The focus of this work is on the Linux operating system with Xen as the virtual-
ization platform, running on the Intel x86 architecture. Still, the goal has been to
maintain as much generality as possible, in both the model and solutions devel-
oped.
File integrity checking falls outside the scope of the thesis, the focus is on
verifying the integrity of the kernel as it appears after being loaded into memory.
For a demonstration and discussion of the use of virtualization for integrity check-
ing of files important to the kernel, interested readers are referred to the work of
Melcher [54].
Attackers are assumed to having already obtained unrestricted access to the
administrative account of the system. The ways in which such access can been
obtained are not a topic for this thesis.
1.5 Summary of results
The results obtained in this thesis suggest that virtualization provides a near ideal
environment for performing integrity analysis of the kernel. The visibility of the
machine state of the monitored host combined with the isolation guarantees pro-
vided by virtualization raises the trustworthiness of the data obtained, while keep-
ing the analysing mechanism out of harms way. However, the platform is not
without potential attack surfaces, and an effort is made identifying those.
The thesis also shows that the verification of integrity is problematic, even
when the trustworthiness of the analyser and the correctness and completeness of
the underlying data set can be assumed.
1.6 Thesis outline
The thesis is comprised of the following chapters:
Chapter 1 provides the motivation for this thesis, defines the problem area and
states the research questions.
Chapter 2 gives a description of the aspect of computer security known as in-
tegrity, and discusses the mechanisms enforcing the integrity policies of a
system.
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Chapter 3 gives an overview of the Linux kernel, the operating system whose
kernel will be the subject of integrity analysis.
Chapter 4 is a survey of the threats to kernel integrity, focusing on the kernel-level
malware known as kernel mode rootkits.
Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to the topic of virtualization, establishing a
terminology and giving several examples of virtualization solutions currently
in use.
Chapter 6 takes a closer look at Xen, the virtualization solution used in the im-
plementation.
Chapter 7 , after identifying the necessary requirements, provides a general ar-
chitecture for an integrity analysis framework.
Chapter 8 describes the proposed prototype of an actual implementation of the
architecture presented in the preceeding chapter.
Chapter 9 shows how the prototype was put to use in implementing integrity
checks of selected parts of the kernel.
Chapter 10 describes how the system was tested using kernel-malware attacks.
Chapter 11 discusses the work done, placing it in a wider context of integrity-
related research and evaluating the approaches and techniques used for this
thesis.
Chapter 12 provides the conclusions of the thesis, giving some suggestions for
future work.
Appendices A-E contain an introduction to loadable kernel modules, a descrip-
tion of the object types of the VFS, instructions for the installation and usage
of Xen, examples of kernel-level malware and, finally, the source code for
the Chili framework.
Part I
Background
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Chapter 2
Integrity of computer systems
Integrity is a key aspect of computer security, and ensuring system integrity con-
tinues to be a significant challenge for the system administrators of the world.
The goal of this chapter is to serve as an introduction to the topic of integrity,
with focus on the attacking and protection of integrity. Recent trends of integrity
attacks will be identified, establishing the kernel of the operating system as an
arena for the battle over integrity. A brief survey of current research concerning
integrity will be given, with an emphasis on the topics motivating the work of this
thesis.
In section 2.1, a formal definition of integrity together with its related terms
will be given. Section 2.2 gives an overview of the threats to system integrity, with
a focus on the most common attacks and the countermeasures developed through
the years. Section 2.3 describes the current trends of integrity attacks, and the
efforts made by both research and industry to meet the challenges imposed on
them. Concluding the chapter, section 2.4 summarizes some of the research work
already done in this area of computer security.
2.1 Definition of terms
As this thesis deals with the integrity property of the operating system, a clarifica-
tion and definition of integrity and its related terms are needed. The definitions in
this sections are taken from the textbook “Computer Security” byMatt Bishop [31].
Bishop provides a formal definition of integrity:
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Let X be a set of entities and let I be some information or a resource.
Then I has the property of integrity with respect to X if all members
of X trust I.
Bishop identifies several aspects of integrity: Data integrity, relating to the
content of the information, and origin integrity, relating to the the source of the
data, also known as authentication. When integrity relates to a resource rather than
information, integrity means that the resource functions correctly. This aspect of
integrity is often called assurance.
The rules stating what is, and what is not, allowed for the integrity to be pre-
served, are called integrity policies. They describe not only how information or
resources may be altered, but also by whom.
The mechanisms tasked with enforcing integrity policies are usually divided
into two classes: prevention mechanisms and detection mechanisms. While pre-
vention mechanisms try to keep integrity violations from occurring in the first
place, detection mechanisms are limited to reporting that an integrity violation has
indeed occurred.
The definition of integrity given by Bishop refers to the trustworthiness of data
or resources, making the question of system integrity a question of the trust that can
be placed in the system. A critical observation made by Bishop, is that the effec-
tiveness of any security mechanism depends on the trust that can be placed both in
the underlying base on which the mechanism is implemented and the correctness
of the implementation.
The notion of the integrity of higher layers being dependent on the integrity of
lower layers, has been stated even more explicitly by Arbaugh et al. [29]. They
state that, presuming the validity of the hardware layer (the lowest layer), integrity
of a layer can be guaranteed if and only if: (1) the integrity of the lower layers
is checked, and (2) transitions to higher layers occur only after integrity checks on
them are complete. By inductively building on the integrity of lower layers, system
integrity can be guaranteed.
2.2 The fight for integrity
In this thesis, the term attack will be used for all acts threatening integrity, be they
accidental or deliberate. The entity carrying out the attack, whether a person or fate
itself, will be called the attacker. The opposite terms, defence and defender, will
be used when the intent is to either prevent or detect the compromise of integrity.
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After an attack is detected, the extent of the integrity breach can be difficult to
establish. Note that not all attacks necessarily result in integrity compromises. It
is, however, difficult to prove the integrity of a system on which a succesful attack
has been launched. If an attack is only detected but not prevented, it is common
practice to treat the integrity of the system as compromised [72].
2.2.1 Attacks
Using the above definitions, all actions resulting in the trustworthiness of the sys-
tem being questioned can be characterized as integrity attacks.
The goal of the attackers is often not limited to obtaining access to systems,
but also maintaining that access undetected. Attacks range from the completely
non-technical forms of social engineering to the highly technical forms as the ex-
ploitation of vulnerabilities in code.
Malware
Malware has emerged as the term for describing software with a malicious intent,
including viruses, worms, trojan horses and rootkits.
Vulnerabilites
Vulnerabilities stem from bugs or flaws in the design, implementation, configura-
tion or use of software. An attacker can exploit vulnerabilities to gain access or to
escalate existing privileges on a system. Often, an attack consists of gaining ac-
cess by exploiting known vulnerabilities, and ensuring future access by installing
malware specifically designed for that task.
2.2.2 Defences
Mechanisms for dealing with the integrity of computer systems can be divided into
two groups: prevention mechanisms and detection mechanisms.
2.2.3 Detection
Detection software can usually be divided into various form of malware detectors
and systems for detecting other forms of intrusions, commonly referred to as intru-
sion detection systems (IDS).
Detection software employs a multitude of techniques:
• Signature detection
Signature detection is perhaps most widely known from anti-virus software,
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but the technique can also be used for other kinds of malware detectors or as
part of an IDS. The assumption is that most malware or exploits contain spe-
cific patterns or code sequences that can be used to identify them. Signatures
can be very effective against known attacks, but the technique has definitive
weaknesses. It requires the frequent updating of a database of signatures,
and it protects only against known attacks.
• Anomality detection
Anomality detection makes the assumption that it is possible to state what is
the expected behavior of the system. Any unexpected behaviour is seen as
suspicious, and may be evidence of an intrusion.
• File integrity checkers
File integrity checkers are used for detecting changes made to key system
binaries, configuration files and other files that are not expected to change
during normal usage. Typically, the integrity checker maintains a database
of cryptographic checksums of the file contents. The integrity checker com-
putes new checksums at (ir)regular intervals, comparing them to the ones
stored in the database. Changes made to monitored files will result in a dif-
ferent checksum, causing the file integrity checker to issue an alert.
• Auditing
Auditing is the analysis of a system’s log records. By keeping extensive
logs of noteworthy events in the system, violations of security policies may
be detected and the sequence of events leading up to the breach may be
examined.
2.2.4 Prevention
While detection mechanisms merely report when the integrity of a system is com-
promised, other mechanisms try to hinder the system from being compromised in
the first place.
Over the years, a set of best practices for securing a system has emerged, and
the process of employing these practices are often referred to as hardening the
system [72] [16]. This will typically include turning off non-essential services,
running processes with only those privileges needed for completing their tasks,
enforcing a strict password policy and keeping the system patched with security
updates.
Note that while a hardened system offers a harder challenge for an attacker, no
guarantees can be given on the security of the system.
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2.3 Trends
At the end of section 2.1, it was noted how the integrity of a layer depends on the
integrity of its lower layers. This key insight can be seen as causing the trend of
attacking increasingly lower layers of the software stack.
AVAR 2006 - AUCKLAND
History and Trends of Kernel Malware
Kernel-mode malware on Windows NT-based systems 
is not a new phenomenon, they have just been rare. 
WinNT/In!s [24], which was discovered in November 
1999, was the !rst known full-kernel malware that was 
designed to run on NT-based systems. It was a memory-
resident parasitic kernel-mode driver virus that gained 
control by hooking the INT 0x2E interrupt handler 
directly from kernel. "is allowed it to monitor every 
system service call made by user-mode applications and 
to infect PE EXE !les when an open request was made. 
Win2K/In!s.4608 [35] added support for Windows 
2000 and was found just one week a#er the new operat-
ing system was released.
Another documented case involving kernel-mode mal-
ware was Virus.Win32.Chatter1 [2][36], which was 
found in January 2003. It was a kernel-mode driver that 
infects only PE SYS !les. It hooks nt!NtCreateFile from 
nt!KiServiceTable and thus gets control on every !le open 
and create operation. However, its infection routine was 
actually executed in user mode. "erefore it is a semi-
kernel malware. "e driver copied itself into the address 
space of the active process and used an undocumented 
nt!KeUserModeCallBack function exported by the kernel 
to execute the infection routine in user mode. "is migh  
have been the !rst time for kernel malware to inject parts 
of its payload from ring 0 to ring 3 to perform some more 
complex tasks. "is code injection from kernel to user 
mode is an important concept and will be discussed in 
more detail later in this paper.
Today the number of kernel-mode malware when com-
pared to the total number of malware seen every month is 
very small. Also, it should be noted that the antivirus in-
dustry has not yet seen any complex malware that would 
ful!ll the requirements for full-kernel malware. To get a 
better view of how real the threat posed by kernel mal-
ware is, it is important to !nd some evidence of real-life 
malware samples using kernel-mode components.
Antivirus analysts who have been analyzing malware 
samples since the beginning of 2005 should agree that 
the number of malware using kernel components has 
been steadily increasing. To get more proof of this trend 
a statistical analysis was conducted. "e author chose two 
antivirus vendors and processed all monthly sample col-
lections from January 2003 to August 2006. On average 
this resulted in around 100000 samples per vendor. "e 
idea was to !nd out how many kernel-mode drivers the 
1. Also know as W32.Keck.1933 (Symantec) and W32/Chatter        
(McAfee).
sample collections had, meaning that they are either full-
kernel malware or parts of semi-kernel malware. In addi-
tion, the number of new malware families that use kernel-
mode drivers was identi!ed. It is important to notice that 
just looking for drivers will not include kernel malware 
that use other means, like code injection or call gates, to 
execute their code in ring 0. However, this would require 
run-time analysis of the samples, which was not possible 
to achieve within the given time frame.
Each sample in the monthly collection was !rst checked 
whether it had a proper PE header. If the result was posi-
tive then additional tests were made against the optional 
header !eld. Following basic checks were made to include 
only samples that are possibly kernel-mode drivers for 
Windows NT and later operating system versions:
Magic !eld equals IMAGE _ NT _ OPTION-
AL _ HDR32 _ MAGIC
Subsystem !eld equals IMAGE _ SUBSYS-
TEM _ NATIVE
MajorSubsystemVersion and MinorSub-
systemVersion !elds were checked against the 
correct platform and version information
In addition all duplicate !les were removed by checking 
their MD5 hash. "e results are shown in Figure 1 be-
low.
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Figure 1. Number of malicious kernel-mode driver samples 
found !om each vendor collection per month. Also, in-
cludes the number of new malware families found to use 
kernel-mode components.
Before discussing more about the results it should be 
noted that there exists possible factors of uncertainty to-
wards the validity of the results. "is is mostly related to 
the quality of the data these results are based on. "e au-
thor is not trying to imply that there is anything wrong 
with the collections, it is just a known problem in the 
antivirus industry that proper classi!cation and naming 
■
■
■
Figure 2.1: Number of malicious kernel malware samples found per month by
two anitvirus vendors, together with the number of new malware families found to
include kern l-mode components [46].
Malware operating within the kernel has seen a steadily increase in popularity
during the last few years. Figure 2.1, taken from Kasslin [46], shows the increas-
ing growth of kernel-level malware for the Windows operating system. Kasslin
explains the rise in popularity by the increa ed motivation for ma ware authors to
keep their malware hidden from detection.
Detection and prevention mechanisms placed within the system being moni-
tored all rely on the view of the computer system presented to them by the oper-
ating system. By making malicious modifications to the operating system kernel,
the information requested by these mechanims may be filtered by the attacker. As
an example, recent years have seen the introduction of kernel-level malware, capa-
ble of keeping the presence of both files and processes hidden from the detection
mechanisms.
In chapter 4, both kernel-level malware and the motivations for their existence
will be given a more thorough look. For now, it is sufficent to note that today, the
battle over system integrity is in large parts being fought inside the kernel of the
operating system.
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2.4 Research efforts
A significant amount of research relating to integrity exists. In this section, some
research topics found to be of interest are presented.
2.4.1 Code attestation
Seshadri et al. [70] defines code attestation as a process where a trusted entity,
known as the verifier, verifies the software stack that runs on another entity, called
the attestation platform. Integrity measurements of the attestation platform’s soft-
ware stack are taken by a measurement agent running on the attestation platform,
and sent to the verifier. The integrity measurements taken from the attestation
platform enable the verifier to detect modifications in the software stack of the
attestation platform.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has released a set of standards describ-
ing how a separate tamper-resistant coprossesor, known as the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), can be used for taking integrity measurements of a system [21].
The measurements consist of computing a checksum of the code that is to be
loaded, using a hash function. While the primary motivation for the development
of the TPM was to provide an immutable base capable of ensuring the secure boot-
strapping of a machine [29], the mechanism can be used for providing integrity
statements of other parts of the software stack [68]. Seshadri et al. [70] describes
how the integrity measurements taken by the TPM can be used for guaranteeing
load-time code attestation, whereby the verifier obtains a guarantee of what code
was loaded into the system memory initially.
The guarantees obtained from load-time code attestation are limited to what
code is loaded into memory, hence making the code vulnerable from in-memory
patching after it is loaded. An example of run-time code attestation is Copilot [57],
a kernel integrity monitor running on a PCI add-in card. Copilot performs integrity
measurements of the kernel memory at regular intervals, thus detecting changes
made after the loading of the kernel code.
Another example of code attestation is the work on Pioneer, which unlike the
other examples does not require any hardware extensions added to the attestation
platform [70]. Pioneer establishes a trusted computing base on the attestation plat-
form, called the dynamic root of trust. The dynamic root of trust is created using
a verification function, a self-checking function that computes a checksum of its
own instructions. The checksum function is constructed in such a way that any
tampering will result in either a wrong checksum or a noticeably slowdown of the
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computation. Using a challenge-response protocol, it is shown that if the verifier
receives the correct response within a certain amount of time, it can be guaranteed
that the verification function code on the attestation platform has executed unmod-
ified.
2.4.2 Virtualization
Using virtual machines as a security mechanism is nothing new. Bishop describes
how virtual machines can be used for isolation purposes, preventing the processes
of the virtual machine from accessing the underlying computer system [31].
Garfinkel and Rosenblum show how virtualization, in addition to the isolation
it provides, offers the possibility to directly inspect the hardware state of the virtual
machine [37], thus providing a high degree of visibility. In their view, the combi-
nation of both visibility and isolation makes virtualization especially suitable as a
platform for intrusion detection systems (IDS). The two dominant IDS architec-
tures of today, network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based
intrusion detection system (HIDS), each offers one at the cost of the other. A NIDS
offers a high degree of isolation, but poor visibility, while a HIDS provides good
visibility at the cost of isolation.
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Chapter 3
The Linux operating system
3.1 Introduction
The Linux operating system is the result of the work started by Linus Torvalds in
1991. Linux has been chosen as the operating system of choice in this thesis mostly
because its source code is open for everyone to review. This means that one is free
to delve into the inner workings of the operating system to find out exactly how
everything works. This chapter gives the reader a brief introduction to the Linux
operating system. The focus will be on the parts of the Linux kernel that the reader
will need to have a basic understanding of to understand the difficulties of integrity
checking this complex piece of software.
A modern computer consists of a great deal of complex subsystems. Some
of these are: one or more processors, memory, hard drives, keyboard, monitors,
network interfaces and other input/output devices. It would be very difficult to
make use of a computer by letting each piece of software written manage all of
these resources by themselves. To keep all of these things manageable, computers
are normally equipped with a layer of abstraction between the hardware and the
software running on the computer [75]. This layer of software is the operating
system. Figure 3.1 shows how a computer system can be viewed as a layered
architecture with the operating system as the layer which all other programs rely
on.
In short the operating system performs two main tasks: extending the machine
and managing the machine’s resources [75]. Firstly, the operating system extends
the machine in the sense that a programmer doesn’t have to worry about all the
details of how hardware interact. A fundamental operation like reading from a
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Virtual Machines
The Reincarnation of 
Figure 3.1: Computer system structure [63]
disk drive may sound like a straight forward operation, but it is actually quite com-
plex, considering all the details of setting and reading device registers, managing
read/write buffers, starting and stopping the device’s motor and so on. All these
details are hidden from the programmer by the operating system, making the use
of various hardware on a system easy through well defined interfaces [75].
Secondly, the operating system helps with the management of the different re-
sources in the system. A computer has many pieces of equipment which must all
work seamlessly together. The operating system keeps programs and users sepa-
rated, and make sure that all resource sharing is done in a proper and fair way.
The next section will give a short history of the origins of the Linux operating
system. Then in section 3.3, some of the most important subsystems of the Linux
kernel will be explained. The last section describes the Virtual File System (VFS),
an important component of the Linux kernel. A knowledge of the different subsys-
tems of the kernel is required for understanding how malicious code can subvert
the kernel. Malicious kernel code will be the topic for the next chapter.
3.2 Background
In 1983, Richard Stallman started the GNU Project with the goal of creating a
UNIX-like, POSIX-compatible operating system composed entirely of free soft-
ware [11]. Some years later, in 1987, Andrew S. Tanenbaum (professor of Com-
puter Science at the Vrilje University, Amsterdam) released an educational operat-
ing system named Minix. This operating system was (and still is) intended to be
used for educational purposes. Therefore the Minix operating system was inten-
tionally kept small and featureless. Minix was at the time the closest ting one could
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get to a completely free clone of the commercial UNIX operating system [75].
A Finnish student, Linus Torvalds, decided to write another clone of the UNIX
system which would eventually be a full-blown free production system. This sys-
tem borrowed many ideas from the Minix system, and was first released in 1991.
This was the start of the Linux operating system. It has now been ported to a
wide range of hardware platforms, and a large number of Linux distributions exist,
which bundle various other open source software with the Linux kernel [11]. The
distribution used in this thesis is Debian GNU/Linux, one of the most feature rich
distributions around today. Debian is also used as the base for many other Linux
distributions [5].
3.3 The Linux Kernel
The Linux kernel is a monolithic kernel, meaning that all the device drivers and
kernel extensions run in the most privileged level of the processor as a single pro-
gram. This privileged level is also known as kernel mode. The x861 processor
family offer four different execution states or protection levels [32], but most oper-
ating systems only use the innermost, kernel mode, and the outermost, user mode,
protection levels.
3.3.1 Kernel modules
Kernel modules (or loadable kernel modules) are used in the Linux kernel to make
the kernel able to provide support for new hardware, filesystems etc without hav-
ing to build kernels with all this functionality precompiled into the kernel image.
Without loadable kernel modules, the kernel binary would get much larger and
more static. Adding new functionality to the kernel would thus require the kernel
to be recompiled and the system to be rebooted.
Because kernel modules can be linked on demand, the kernel does not have
to be bloated with hundreds of seldom-used programs. Nearly all higher-level
components of the Linux kernel: filesystems, device drivers, executable formats
and network layers can be compiled as modules.
Loadable kernel modules can also be used to subvert the kernel in various ways,
as will be shown in chapter 4. Since the modules are linked into the kernel image,
they get unrestricted access to all of the kernel’s internal data structures and are
therefore able to do unlimited damage if programmed to do so. Because of this,
1In this paper, CPUs belonging to the i386 family will be referred to as x86 processors.
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many intrusion detection systems rely on monitoring the insertion of kernel mod-
ules [33]. More on how kernel modules are built and inserted into the kernel can
be found in appendix A.
3.3.2 Memory management
Memory management is one of the most crucial tasks of the kernel. The ker-
nel’s memory manager is responsible for efficiently dividing the available phys-
ical memory to processes and threads and for freeing memory when it is no longer
needed [75].
When talking about memory in the Linux kernel, it is important to distinguish
between to main types of memory addresses: Virtual addresses and physical ad-
dresses [32]. The virtual address space is divided into pages (normally of 4kB
each), and each page is contained in page frames in the physical memory.
3.3.3 Virtual memory
The basic idea behind virtual memory is that the combined size of the program,
data and stack may exceed the amount of physical memory available for a process.
This means that the set of memory references a process uses is different from the
physical memory addresses actually accessed. It is the responsibility of a hardware
circuit called the MemoryManagement Unit (MMU) to transform virtual addresses
into physical ones.
Paging
The virtual memory subsystem uses a method called paging to manage the dis-
tinction between physical page frames and virtual pages. The paging unit inside
the MMU thinks of all Random Access Memory (RAM) as partitioned into fixed-
length page frames. Each page frame contains a page; that is, the length of a
page frame coincides with that of a page. When the physical memory is insuffi-
cient to hold all the required pages, the MMU moves pages from primary memory
(RAM) to secondary memory (hard disk) and marks the pages in the page table as
swapped out to disk. This way the MMU frees up physical memory. The swapped
page frame may later be retrieved from disk by the MMU when it gets a request for
an address that corresponds to that particular chunk of memory. Such a request; a
request for a page that is currently not in main memory, is called a page fault.
Memory layout
Figure 3.2 [32] shows how the first 3 MB of RAM are filled by Linux (assuming
that the kernel requires less than 3 MB of RAM). Linux reserves some page frames
3.3. THE LINUX KERNEL 21
exclusively for the kernel code and data structures. The remaining parts of RAM
are called dynamic memory, and are used by the user processes as well as by the
kernel itself. The kernel uses dynamic memory for dynamically allocated kernel
data structures, device driver buffers, code of a kernel module etc. Figure 3.3 [32]
shows the dynamic memory areas.
The pages that are allocated for the kernel, are never swapped to disk [32]. This
is an important observation, as the integrity checking system presented in part II of
this thesis depends on being able to access all kernel memory at all times.
In figure 3.2 the symbol _text, corresponding to the physical address 0x00100000,
denotes the address of the first byte of kernel code. The end of the kernel code is
similarly identified by the symbol _etext. Kernel data is divided into two groups:
initialized and uninitialized. The initialized data starts right after _etext and ends
at _edata. The uninitialized data follows and ends up at _end.
Figure 3.2: Kernel memory layout
[32]
The symbols appearing in figures 3.2 and 3.3 are not defined in Linux source
code. They are produced while compiling the kernel, and the addresses of these
symbols can be found in the file System.map, which is created as part of the
kernel compilation process.
3.3.4 Context switch
In user mode the executing program cannot directly access the kernel data struc-
tures or the kernel programs. When in kernel mode, these restrictions do no longer
apply. The processor provides special instructions for moving from user mode to
kernel mode and vice versa. This switch between kernel and user mode is called
a context switch. The services provided by the kernel are made available through
22 CHAPTER 3. THE LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM
Figure 3.3: Dynamic memory
[32]
system calls (see section 3.3.6). Besides system calls, the kernel routines can be
activated when the running process signals an exception, which the kernel then
handles. A peripheral device may also issue an interrupt to signal the CPU of an
event that requires attention. All such interrupts is handled by the interrupt handler
within the kernel (see section 3.3.5).
3.3.5 Interrupt handler
An interrupt is usually defined as an event that alters the sequence of instructions
executed by a processor [32]. The Intel 80386 manual [45] talks of two types of
interrupts: interrupts and exceptions, which are synchronous and asynchronous,
respectively.
A system table called the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) associates each
interrupt or exception vector with the address of the corresponding interrupt or
exception handler [32]. One such vector, 0x80 or 128 in decimal, will be given
a detailed description in the next section. The fact that the addresses in the IDT
decides what functions within the kernel should be called when an interrupt occurs,
makes this an interesting point of attack for malicious code that have gained access
to the kernel.
The idtr CPU register allows the IDT to be located anywhere in memory, and it
specifies both the IDT base physical address and its limit (maximum length). The
IDT must be initialized before enabling interrupts by using the lidt assembly
language instruction.
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3.3.6 System calls
Unix systems include several libraries of functions that provide APIs to program-
mers. Usually, each system call has a corresponding wrapper routine, which de-
fines the API that application programs should use [32]. These wrapper routines’
only purpose is to issue the system calls.
When a user mode process invokes a system call, the CPU switches to kernel
mode and starts the execution of a kernel function. A Linux system call can be
invoked in two different ways (as will be discussed shortly). The result of both
methods, however, is a jump to an assembly language function called the system
call handler. To associate each system call number with its corresponding ser-
vice routine, the kernel uses a system call dispatch table, which is stored in the
sys_call_table array (see figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Syscall table
The system call handler is responsible for performing the following operations:
• Saving the contents of most registers in the Kernel mode stack.
• Handling the system call by invoking a corresponding C function. These
functions are called system call service routines.
• Exiting from the handler: The registers are loaded with the values saved in
the Kernel mode stack, and the CPU is switched back from Kernel mode to
User mode.
24 CHAPTER 3. THE LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM
Figure 3.5 [32] illustrates the relationships between the application program
that invokes a system call, the corresponding wrapper routine, the system call han-
dler and the system call service routine. The arrows denote the execution flow
between the functions. The terms "SYSCALL" and "SYSEXIT" are placeholders
for the actual assembly language instructions that switch the CPU from user mode
to kernel mode and from kernel mode to user mode.
Figure 3.5: Invoking a system call
[32]
As mentioned above, a system call can be invoked in two different ways:
By executing the int 0x80 assembly language instruction or by executing the
sysenter assembly language instruction. Below is a short description of these
two methods.
int 0x80 The vector 0x80 (128) in the IDT points to the system_call function
which is the service handler routine for all system calls entering via the int
0x80 instruction. The system_call function does a lot of work (permis-
sion checking, checking if the debugger is enabled etc.), but then eventually
ends up calling the requested service routine by issuing the assembly instruc-
tion:
call *sys_call_table(0, \%eax, 4)
where the requested system call number is found in the eax register of the
CPU [32].
sysenter The int assembly language instruction is inherently slow because it
performs several consistency and security checks [32]. The sysenter in-
struction, also called "Fast System Call," provides a faster way to switch
from user mode to kernel mode [32]. The wrapper routine in the stan-
dard library loads the system call number into the eax register and calls the
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__kernel_vsyscall function. This causes the CPU to switch from user
mode to kernel mode, and the kernel starts executing the sysenter_entry
function. This again invokes the system call handler by executing a sequence
of instructions identical to that starting at the system_call as described
for int 0x80 above.
int 0x80
IDT
sysenter
system_call() sysenter_entry()
syscall_xyz()
sys_call_table
__kernel_vsyscall
Figure 3.6: The system call chain
Being the link between user processes and kernel structures the system call
chain is a very tempting target for malicious code. The whole process of invoking
system calls can be (and in fact is) attacked in many ways by malicious kernel
code, and will be discussed in more details in chapter 4. Figure 3.6 depicts the
whole system call process.
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3.4 The virtual file system
Linux supports a wide variety of file systems, and new ones can easily be added.
Differences between file systems are made transparent to user space programs by
the use of an interface layer known as the Virtual File System (VFS). The idea
behind the VFS is to put a wide range of information in the kernel to represent the
general features and behaviour of the different types of file systems [32]. The VFS
thus defines the basic conceptual interfaces and data structures that all file systems
support, while the implementation details are hidden in the code of the actual file
systems. To the VFS layer and the rest of the kernel, each file system looks the
same [51].
Because of the VFS, nothing in the kernel needs to understand the underlying
details of the file systems, except the file systems themselves. Figure 3.7 illustrates
how VFS abstracts away the specific file system details and provides user space
with a generic file writing method. A user space program calls the write method
of the system’s standard library (for example, the C standard library, libc), which
in turn calls the generic sys_write() system call. The system call then deter-
mines the actual file writing method to be used and invokes it, causing the data to
be written to physical media. On one side of the system call is the generic VFS
interface, providing the frontend to user space; on the other side of the system call
is the file system-specific backend, dealing with the implementation details [51].
Figure 3.7: Issuing a write() call [51]
3.4.1 Common File Model
Even though the kernel is programmed in C, which is not an object-oriented lan-
guage, the VFS is in fact object-oriented. The VFS objects are implemented as
plain C data structures, where some of the fields contain pointers to the file system-
implemented functions corresponding to the object’s methods [32].
VFS uses a common file model capable of representing all supported file sys-
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tems [32]. The common file model is based on the abstractions found in the tra-
ditional Unix file system: files, directory entries, inodes, and mount points. Thus,
the four primary object types of the VFS are [51]:
• The superblock object, representing a specific mounted file system.
• The inode object, representing a specific file.
• The dentry object, representing a directory entry, a single component of a
path.
• The file object, representing an open file as associated with a process.
Each of the four primary objects types described above contains an operations
object, which describes the methods that the kernel can invoke in the primary ob-
jects [51]. Details of the four primary objects, and the operations objects associated
with them, can be found in Appendix B.
Figure 3.8 [32] helps in illustrating how the concepts and objects of VFS fit to-
gether. Three different processes have opened the same file, process 1 and process
2 use the same hard link2, while process 3 uses a different hard link. Each process
has its own file object, but only two dentry objects are needed, one for each hard
link. The dentry objects refer to the same inode object, which identifies the su-
perblock object. The superblock object and the inode object together identify the
common disk file.
3.4.2 Proc - a special file system
Linux supports a wide range of file systems, and while most of them are conven-
tional file systems, some are treated in a special way.
The /proc file system is a virtual file system that acts as an interface to internal
data structures in the kernel. Each file in the /proc file system is tied to a kernel
function that simulates reading or writing from a real file [51].
The original purpose of the /proc file system was to provide information about
the processes running in the system, but /proc now also provides information about
a wide variety of other system data. This has made the kernel developers view the
/proc file system as a bit of an uncontrolled mess [36], and caused the development
2A filename included in a directory is called a file hard link. Because more than one hard link
can be associated with the same file, a single file may have several filenames.
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Figure 3.8: Interaction between processes and VFS objects [32]
of another special file system, sysfs, which is tasked with providing information
about the system’s devices, thus reducing some of the clutter in /proc.
Because /proc provides information about the processes running on the system,
it is used by a variety of utilities. For example, ps, top and uptime all gather their
information from /proc. By modifying /proc, the visibility of individual processes
can be manipulated, a technique used by some rootkits (see section 4.4.2).
/proc contains one subdirectory for each process running on the system, named
after the process ID (PID). Table 3.1 lists some of the entries common to all pro-
cesses.
The data structures of the /proc file system in special, and the whole VFS in
general, all represent important targets for malicious code. As described in chapter
4, some of the existing kernel level malware used today are able to subvert the
kernel by modifying these structures.
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File Content
cmdline Command line arguments
cpu Current and last cpu in wich it was executed
cwd Link to the current working directory
environ Values of environment variables
exe Link to the executable of this process
fd Directory, which contains all file descriptors
maps Memory maps to executables and library files
mem Memory held by this process
root Link to the root directory of this process
stat Process status
statm Process memory status information
status Process status in human readable form
wchan If CONFIG_KALLSYMS is set, a pre-decoded wchan
smaps Extension based on maps, presenting the rss size for each mapped file
Table 3.1: Process specific entries in /proc
30 CHAPTER 3. THE LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM
Chapter 4
Malicious kernel code
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will give the reader an introduction to some of the concepts of ma-
licious kernel code. Most often this type of code comes in the form of rootkits.
As malicious kernel code and rootkits pose a great threat to integrity of the kernel,
they deserve a chapter of their own.
Many definitions of rootkits may be found: Levine et al. [49] argue that rootk-
its may be characterized as trojan horses. A trojan computer program is usually
defined as something like: “a program with an overt (documented or known) effect
and a covert (undocumented or unexpected) effect” [31]. By calling a rootkit a
trojan, one also implies that the rootkit has an overt effect. This may not always
be correct as the rootkit by nature tries to hide its presence from the user. On the
other hand the rootkit provides functionality to the persons that place a rootkit on
a system. From their point of view it may be correct to characterize it as a trojan.
Another definition is given by the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Secu-
rity) Institute [7]:
A collection of tools (programs) that a hacker1 uses to mask intrusion
obtain administrator-level access to a computer or computer network
Using this definition, the rootkit is a toolkit that is installed on a computer sys-
tem after an attacker has gained administrative access to it. The means by which
1The word “hacker” is much debated. This thesis uses the word hacker as meaning one that is
utilizing malicious code. (A “cracker” might be a better suited, but perhaps less well known term).
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such access is gained is not of interest in this context. Once installed, rootkits mod-
ify the host’s software to provide an attacker with the ability to hide the existence
of chosen processes, files or network connections from other users. They may also
provide convenient back doors through which an attacker may regain privileged
access to the host, or even keystroke logging facilities for spying on other users.
The goal of this chapter is to give the reader insight in how this type of mali-
cious code works, and why it is difficult to detect. Different detection techniques
will be described, followed by a general discussion of their use. At the end we
will try to sum up what seams to be the most promising techniques to counter the
threats posed by malicious code.
4.2 Background
In short, the reason rootkits were first developed, was because breaking into a
computer system usually is a lot of hard work. Attackers therefore wanted to make
sure they didn’t have to do all this work every time they wanted to break into a
specific system. The rootkit mainly functioned as a back door into the system.
The rest of the rootkit was mostly meant to provide means to keep this backdoor
hidden on the computer. Since the arrival of the first rootkits, they have evolved a
lot both in terms of functionality and techniques [40]. This evolution has resulted
in the development of continuously more sophisticated countermeasures, leading
to what one might call an arms race between the “good” and the “bad” guys. In
this race, the “bad” guys, meaning the rootkit creators, have traditionally held the
advantage [57].
4.3 The threat
According to Greg Hoglund, one of the leading experts on rootkits, rootkits are not
only used for malicious activities. In his book “Rootkits - Subverting the Windows
kernel” [40], he gives multiple examples of how rootkits can be used with good
intentions by e.g the government in areas like military warfare, computer security
and crime investigations.
Also, there have been examples of rootkit technology being used by commer-
cial actors as a technique to implement digital rights management systems. The
best known example is Mark Russinovich’s disclosure of Sony’s use of the Aries
rootkit shipped along with many of their music CDs [64]. Russinovich also pointed
out that two of the most popular CD emulation utilities, Alcohol andDaemon Tools,
both make use of rootkit technology [65]. According to a senior official in Mi-
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crosoft Corp.’s security unit [55], by December 2005 more than 20 percent of all
malware removed from Windows XP SP2 (Service Pack 2) systems were stealth
rootkits.
So, again according to Hoglund, rootkits are not inherently bad, they are just
a technology. Since the cornerstone of this technology is keeping things hidden
from a administrator of a computer system, it is important to have knowledge of
the possible severe consequences they may have on the infected system.
4.4 Types of rootkits
Rootkits are usually partitioned into two main categories: user mode, and kernel
mode rootkits [71]. The former is also known as first generation rootkits [40]. The
main difference is that the former does not modify the attacked kernel’s code and
the latter does.
4.4.1 User mode rootkits
These rootkits usually replace critical system utilities such as ps, ls and netstat
with versions that work in favor of the attacker by filtering information returned
from the kernel. In this way an attacker may succeed in hiding files, processes and
network connections of his liking.
Since the kernel in this case remains unmodified, these rootkits are easily dis-
closed by an suspicious administrator by comparing the output from the modified
versions of the ps, ls etc. with unmodified versions of these programs. The correct
information may also be obtained by asking the kernel directly through the proc
file system, as described in section 3.4. It is also quite common for an administra-
tor to monitor important system files with an integrity checker like Tripwire [20]
or AIDE [2].
4.4.2 Kernel mode rootkits
This type of rootkits penetrates the kernel of the running operating system. Once
inside the kernel they are pretty much able to do anything they like. The next sec-
tions describe the most common techniques rootkits of this type use to make the
kernel return incomplete or wrong information when queried by user mode pro-
grams. Figure 4.1 [57] sums up most of the techniques used by the most common
rootkits today. There may be more known and unknown techniques than the ones
listed below, but these are the most used and widely discussed techniques that the
authors have found.
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Figure 4.1: Rootkits and their techniques
[57]
Entering the kernel
To be able to modify the kernel, the rootkit first have to get access to the kernel
symbols and structures. This is usually achieved in one of two ways: Through
the loading of kernel modules or by writing directly to the memory of the running
kernel via the /dev/kmem2 interface [71].
The use of loadable kernel modules (LKMs) is a very useful feature of the
Linux kernel, but it also serves as the entry point of most of today’s rootkits [71].
By constructing the rootkit as an LKM, the rootkit is easily loaded into the kernel
and thereby automatically given full access to all of the kernel. From here it is only
up to the rootkit creator what kernel code he wants to modify or add.
The /dev/kmem device file is a special character device in the linux kernel that
enables user mode processes with administrator privileges to access memory as it
was a regular file. SucKIT [18] is a rootkit which inserts itself into the kernel by
patching /dev/kmem, effectively writing itself into kernel memory.
Surviving a reboot
When the rootkit inserts itself into kernel memory, it is lost if the system reboots.
Some rootkits try to avoid this by not acting as standalone LKMs, but insted inject
their code into a suitable kernel module already installed on the system. By pig-
gybacking on another module, the rootkit is automatically reloaded into the kernel
2The /dev/kmem provides read/write access to the virtual memory space. /dev/mem provides the
same access to physical memory.
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during the boot sequence. To accomplish this the rootkit has to modify a binary
LKM file on the disk, and the attacker therefore would be an easy prey for an
attentive integrity checker.
Common rootkit techniques
Below follows a description of the most common techniques used by rootkits.
Overwriting syscall jumps This is the most common technique utilized by rootk-
its, as can be seen in figure 4.1. Overwriting a syscall jump simply means
to change one of the addresses in the system call table to point to a function
provided by the rootkit (see section 3.3.6). With this technique a rootkit can
intercept a system call, run its own code and then, if it wants, call the original
function. This is mostly used to filter information when a user process, such
as ls, requests information from the kernel [71]. By filtering the information
returned by e.g the system call sys_getdents, the rootkit is able to hide cer-
tain files or folders. Being the most commonly used method, this is also the
one thing all rootkit detectors try to look for (see section 4.5).
Adding new syscall jumps Since most rootkits is detected when modifying the
system call table, some rootkits use a technique where they instead modify
the entry in the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) used in system call invoca-
tions. As described in section 3.3.5, a system call can be invoked by issuing
a software interrupt using the int $0x80 assembly instruction. The soft-
ware interrupt handler is defined in the IDT, and by replacing this handler a
new system call table can be created. In this way the original syscall table
is left unchanged, and anyone checking for changes in the original table will
find nothing unusual.
Modifying kernel text In this context, the kernel text refers to the code segment
of the kernel resident in memory (see section 3.3.3). By changing this code,
a rootkit changes the application logic of the kernel code. This can lead to an
almost infinite range of new behaviour in the kernel. The phantasmagoria
rootkit uses this technique to change the code of the kernel’s scheduling
mechanism, allowing processes to be scheduled for processor time, but at
the same time removing them from the kernel’s list of currently running
processes.
Hooking Hooking means to alter the call chain invoked by a kernel procedure to
include one of its own functions in the chain [23]. This is a general technique
that can be applied in many places in the kernel. The taskigt uses this to
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grant administrative privileges to any process that reads from a particular
proc entry [57].
Manipulating the Virtual File System This is a technique utilized by the newest
version of adore: adore-ng [1]. Adore-ng modifies the proc file system so
that the rootkit’s own functions is called whenever someone reads from proc
entries. By doing so, Adore-ng is able to hide processes from view.
Adding inet protocol handler 3 This means that the rootkits registers its own
handler to process special packets arriving at the network interface. The
rootkit manipulates the TCP/IP stack by changing the original network prot-
col handler with a version of its own. When a packet comes in, the rootkit
analyzes the packet, if it is “evil”, it is processed by the rootkit, if not, the
original handler is called [71]. The knark [10] rootkit uses this functional-
ity to spawn privileged processes running programs of its own choice, when
certain kinds of “evil” packets are received [57].
4.5 Detecting kernel mode rootkits
As described in the section about rootkit techniques( 4.4.2) above, these kinds of
attacks can be very hard to detect, and sometimes the attacker may be left unde-
tected for months and years before he is detected [71].
4.5.1 Preventing entry
The best prevention would be if the rootkits were never allowed to enter a system.
The problem is knowing which “doors” to guard. The two main entry points are
/dev/kmem and LKMs, as was shown in section4.4.2.
Kruegel et al. describes how malicious modules can be detected before being
loaded into the kernel, by doing static binary analysis of the module binaries [47].
This approach is based on the observation that the runtime behaviour of regular
kernel modules differs significantly from the behaviour of kernel-level rootkits,
and that the behaviour can be determined trough binary analysis.
To counter the use of the /dev/kmem entry point, the Red Hat Linux distribu-
tion removed this special character device from its kernel some time ago, but it is
still present in most other distributions. Even if /dev/kmem is removed, it is still
possible to write to /dev/mem. This device file is not easily removed, as several
3inet(Internet protocol family) is a collection of protocols layered atop the Internet Protocol (IP)
transport layer, and utilizing the Internet address format.
4.5. DETECTING KERNEL MODE ROOTKITS 37
applications rely on this device (an example is the XFree86 window system, which
uses /dev/mem to access the video card). And even if both /dev/kmem and /dev/mem
are removed, there are still techniques that a privileged user can use to access the
memory. More details regarding those techniques can be found in [71].
4.5.2 Searching for anomalies
Rootkits often leave traces to their whereabouts. Detecting them is often just a
question of knowing where to look. One might look for anomalies like unusual
network traffic, open ports, network cards in promiscuous mode, abnormal disk
usage, log file entries, mismatches between hard link counts and the output from
ls [71].
Saint Jude is a tool that is much used for anomaly detection [33]. It is self
learning in the sense that it first observes the normal behaviour of the system, then
creates a set of rule based policies based on the observations. The system is then
monitored for behaviour that violates the policies created.
Most of the rootkits have very specific behaviours that may reveal their exis-
tence on a system. One well known example is how knark makes use of the signal
mechanism in Linux. A signal is a short message that may be sent to a process,
used to make the process aware that a specific event has occured [32]. Signal
number 31 is normally unused, but if a process receives this signal when knark is
installed, the process gets hidden. The use of signal 31 is thus a good indication of
the presence of knark.
Examining call execution
Patchfinder 2 is a tool for the Windows family of operating systems, which exam-
ines the execution of call sequences in the kernel functions [67]. The number of
calls made in each function is recorded as Patchfinder starts up. Then the number
of calls made is periodically recorded as the system is running, and compared to
the ones in the baseline to reveal any discrepancies.
4.5.3 Hidden files and processes
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, most rootkits include the capability to
hide files, directories and processes. Detecting these hidden resources can be done
by directly obtaining information from kernel structures, without relying on the
possible compromised system calls of the operating system.
This technique has been proven effective by another tool for the Windows op-
erating systems, RootkitRevealer [66]. RootkitRevealer compares the information
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provided through the Windows API with the information obtained from the raw
contents of the file system.
Another technique used for detecting hidden processes, is using a kernel mod-
ule for hooking into the kernels scheduling routine. Because the hidden processes
must be given processor time by the operating system’s scheduler in order to be
useful to the attacker, the scheduler have to get some knowledge about them at
some time. By hooking into the scheduler, it can be detected if the scheduler has
been modified to also schedule processes that were previously removed from the
task_array4 list [34].
4.5.4 Hidden kernel modules
The modules running in the kernel are kept in a linked list of module objects, aptly
named modules. To locate kernel modules that a rootkit has removed from the
modules list, one may search the memory area for objects that seem to have the
structural layout of a module [71]. In Phrack Magazine #61 [53], a kernel module
named MODULE_HUNTER was presented, using such a technique to search the
kernel for hidden modules.
4.5.5 Integrity checking the kernel memory
Information about the memory of the running kernel can normally be extracted
from two places: The /dev/kmem special device file, and using a module loaded
into the kernel [34]. Neither of these options is ideal, as they both operate within
an environment that may already be subverted, and are both already dependent of
the integrity of the kernel they are to check. Nevertheless, several tools performing
integrity checks of the kernel from within the (possibly compromised) system exist
[15] [33] [17].
The approach usually taken by integrity checking tools, is to obtain a copy of
important kernel structures at startup, comparing the subsequent memory scans to
it. Much of the memory of a running system is highly dynamic. Identifying which
parts of memory to check is therefore one of the biggest challenges in this type of
rootkit detection. Below is a listing of some important kernel structures that are
not expected to change during system execution:
Kernel text This is the area of memory containing the compiled kernel code.
4an array in the Linux kernel that contains pointers to all the process descriptors (see section 4.4.2
4.6. DISCUSSION OF THE DETECTION METHODS 39
LKM text The code of LKMs resides in dynamically allocated memory areas, that
are allocated when the LKMs are loaded into the kernel and freed when the
LKMs are unloaded from the kernel.
System call table This structure is targeted by most of the rootkits we know of
today, and should not be modified in a healthy kernel.
Interrupt descriptor table This is the place to make changes if a rootkit wants
to trick the kernel into using a different system call table. This table also
handles the other kernel interrupts, and should be kept static.
Virtual File System While the VFS is highly dynamic, allowing for run-time reg-
istration of the function handlers associated with the particular file systems,
those handlers are usually not expected to change after first being registered.
As an example, the function handlers used for the operations of the /proc file
system, should remain static through the exectution of the system.
4.6 Discussion of the detection methods
The ways of detecting rootkits described above all have their pros and cons. Below,
some positive and negative aspects of the various methods will be discussed.
The static binary analysis used by Kruegel et al. [47], is not only a detection
method, it is also a prevention mechanism as the malicious code is detected prior
entering the kernel. In their testing, almost 1000 kernel modules were analysed;
no false positives were detected, and 8 commonly known rootkits were correctly
identified. While the numbers are impressive, it is an open question if it would
be possible for a rootkit developer to fool the detection algorithm given the details
of how it works. Also, the algorithm used for binary analysis is based on the
behaviour of existing rootkits, its usefulnes in providing protection against new
techniques can thus be questioned.
The main problem with the anomaly detection techniques described in sec-
tion 4.5.2, seems to be that they all rely on the attacker having made some sort of a
mistake when designing his rootkit, causing the system to behave in an anomalous
way. While it is certainly true for some rootkits, it is unlikely to be true for all.
Checking for known anomalies caused by a particular rootkit, is in fact a form
of signature detection. As such, it has the same properties of being effective against
known threats but as good as useless against new threats.
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Rutkowska’s findings when examining the call chains of kernel functions, showed
that it was indeed possible to detect abnormal chains of function calls, which indi-
cated that the kernel had been subverted. This method does however suffer from the
natural variations in the execution of functions, caused by conditional statements
within the code, making it crucial to define what should be considered acceptable
variations within the monitored system [40].
Integrity checking of vital kernel structures, seems like a sound approach, ca-
pable of detecting both known and unknown rootkits. The approach is not without
challenges, as the structure vital for the kernel integrity needs to be identified, and
a reliable way of inspecting their state must be provided.
Most implementations are limited not only by the techniques they use, but of
the placement of the detection mechanism. By placing the detection mechanism
within the system to be monitored, the integrity of the mechanism itself and of
the data on which it operates, can be questioned. Some of the research efforts
described in section 2.4 address this problem, using various methods for ensuring
both the safety of the detection mechanism and the correctness of the data used
by it. The Copilot project is one example [57], using a PCI card based monitor.
Another example from section 2.4 is the Livewire IDS [37], which uses virtual
machines for securing the detection mechanism, while maintaining access to the
entire hardware state of the monitored host. The suitability of virtualization as a
platform for doing integrity analysis, is further explored throughout part II of this
thesis.
Chapter 5
Virtualization
5.1 Introduction
Today, the term virtualization is used to cover a wide range of ideas, concepts and
technologies.
The virtual memory abstraction found in all recent Unix and Linux systems, is
a good example of how modern operating systems are already using virtualization
techniques (see section 3.3.3). Also, in the multiprogramming model used by most
modern operating system, each process can be thought of as having its own virtual
processor while they in reality share a single physical processor.
Virtualization encompasses such a broad range of ideas, that it is hard to pro-
vide a strict, formal definition of it. Nanda and Chitueh [74] define virtualization
as: “(...) a technology that combines or divides computing resources to present one
or many operating environments using methodologies like hardware and software
partitioning or aggregation, partial or complete machine simulation, emulation,
time-sharing, and many others.” Singh provides a similar definition [73]: “Virtual-
ization is a framework or methodology of dividing the resources of a computer into
multiple execution environments, by applying one or more concepts or technolo-
gies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, partial or complete
machine simulation, emulation, quality of service, and many others.”, or as he later
puts it: “virtualization abstracts out things.”
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5.2 Virtual machines
A key concept of virtualization in all its variations, is the concept of the virtual ma-
chine. The virtual machine is a software abstraction, for which we write software
to run upon.
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Figure 5.1: Computer system structure [63]
Figure 5.1 shows howmodern computing systems are composed of layers, con-
sisting of the hardware, an operating system and application programs running on
top of the operating system.
Virtualization software abstracts virtual machines by interposing a layer at var-
ious places in the system [63]. Using this notion of virtualization layers, the set of
virtualization technologies can be partitioned into three types:
1. Hardware-level virtualization
This is the traditional form of virtualization, where the virtualization layer
is located right on top of the hardware, resembling a real machine (see fig-
ure 5.2). By replicating the hardware, all software written for it will run in
the virtual machine, effectively allowing multiple operating systems to be
run concurrently. Examples include VMware Server/Workstation, Xen and
Parallels.
2. Operating system-level virtualization
Here the virtualization layer is situated between the operating system and
the application programs. The virtual machine environments are all running
on the host operating system, sharing the same kernel. This is sometimes
referred to as lightweight virtualization or container-based virtualization.
Some examples are FreeBSD Jails, Solaris Containers and OpenVZ.
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Figure 5.2: Hardware-level virtualization [63]
3. High-level language virtual machines
This type places the virtualization layer on top of the operating system, as an
application program. The virtual machine implements an abstract machine
definition, allowing application written in the high-level language and com-
piled for the virtual machine to run on it. The Java Virtual Machine is an
example of this kind of virtual machine.
5.3 Hardware-level virtualization
In this thesis, virtualization will be employed as a tool for checking the integrity of
the operating system’s kernel, making the hardware-level the appropriate level of
virtualization.
5.3.1 Virtual machine monitors
In their classic 1974 paper [59], Popek and Goldberg define a virtual machine (VM)
as: “an efficient, isolated duplicate of the real machine”. Multiple VMs can be run
concurrently on a single hardware platform, each instance running an operating
system of its own.
The Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) is the system software responsible for
creating and controlling the virtual machines, and the environment in which they
run.
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Popek and Goldberg identified three essential characteristics of a VMM:
1. The VMM provides an environment for programs which is essentially iden-
tical to the original machine.
2. Programs that run in this environment show at worst only minor decreases
in speed.
3. The VMM is in complete control of the system resources.
The first of these characteristics ensures that a program executing on a virtual
machine runs the same as it would if it was running directly on the original ma-
chine. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule. Differences caused by the
availability of systems resources, such as the amount of available memory, may
lead to the program performing differently. The intervening nature of the VMM
may also cause differences related to timing dependencies. The second character-
istic is an efficiency requirement, and is what separates VMMs from hardware em-
ulators and simulators. Most of the virtual processor’s instructions must therefore
be executed directly by the real processor without the intervention of the VMM.
The third characteristic is that of resource control. The VMM should ensure that
none of the VMs can access any resource not explicitly allocated to them, and that
the VMM can regain control of previously allocated resources.
5.3.2 Virtual machine environments
The virtual machine systems of today typically use one of two different approaches
to build the virtual machine environment. In type I environments, the VMM runs
directly on the machine hardware (see figure 5.3).
The type I VMM, also known as the standalone VMM, can be thought of as an
operating system kernel with additional mechanisms to support virtual machines.
It requires drivers for hardware peripherals, and performs scheduling and resource
allocation for the virtual machines. Typically, a type I VMM is very small, making
it easier to ensure the robustness and security properties of the VMM.
In type II environments, however, the VMM runs as a a normal process on a
host operating system, as shown in figure 5.4. It is thus able to take advantage of
the host operating system for memory management, processor scheduling, resource
allocation, and hardware drivers [61]. However, the added comfort provided by the
type II environment, comes with a price: Security vulnerabilites in the host OS,
will also render the VMM and the virtual machines vulnerable.
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Mode Linux [7] fit in this category. This article considers 
the application of type II virtual machine environments in 
system security. 
Figure 1. Type I virtual machine environment 
Figure 2. Type II virtual machine environment 
 Common Intel-like PC processors provide no adequate 
support for virtualization. Consequently, virtualization 
overhead can be as high as 50% of total computing time 
[5, 7, 18]. However, recent research significantly reduced 
this cost, achieving overhead levels under 10%, as shown 
in [14, 15, 19]. For instance, VMware [18] adopts a 
technique of code rewriting that consists of dynamically 
rewriting parts of the code being loaded by the guest 
kernel, in order to adapt it to the virtual machine 
environment and thus obtain a better performance. 
Recently, the Xen project [2] proposed and built a type I 
virtual machine environment in which average costs 
remain under 3% for virtualizing Linux, FreeBSD, and 
Windows XP. These works open many perspectives on 
the effective use of virtual machines in production 
environments. 
3. Intrusion detection 
 An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) continuously 
collects and analyzes data from a computing system, 
aiming to detect intrusive actions. With respect to the 
origin of analyzed data, there are two main approaches for 
intrusion detection [1]: Network-based IDS (NIDS) – 
based on watching the network traffic flowing through the 
systems to monitor, and Host-based IDS (HIDS) – based 
on watching local activity on a host, like processes, 
network connections, system calls, logs, etc. The main 
weakness of host-based intrusion detection is its relative 
fragility: in order to collect system activity data, a HIDS 
agent should be installed in the machine to monitor. This 
agent can be deactivated or tampered by a successful 
intruder, in order to mask his/her presence, turning the 
detection system useless. 
 Techniques used for analyzing collected data in order 
to detect intrusions can be classified in: signature 
detection, when collected data is compared to a base of 
previously known attacks patterns (signatures), and 
anomaly detection, when collected data are compared to 
previously collected data representing the normal activity 
of the system. Normality deviations are then signaled as 
threats. 
 Several papers describe techniques for anomaly-based 
intrusion detection which uses the sequences of system 
calls generated by processes. In the proposal presented in 
[9, 12], the system calls issued by a process are recorded 
in sequence, without their parameters. This execution 
history is then transformed in sequences of system calls of 
length k. The collection of all possible sequences of 
length k defines the normal behavior of that process. Any 
sequence of k system calls issued by that process and not 
present in its normal behavior is considered an anomaly, 
or a threat. 
 To illustrate that technique, let us consider a process 
which issued the following system calls during its 
execution: 
[open read mmap mmap open read mmap] 
Adopting k=3, the following set of sequences is 
obtained: 
 (open read mmap) (read mmap mmap)
 (mmap mmap open) (mmap open read)
 If the process issues a different sequence, like (open 
open read), it should be placed under suspicion. 
Despite the set of system calls to be system-dependent 
and the capture of the complete behavior of a process to 
be potentially laborious, this method presents good 
detection efficiency, as shown by their authors. 
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Figure 5.3: Type I virtual machine environment [48]
5.3.3 Virtualization techniques
In this section, the classical techniques used in implementing VMMs will b de-
scribed, and some obstacles posed by the x86 architecture will discussed. Finally,
some extensions to the x86 architecture that allow for hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion, will be described.
Architectural requirements
Robin and Irvine [61] cite Goldberg [38] as having identified the key architectural
features of hardware pertitent to virtual machines:
• two processor modes of operation,
• a method for non-pri ileged pr grams to call privileged system routines,
• a memory relocation or p ote tion m chanism such as segmentation or pag-
ing, and
• asynchronous interrupts to allow the I/O system to communicate with the
CPU.
As stated above, the processor needs at least two modes of operation, a privi-
leged mode and a unprivileged m de. In the privileged mode, the complete instruc-
tion set is available for the processor, while in unprivileged mode, only a subset is.
When instructions that read or write privileged state execute when the processor is
in unprivileged mode, they are made to trap. When a trap occurs, the instruction is
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Mode Linux [7] fit in this category. This article considers 
the application of type II virtual machine environments in 
system security. 
Figure 1. Type I virtual machine environment 
Figure 2. Type II virtual machine environment 
 Common Intel-like PC processors provide no adequate 
support for virtualization. Consequently, virtualization 
overhead can be as high as 50% of total computing time 
[5, 7, 18]. However, recent research significantly reduced 
this cost, achieving overhead levels under 10%, as shown 
in [14, 15, 19]. For instance, VMware [18] adopts a 
technique of code rewriting that consists of dynamically 
rewriting parts of the code being loaded by the guest 
kernel, in order to adapt it to the virtual machine 
environment and thus obtain a better performance. 
Recently, the Xen project [2] proposed and built a type I 
virtual machine environment in which average costs 
remain under 3% for virtualizing Linux, FreeBSD, and 
Windows XP. These works open many perspectives on 
the effective use of virtual machines in production 
environments. 
3. Intrusion detection 
 An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) continuously 
collects and analyzes data from a computing system, 
aiming to detect intrusive actions. With respect to the 
origin of analyzed data, there are two main approaches for 
intrusion detection [1]: Network-based IDS (NIDS) – 
based on watching the network traffic flowing through the 
systems to monitor, and Host-based IDS (HIDS) – based 
on watching local activity on a host, like processes, 
network connections, system calls, logs, etc. The main 
weakness of host-based intrusion detection is its relative 
fragility: in order to collect system activity data, a HIDS 
agent should be installed in the machine to monitor. This 
agent can be deactivated or tampered by a successful 
intruder, in order to mask his/her presence, turning the 
detection system useless. 
 Techniques used for analyzing collected data in order 
to detect intrusions can be classified in: signature 
detection, when collected data is compared to a base of 
previously known attacks patterns (signatures), and 
anomaly detection, when collected data are compared to 
previously collected data representing the normal activity 
of the system. Normality deviations are then signaled as 
threats. 
 Several papers describe techniques for anomaly-based 
intrusion detection which uses the sequences of system 
calls generated by processes. In the proposal presented in 
[9, 12], the system calls issued by a process are recorded 
in sequence, without their parameters. This execution 
history is then transformed in sequences of system calls of 
length k. The collection of all possible sequences of 
length k defines the normal behavior of that process. Any 
sequence of k system calls issued by that process and not 
present in its normal behavior is considered an anomaly, 
or a threat. 
 To illustrate that technique, let us consider a process 
which issued the following system calls during its 
execution: 
[open read mmap mmap open read mmap] 
Adopting k=3, the following set of sequences is 
obtained: 
 (open read mmap) (read mmap mmap)
 (mmap mmap open) (mmap open read)
 If the process issues a different sequence, like (open 
open read), it should be placed under suspicion. 
Despite the set of system calls to be system-dependent 
and the capture of the complete behavior of a process to 
be potentially laborious, this method presents good 
detection efficiency, as shown by their authors. 
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Figure 5.4: Type II virtual machine environment [48]
passed on to the VMM, which emulates the trapping instruction against the virtual
machine state. This technique is known as trap-a -emulate [28].
Some sort of memory protection mechanism is necessary to deny guest ac-
cesses to in-memory privileged state. VMMs typically maintain shadow page ta-
bles for use by the guest, usi g hardware page pro ection mechanisms to trap and
emulate memory accesses [28].
The x86 architecture
As mentioned above, some processor instruction should not be executed directly
on the processor because they expose privileged state. These instructions are called
sensitive instructions. For an architecture to be virtualizable, sensitive instructions
must trap when executed in unprivileged mode, or as Popek and Goldberg [59]
puts it: “(...) a virtual machine monitor may be constructed if the set of sensi-
tive instructions for that computer is a subset of the set of privileged instructions”.
The x86 architecture does, however, contain several sensitive, unprivileged instruc-
tions. After examining the instruction set of the fifth generation x86 processor (the
Pentium), Robin and Irvine [61] identified a total of seventeen such instructions.
As a result, the lack of full virtualization support in the x86 architecture has
necessitated the development of alternative approaches.
Binary translation. Executing instructions on an interpreter as opposed to a
physical processor, bypasses the problems of x86 virtualization. An interpreter
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could prevent leakage of privileged state, and correcty implement the sensitive
non-privileged instructions [28]. However, interpretation does not fullfill the per-
formance requirement of Popek and Goldberg; an interpreter using a fetch-decode-
execute cycle could use hundreds of actual physical instructions per guest instruc-
tion. Binary translation, however, operates on larger pieces of code and caches
the results for future use. By using a suitable binary translator, the performance
requirement may be met.
Adams and Agesen [28] describe the binary translator used in VMware as hav-
ing the following properties:
• Binary. Input is binary x86 code, not source code.
• Dynamic. Translation happens at runtime.
• On demand. Code is translated only when it is about to execute.
• System level. The translator makes no assumptions about the guest code.
• Subsetting. While the translator’s input is the full x86 instruction set, the
output is only a safe subset.
• Adaptive. The translated code is adjusted in response to guest behaviour
changes, improving overall efficiency.
Paravirtualization. A different approach in virtualizing the x86 architecture, is
to relax the requirements of full virtualization, and use a virtual machine abstrac-
tion that is similar but not identical to the underlying hardware platform [30]. This
approach, which has been dubbed paravirtualization, is the approach taken by Xen
(see chapter 6).
Paravirtualization promises higher performance and a simpler VMM, but be-
cause of the virtual machine not being identical to the underlying hardware, par-
avirtualization does require modification of the guest operating system. Because
of this, the only operating systems that are likely to be supported, are those with an
open source license.
x86 architecture extensions. Both Intel and AMD recently introduced architec-
tural extensions to their x86 processors, making classical trap-and-emulate virtual-
ization possible on the x86 architecture.
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Adams and Agesen [28] have compared the performance of a VMM imple-
mentation using these extensions with the performance offered by their BT-based
software VMM. For some workloads the hardware VMM outperforms the soft-
ware VMM, but, perhaps surprisingly, not for all. This may suggest that the recent
hardware support for virtualization will be complementing existing software tech-
niques, rather than replacing them completely.
5.4 Virtualization solutions
There are many virtual machine solutions available today. Here, only a brief
overview of some of the most prevalent ones will be given.
5.4.1 VMware
VMware has several virtualization products, VMware workstation and VMware
ESX server being the most interesting ones.
VMware workstation is a type II VM, running within a host operating system,
while VMware ESX server is a standalone, type I VM, running directly on top of
the hardware.
Both provide full virtualization through binary translation, and are capable of
running most x86 operating systems as guests. The VMware products are dis-
tributed as binaries, with no source code available.
5.4.2 Xen
Xen is an open source virtual machine monitor, originally created at the University
of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.
As described above, Xen uses paravirtualization to achieve high performance.
Xen has since version 3 also supported classical virtualization using the recent
x86 architectural extensions, thus enabling unmodified operating systems to run
on it. Chapter 6 will provide the reader with a more detailed description of the Xen
hypervisor.
5.4.3 Parallels
While Parallels are perhaps best known for their Desktop forMac product, allowing
Microsoft Windows to be run on Mac OS X, they also offer Parallels Workstation
for use on Microsoft Windows or Linux.
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While Parallels use a lightweight hypervisor concept similar to Xen, they do
not use paravirtualization, instead relying on the x86 architecture extensions from
Intel.
5.4.4 KVM
KVM is a type II virtualization environment for Linux, using the x86 extensions
from AMD and Intel to achieve full virtualization capabilities.
As shown in figure 5.5, KVM is implemented as a Linux kernel module, using
Linux as the hypervisor. Even though KVM is a rather recent effort, it has already
been included in the mainline Linux kernel tree, giving it considerable momentum.
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Figure 5.5: A kvm based architecture [43]
5.5 Virtualization and security
Some properties of virtualization are especially relevant to the field of information
security.
5.5.1 Isolation
The various variants of virtualization offer differing degrees of isolation. Virtual
machines running in operating system-level virtualization solutions, share the same
kernel as their host systems, and a compromise of the kernel will affect the host
system and all the virtual machines running there.
Hardware-level virtualization provides strong isolation, with each virtual ma-
chine running in its own hardware protection domain. Code running in a virtual
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machine cannot access code running in the hypervisor or in some other virtual
machine.
5.5.2 Software reliability
The correctness of the VMM is fundamental to the issue of reliability. As Goldberg
[39] points out, it is a reasonable assumption that the VMM is correct, because
the VMM is likely to be a very small program with limited functionality. While
this certainly holds true for a Type I VMM, the reliability of a Type II VMM is
highly dependent on the underlying host operating system. As Robin and Irvine
[61] observe, flaws in host OS design and implementation will render the virtual
machine monitor and all its virtual machines vulnerable.
Chapter 6
The Xen virtualization technology
We have chosen Xen as the virtualization solution for this thesis. This chapter will
describe the concepts and architecture of Xen, focusing on the issues most relevant
to this thesis. Xen, starting out as a research project at the University of Cambridge,
is today being actively developed by a large community of open source developers.
Section 6.1 gives an overview of the Xen architecture, while section 6.2 takes
an in-depth look at the Xen hypervisor.
6.1 Architectural overview
Xen has become widely known for its use of the paravirtualization technique,
which obtains high performance by modifying the guest operating systems. Since
version 3.0, Xen also provides support for unmodified guest operating systems,
using the x86 architecture extensions from Intel and AMD (see section 5.3.3,
page 47). Figure 6.1 gives an architectural overview of Xen 3.0.
In the figure, four virtual machines run on top of a virtual machine monitor,
termed the Xen Hypervisor, or just the hypervisor for short. Xen’s hypervisor is
quite small, providing only basic control operations [30]. The virtual machines
are identified as VM0-4, but in Xen-terminology the term domain is often used to
refer to a virtual machine. The following gives a short description of all of the
components shown in the figure:
VM0 is the initial virtual machine, and is created automatically at boot time. It is
usually referred to as domain 0 [30], or just dom0. Domain 0 is a required
51
52 CHAPTER 6. THE XEN VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGY
part of any Xen-based server and runs the application software that manages
Xen. The operating system used in VM0 is a modified version of Linux.
VM1-3 are unprivileged domains, usually referred to as domUs. In this figure
VM1 and VM2 run paravirtualized version of Linux, while VM3 runs an
unmodified guest operating system using the x86 architecture extensions of
either Intel (VT) or AMD (AMDV). The VT and AMDV extensions are
so similar that Xen has developed a common interface layer, the Hardware
Virtual Machine (HVM) layer, and domains running unmodified operating
systems are often referred to as HVMs.
Split device driver The figure also depicts Xen’s split device driver architecture.
Xen uses two co-operating drivers to provide the illusion of a virtual device,
the frontend driver and the backend driver. The frontend drivers runs in the
unpriviliged domains, while the backend drivers run in domain 0, which is
usually the only domain with access to the real device hardware.
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Figure 6.1: Xen architecture [60]
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6.2 Xen - the hypervisor
6.2.1 CPU
The protection model of the x86 architecture consists of four privilege levels [44],
where privilege level 0 is the highest and privilege level 3 the lowest. The privilege
levels can be interpreted as rings of protection, as depicted in figure 6.2.
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In this example, the highest privilege level 0 (at the center of the diagram) is used for 
segments that contain the most critical code modules in the system, usually the 
kernel of an operating system. The outer rings (with progressively lower privileges) 
are used for segments that contain code modules for less critical software. 
Code modules in lower privilege segments can only access modules operating at 
higher privilege segments by means of a tightly controlled and protected interface 
called a gate. Attempts to access higher privilege segments without going through a 
protection gate and without having sufficient access rights causes a general-protec-
tion exception (#GP) to be generated.
If an operating system or executive uses this multilevel protection mechanism, a call 
to a procedure that is in a more privileged protection level than the calling procedure 
is handled in a similar manner as a far call (see Section 6.3.2, “Far CALL and RET 
Operation”). The differences are as follows:
• The segment selector provided in the CALL instruction references a special data 
structure called a call gate descriptor. Among other things, the call gate 
descriptor provides the following:
— access rights information
— the segment selector for the code segment of the called procedure
— an offset into the code segment (that is, the instruction pointer for the called 
procedure)
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Figure 6.2: x86 protection rings [44]
Even though four rings are provided, most modern operating systems use only
two. The kernel code typically runs in ring 0, because this is the only ring that can
execute privileged instructions, while application code runs in ring 3.
In Xen, the hypervisor runs n ring 0, wh the guest operating systems are
demoted to run in ring 1. The applications still run in ring 3 (see figure 6.3).
This means that all privileged instructions, such as installing a new page table, or
yielding the proc ssor when idle, must be ha dled by Xen. The guest operating
systems use hypercalls to invoke operations in Xen, analogous to the use of system
calls in conventional operating systems. As described in section 3.3.6, a system
call is a way to move from user space ring 3) to kernel s ac (ring 0). Likewise,
hypercalls are used in order to move from ring 1, where the guest OS runs, to ring
0, where Xen runs.
As an example of the use of hypercalls, a guest OS might make a hypercall to
request a set of page-table updates, which Xen then validates and executes before
returning control to the guest OS [30].
Paravirtualization makes it possible to implement various optimizations by
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Figure 6.3: Xen and the protection rings
modifying the guest OS. The system call mechanism provided by an operating
system is usually implemented via the use of a software exception, which would
necessitate a trap into Xen, since the OS is running in ring 1. By allowing the guest
OS to register an exception handler that is accessed directly by the processor with-
out indirecting via ring 0, the performance of system calls is greatly improved [30].
Not all privileged instructions are replaced by hypercalls, some instead use the
classical trap-and-emulate technique described in section 5.3.3.
6.2.2 Event channels
Communication from Xen to a domain is provided through an asynchronous event
mechanism, called event channels. Events are the Xen equivalents of hardware
interrupts, and the guest OS can map these events onto its normal interrupt dispatch
mechanisms. Just as hardware interrupts can be disabled on the processor, events
too may be disabled by setting a software flag [25] [30].
6.2.3 Memory
The complexity of memory management in modern computer systems, makes vir-
tualizing memory a challenging task. Traditionally, this has been solved through
the use of shadow page tables, where the hypervisor provides the guest OS with an
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independent copy of page tables, not visible to the hardware memory-management
unit (MMU).
Although Xen does support shadow page tables, it uses a different approach
in its default configuration. By registering the guest OS page tables directly with
the MMU, and giving the guest OS read-only access to them, Xen avoids the com-
plexity and overhead from using shadow page tables. When the guest OS needs to
make an update to a page table, it issues a request to Xen via a hypercall. Xen then
validates the request, and applies the update if it is deemed safe.
Physical memory
Xen needs only a small portion of physical memory for its own use, the rest of the
physical memory is available for allocation to domains. Physical memory is always
allocated to the domains at a page granularity, and Xen tracks both the ownership
and use of each page. Each domain has a maximum and a current memory alloca-
tion. If the domain is in need for more memory, it may adjust its current memory
allocation up to the maximum limit. If a domain wishes to save resources, it may
reduce its current memory allocation.
Since Xen allocates memory on a page-level granularity, it cannot guarantee
that a domain will receive a contiguous stretch of physical memory. However,
most modern operating systems expect memory to be comprised of at most a few
large contiguous extents. To help alleviate this, Xen introduces a distinction be-
tween machine memory and pseudo-physical memory. Machine memory refers to
all of the actual hardware memory installed in the machine. The machine mem-
ory is comprised of 4kB machine page frames, which are numbered consecutively
starting from 0. An actual page frame is thus referred to with the same machine
frame number (mfn) within Xen or any domain.
In contrast, pseudo-physical memory is a per-domain abstraction, providing the
guest with the illusion of contiguous memory, even though the underlying machine
page frames may be sparsely allocated and laid out in any order. Mapping from
pseudo-physical memory to machine memory is the responsibility of the guest OS,
which must maintain a physical-to-machine table. Xen fascilitates the inverse map-
ping by providing a machine-to-physical table that is readable by all domains.
Memory sharing
Memory can be shared between domains, making communications between both
unprivileged and privileged domains possible. The split device driver architecture
discussed in section 6.1 is actually implemented through the use of shared memory.
Memory is shared through the use of grant tables. Each domain maintains a grant
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table, which is used to tell Xen what kind of permissions other domains are granted
on its pages.
6.2.4 Xenstore
Xenstore is a centralized configuration database that is accessible by all domains.
It consists of a collection of key-value pairs stored in a hierarchical namespace,
and is used to store information about the running domains and as a mechanism for
controlling domains. Uses of Xenstore include:
• setting up shared memory regions and event channels
• notifying the guest OS of control events
• reporting status information from the guest OS
Each domain has its own directory hierarchy in the store, containing data re-
lated to the domain’s configuration. Guests have only write access to the contents
of their own directories, but may read any part of the store, but only if it has per-
mission to do so. Domain 0 may however, by being a privileged domain, read or
write anywhere in the store.
Domains can be notified about changes in subtrees of the store by registering
callback functions within the store. The callback function is invoked when any-
thing at or below that point in the hierarchy changes.
6.2.5 Devices
In section 6.1, it was noted that Xen uses a split device driver architecture. Fig-
ure 6.4 gives a more detailed view of its implementation.
As seen in the figure, the front- and backend layers contain drivers for various
types of devices, including network and block devices. The frontend drivers appear
as real devices to the guest operating system, but since it does not have access to
the physical hardware, all IO requests from the guest kernel are delegated to the
backend.
The backend driver is then responsible for ensuring that the requests are well-
formed and do not violate isolation guarantees. After validating the requests, the
backend then issues them to the real device hardware. By keeping most of the
complexity in the backend, the frontend drivers can be kept relatively simple.
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Figure 6.4: Split device driver diagram [62]
After a frontend driver is initialized , an event channel and a shared memory
area are set up for communication with the backend. The event channel is used
for asynchronous notifications of activity, while the shared memory is used for
passing requests and data. The separation of notification from data transfer is done
for efficency, by allowing messages to be sent in batches.
6.3 Domain 0
As stated above, Domain 0, the initial domain, has special privileges and responsi-
bilities. Domain 0 is responsible for creating and destroying domains and manag-
ing their resources and virtual devices.
By running the control software in domain 0, and not in the hypervisor itself,
Xen achieves a separation of mechanism and policy within the system [25].
6.3.1 Xend
Xend is the control daemon used to manage the system running Xen. It runs in
domain 0, using a low-level api to communicate with Xen via the domain 0 kernel.
Xend exports an HTTP interface to its clients, and commands are issued to xend
via the command-line tool xm.
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6.3.2 xm
The xm program is the primary tool for managing Xen through the xend daemon.
A complete list of the available commands can be obtained by issuing the com-
mand xm help --long on the command line; here, only a few examples will
be given.
The xm list command lists all the running domains. An example output
from the command is shown below:
Name ID Mem VCPUs State Time(s)
Domain-0 0 257 1 r----- 7064.6
xenetch 14 128 1 -b---- 234.1
Name is the name of the domain, while ID is its numeric id. Mem is the size
of memory allocated to the domain, while VCPUs it the number of virtual CPUs
allocated to the domain. State is the run state, where r means that the domain is
currently running on a CPU, while b means the domain is blocked (waiting on IO,
or sleeping because it has nothing to do). Time is the total run time for the domain.
Several commands exist for managing the lifecycle of a domain, including
xm create for creating a domain, xm pause for pausing the execution of a
domain, xm reboot for rebooting a domain and xm shutdown for shutting
down a domain.
6.3.3 libxc
For low-level access to the Xen control interfaces, Xen provides a library, libxc,
written in the C programming language. This library contains not only domain
management functions, but also functions for memory mapping, domain debugging
and tracing. Chapter 8 will describe the use of this library in retrieving information
from the Xen hypervisor.
6.4 Note on performance
The Xen hypervisor has proved to perform close to native Linux on a modified
Linux operating system. This result was first published by the Xen developers
themselves in the paper Xen and the Art of Virtualization [30], and later confirmed
by an independent research group in Xen and the Art of Repeated Research [35].
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Some recent benchmarks, published by VMware and Xensource respectively,
can be found in [76] and [78]. These also serve as an example of the many ways
benchmarks can be performed, and as an illustration of the importance of indepen-
dent benchmarks.
6.5 Notes on security
The security of Xen is vital for the security of the virtual machines running within
it. Assessing the security of Xen involves analysing the hypervisor, the privileged
and unprivileged domains, and the ways they interact.
A key assumption is that the hypervisor is likely to be correctly implemented.
As Goldberg [39] points out, the limited functionality of hypervisors enables bugs
to be largely checked out by running system diagnostics. While this does not prove
it secure, it is reasonable to expect a low number of exploitable bugs stemming
from the Xen hypervisor.
As described in section 6.3, domain 0 has special privileges and responsibil-
ities. In addition to host the Xen management software, it also functions as the
driver domain, implementing the backend parts of the split device drivers de-
scribed in section 6.2.5 [25]. Because domain 0 has effectively unrestricted access
to the real device hardware, the security of the other domains is dependent on the
security of domain 0.
Also, the limitations in current hardware raises a number of concerns related to
the use of hardware device drivers, and the Xen Users’ Manual identifies at least
some of them [26]:
• Hardware devices can make use of DMA (direct memory access) to perform
memory reads and writes outside of the memory of its controlling domain.
A malicious domain can thus use a hardware device to overwrite or reading
memory in another domain.
• Devices that use the same data bus can eavesdrop on each others’ data. If the
devices are controlled by different domains, one domain could eavesdrop on
the data being transmitted to the other domain.
• Xen restricts access to the memory address space on a page size basis. If
multiple devices share a page in the I/O memory address space, the domains
to which those devices belong will be able to access the I/O memory address
space of each others’ devices.
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• Devices sharing the same interrupt line can block each other from receiving
interrupt, or flood the line with interrupts.
However, in a normal setup, only domain 0 will have direct access to the hard-
ware mentioned above.
Part II
Contributions
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Chapter 7
Requirements, architecture and
design
The previous chapters have provided the background information needed for de-
signing an integrity checking framework based on virtualization. In this chapter,
the knowledge obtained is used to formulate a set of requirements that must be
fulfilled by the integrity checking framework. This chapter concludes with the de-
scription of a general model, serving as a starting point for the implementation of
the prototype required by the problem statement given in chapter 1.2.
7.1 Research context
In section 2.4.2, it was shown how Garfinkel and Rosenblum made use of virtual-
izaton for building an intrusion detection system (IDS) [37]. Their implementation
was based on the VMware virtualization system [22], a commercial, proprietary
product 1. The work of Garfinkel and Rosenblum has been of great influence for
this thesis, and the lack of publicly available source code both for VMware and
the IDS prototype made by Garfinkel and Rosenblum, has only served as an added
motivation for providing an open source implementation.
From the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), at least
two master theses related to kernel integrity checking have emerged during the past
few years. One was the thesis of our current daily supervisor Ane Daae Weng [77],
and the second was the 2005 thesis of Tobias Melcher [54].
1See section 5.4.1 for a description of VMware
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In the design of the integrity checking framework presented in this thesis, the
authors have been primarily influenced by the work of Garfinkel and Rosenblum,
and of the work done by Melcher.
7.2 General requirements
In his thesis Melcher identified some general requirements (GRs) that he, with the
support of Weng’s [77] work, found to be important for the implementation of an
kernel integrity checking system. Table 7.1 lists Melcher’s findings.
Requirement Description
GR1 Kernel malware indepen-
dence
The kernel integrity model should be able to dis-
cover any kind of kernel level malware.
GR2 Integrity of important files The model should be able to check the integrity of
any file within the monitored system.
GR3 Integrity of kernel memory The kernel integrity model should be able to check
the integrity of the kernel’s memory.
GR4 Isolation The kernel integrity checker should be kept strictly
apart from the system to be checked.
GR5 Resource consumption The kernel integrity model should not hurt the per-
formance of the system to be checked.
GR6 Hidden from an attacker The attacker should be kept unaware of the presence
of the kernel integrity checker.
GR7 Operating system indepen-
dence
The kernel integrity model should be independent of
the OS installed on the system to be checked.
GR8 Reporting The system administrator should be kept aware of
any suspicious changes made to the system.
GR9 Reliability The kernel integrity model should avoid false-
positives and false-negatives.
Table 7.1: General requirements of an integrity checking system [54]
The requirements put forward byMelcher provide for an obvious starting point,
but a review of each of the requirements is needed before applying them to this
thesis. The following will provide a short description of each of the requirements,
discussing to which extent they are applicable to the framework presented in this
thesis.
GR1 Kernel malware independence The framework should be independent of
the type of malware attacking the kernel. The authors’ proposed framework
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takes this into consideration in the way that it does not care how the ker-
nel is subverted. It looks only at the malware’s effect on the kernel’s data
structures.
GR2 Integrity of important files As the integrity of files falls beyond the scope
of the problem definition provided in chapter 1.2, this requirement is not
covered in the proposed framework. However, Melcher’s work [54] proved
that this was indeed doable with a virtualization based integrity system.
GR3 Integrity of kernel memory Melcher’s integrity checking prototype was not
able to retrieve information from the memory of the guest operating system.
As a result, this was an explicitly stated requirement in the problem defini-
tion given to the authors.
GR4 Isolation Isolation between the kernel of the virtual machine running the
integrity checker and the virtual machine kernel being integrity checked is
of utmost importance. This is due to the fact that the host system represents
the base of trust for the integrity checking system. Isolation is thus still an
important requirement.
GR5 Resource consumption The Xen hypervisor has proved to provide good
performance (see 6.4). The proposed prototype will add an extra workload
on the processor, by periodically fetching fresh data from the guest domain
to analyse. The proposed solution will allow for tuning of the resource con-
sumtion by enabling the administrator to regulate the frequency of this infor-
mation gathering.
GR6 Hidden from attacker The premise that keeping the integrity checking frame-
work hidden from the attacker is a laudable goal, is debatable. It may be seen
as a defense-in-depth measure; by adding the detection of the framework to
the attacker’s workload. On the other hand, the security of the framework
should in the authors’ opinion under no circumstances depend on its ability
to hide itself.
The integrity checking framework presented in this thesis does not make
changes to the monitored system. Since the system cannot be directly ob-
served from the monitored system, its existence can only be deduced from
its effect on its environment.
In recent years, the use of virtualization technologies for implementing hon-
eypots 2 has made attackers wary of the technology [42]. Up until recently
2A honeypot is an electronic bait, a trap set to be probed, attacked and compromised. The aim
of these systems is to collect as much data as possible about the attacker’s actions, both during and
after an attack.
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virtualization has seen very limited adoption in real-world production sys-
tems, making the use of virtualization enough to raise an attacker’s suspicion.
The fact that the virtualization technologies most commonly used incurred a
signficant performance penalty, did little to help them pass as regular desktop
or server systems.
With the computing industry finding ways to decrease the performance penalty
of virtual machines, coupled with the continuing increase of computing power
in today’s systems, the adoption of virtualization technologies has rocketed
in the server market. Xen, the virtualization solution used in this thesis, now
claims near-native performance with a “benchmarked overhead of well under
5% in most cases” [27] (for more on Xen’s performance, see section 6.4).
The widespread adoption of virtualization, together with its diminishing per-
formance penalties, does much to weaken the correlation between the tech-
nology and its use as a detection platform. But even if the presence of an
integrity checking system could be deduced from the use of virtualization,
the positive effect this would have on the safety of the system would, at best,
be questionable. It may even be seen as an incentive for the attacker to move
on to a more attractive target.
GR7 Operating system independence The current implementation of the pro-
posed prototype will not be independent of the monitored operating system.
The modularity of the prototype will decrese the amount of work required
for extending the support for additional operating systems in the prototype.
GR8 Reporting The proposed prototype will be able to report all events to a log
file, as well as to take immediate action to pause the suspected running guest
domain if something suspicious occurs.
GR9 Reliability The prototype will be able to get a reliable view of the memory
areas belonging to the monitored kernel, but the overall reliability of the
system will depend on its ability to correctly identify only the malicious
changes made to the kernel.
7.3 General model
Figure 7.1, taken from Melchers work [54], show the general idea of an integrity
system based on virtualization. In this figure, a guest system is visible to the outside
world, and may thus not be considered safe from attacks. The host system, on the
other hand, is isolated from the guest system with the help of the virtualization
monitor, and may be considered safe from attacks from the outside world. Since
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both the host and the guest system are running on the same virtualization platform,
the host system retains full visibility into the kernel of the guest system, but not
vice versa.
Figure 7.1: General architecture
[54]
Influenced both by the Melcher’s model (figure 7.1) and the system designed
by Garfinkel and Rosenblum [37], the authors propose the general architecture
outlined in figure 7.2. This figure contains the same main parts found in Melcher’s
figure: The host system, guest systems and the virtualization hypervisor.
7.3.1 The architecture’s support for the general requirements
Below is an outline of how the architecture shown in figure 7.2 supports the general
requirements of section 7.3.1.
GR1 To support GR1, Kernel malware independence, the proposed architecture
introduces Policy modules. These modules define what parts of the kernel’s mem-
ory are to be checked and what the allowed changes in those parts are. It will be
possible to add newmodules at run-time, allowing the administrator to select which
parts of the kernel structures that should be monitored without having to restart the
integrity checking system.
GR2 As mentioned above, GR2, Integrity of important files, will not be covered
in this prototype, but it should be relatively straight forward to add support for this
by reimplementing the work done by Melcher [54]. His solution to this problem
was to mount the guest systems disk(s) in the host system’s filesystem and perform
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Figure 7.2: General architecture
integrity checking on the mounted disk with the help of a standard file integrity
checker.
GR3 Integrity checking the kernel memory requires that the prototype has ac-
cess to the physical machine memory of the guest system. The physical machine
memory is controlled by the virtualization hypervisor, and the hypervisor should
therefore be able to provide the prototype with all the necessary information. As
can be seen in figure 7.2, the proposed architecture will contain an operating system
library (the OS library). This component will be responsible for the communica-
tion with the hypervisor and for providing the policy modules with data from the
memory of the guest.
GR4 For the isolation between guest and host systems, the architecture relies on
the actual implementation of the chosen virtualization solution. Thus, a discussion
of the isolation provided in our prototype solution will be required.
GR5 As illustrated in figure 7.2 the communication between the hypervisor and
the OS library will be based on a polling scheme. An alternative, but more complex
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scheme would be to modify the hypervisor, enabling it to directly notify the proto-
type when modifications are being made to the monitored memory areas. While the
former scheme consumes more resources by constantly pulling, the latter scheme
the hypervisor would only alert the OS library when something suspicious hap-
pens. By letting the policy modules be able to determine the polling frequencies,
the resource consumption imposed may to some extent be controlled.
GR6 GR6 has been rejected as an requirement for the architecture proposed,
based on the discussions of section .
GR7 GR7, Operating system independence, is partially covered by the fact that
the OS library contains meta data about the guest kernel(s). This library can be
adapted or replaced to implement support for different operating systems, as long
as they are supported by the hypervisor.
GR8 Reporting will be supported by the logging facility provided by the archi-
tecture.
GR9 The reliability of the system will depend both on the virtualization solu-
tion’s ability to provide the integrity analyser with the correct data, and on the
integrity policies abilities to correctly identify only malicious modifications of the
monitored kernel.
The next chapter presents an integrity checking framework implementing the
architecture presented above.
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Chapter 8
Chili - an integrity checking
framework
This chapter gives a description of the implementation and inner workings of
Chili1, our framework2 for integrity checking of a running kernel.
The first section explains the general structure of the Chili framework. The
next section gives a presentation of each component of the framework in more
detail. Section 8.4 comments on the choice of languages used to implement the
framework, and section 8.5 describes the XenAccess open source project that has
been used as part of the Chili framework. The last section gives the reader an
example of how the framwork can be used.
8.1 Introduction
The framework is implemented as a user mode process running in the privileged
domain (see chapter 6). Figure 8.1 shows the overall architecture of the Chili
framework. Chili runs in Dom0, the privileged Xen domain, while DomU is the
unprivileged domain running the kernel that is to be monitored. The figure also
shows some other elements in Dom0 that are used by Chili, but not a part of the
framework iteself: The Xen manager and the Libxc are part of Xen, while XenAc-
cess is a third-party library that helps in getting a more convenient access to the
run-time state of DomU.
1The name “chili” does not mean anything special. It is just a randomly picked codename we
used in the development process.
2The Chili implementation is called a “framework” as it is easily extended with new functionality
through new policies and targets without needing to change the core parts of the system.
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Figure 8.1: Chili architecture
As shown by the figure, the Chili framework consists of several modules. The
modules of most importance to the framework are the engine, the policies and the
targets. Together these modules make the framework extensible and easy to adopt
to the user’s needs.
The engine provides the core functionality of the framework. This functionality
is however implemented in loosely coupled modules, meaning that the functional-
ity provided by e.g the Admin module (see 8.2.3) or the Scheduler may be replaced
without needing to rewrite the engine module.
The policy modules represent the integrity policies that are to be enforced by
the framework. They are implemented as plug-in modules, allowing new policies
to be tailored to the user’s needs and added to the framework at run-time.
The targets, representing the various kernel structures of the monitored domain,
are also loosely connected to the rest of the framework. Through the use of prede-
fined interfaces, new targets can be made to collect information about every area
of the user domain’s memory. The policies and targets will be explained in more
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detail later in this chapter.
The rest of this section will give a description of each of the main components
composing the framework. All the source code referenced below can be found in
appendix E.
8.2 Description of the Chili framework
This section gives a description of all the modules shown in figure 7.2.
8.2.1 Console
The Chili framework is controlled through a command line interface, called the
Console. The console communicates only with the engine, functioning as a mes-
senger that brings user requests to the engine. Section 8.6 gives a more detailed
description of the use of the Chili Console, and its source code can be found in
Appendix E.1.
8.2.2 Engine
This is the heart of the framework, implementing most of the critical functionality
of the framework. The engine is responsible for loading all available policies at
startup, enabling them for later activation. It also sets up a logging mechanism
which makes it possible for the policies to write their output to a log file, named
chili.log.
One of the main components within the Engine is a multi-threaded scheduler.
Upon the activation of a policy, the Engine registers the policy with the scheduler,
which causes the policy to be run at a periodic interval. Rather than implementing
a full-fledged multi-threaded scheduler of our own, the scheduler of the Webware
for Python web application toolkit has been integrated into Chili.
The Engine also makes use of the Admin and Inspector modules, both of which
will be described shortly. The source code implementing the Engine is found in
Appendix E.2.
8.2.3 Admin
The Admin module is used by the Engine to send administrative commands to
the guest domains. This module basically just wraps the xm tool (see section
6.3.2) which is provided as part of the Xen installation. The current implemented
methods are: listDomains, which lists all the current running Xen domains,
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pauseDomain, which temporarily halts the execution in of a given domain and
unpauseDomain, which resumes the execution of a given domain. Its source
code can be found in appendix E.3.
8.2.4 Targets
The targets represent the different kernel structures of kernel running in the mon-
itored domain. The targets are specially tailored for each type of kernel stuc-
ture, reflecting the semantics of the structure. One exception is the generic tar-
get MemoryArea described more fully in section 9.1.6, which can represent any
memory region defined by a start and end virtual address.
The targets are implemented using the C language. The implementation makes
heavy use of both the Xen control library: libxc (described in section 6.3.3) and the
XenAccess library (described in section 8.5). All C targets are also provided with
a Python wrapper, making them easier to integrate with the rest of the framework
(see section 8.4 for the details).
The authors have written several targets to retrieve information from the moni-
tored kernel. For detailed explanations of these, please see chapter 9 and the source
code of Appendix E. To add support for other kernel structures, new targets will
have to be added to the framework. This can be easily done without requiring
changes to be made to the surrounding framework.
8.2.5 OS library
The OS library serves as a wrapper around the framework’s available targets. It
is responsible for instantiating and returning a fresh target when requested by the
Inspector. Every time the OS library gets a request for a specific target, it creates a
new instance of this target, reflecting the state of the corresponding kernel structure
at that time.
The name OS library indicates that the framework may support multiple op-
erating systems. As this is the only place in the framework that is exposed to
the details of the implementation of the monitored kernel, it would be the right
place to implement support for different operating systems. This could probably
best be done through differentiated implementations of the framework’s targets.
In this way one could have one implementation of e.g the kernel text target (see
section 9.1.1) for the RedHat Linux distribution, but a completely different one for
Windows XP. The rest of the framework would not have to be changed to support
multiple operating systems.
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8.2.6 Inspector
The Inspector serves as the link between the Engine and the OS library, and the
policies running inside the Engine uses the Inspector to request fresh targets from
the OS library.
Because the Inspector provides no functionality of its own, the reader may
wonder if a cleaner and easier solution would have been to let the policies call the
OS library directly. A decoupling between the policies and the OS library was
however desired, and the reason can be found in figure 8.2 which shows the frame-
work with an additional module, the Monitor. In the framework’s current form,
the policies themselves monitors the kernel structures for changes, by periodically
requesting new targets from the Inspector and comparing them with the previous
ones. This is not a very efficient solution, particularly if the targets in question
are used in multiple policies. As a result, the concept of a separate Monitor mod-
ule was introduced. The policies would register their interest of a particular target
type with the Monitor, which would notify all interested policies when the target
changes. The policies would still be able to inspect other kernel structures using
the Inspector, but the actual monitoring of kernel structures would be best left to
the Monitor. The Monitor could also be extended to make use of the event mech-
anisms provided by Xen through the use of Xen store, allowing for more efficient
monitoring of certain events.
Monitors were not implemented in the current prototype due to the limited
amount of time available, but the concept may prove useful if the prototype is to be
expanded.
The source code for the Inspector module can be found in appendix E.5.
8.3 Policies
For the framework to be of any real use, there has to exist a set of rules that define
which parts of the monitored domain’s kernel structures that are allowed to be
modified and which that are not. The policy modules define these rules. Each
policy contains a set of rules based on the policy’s knowledge about one or more of
the targets available in the framework. The distinction between a target and a policy
is worth repeating: The target represents the specifics of a kernel structure. The
policy defines both what is considered to be illegal changes in the kernel structure,
and what the consequences should be.
As described in the preceding section, the monitoring of the kernel structures
is currently done by the policies themselves. When a policy is first activated, it
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Figure 8.2: Chili architecture with monitor
requests a copy of the target(s) of interest. In regular intervals, a new copy of the
target is requested and subsequently compared to the original one, thus detecting if
the target has changed.
The authors have written several policies for use in the Chili framework. For
detailed explanations of these, please see chapter 9. The source code of the policies
can be found in Appendix E.
8.4 Choice of language
The framework is written mostly in the Python language [14]. Some of the more
low-level parts are written in the C language. Python were chosen as the main
language of the implementation because it is a powerful, high-level object-oriented
language that offers strong support for integration with other languages. Python is
also the language of choice for the high-level parts of the Xen hypervisor, and this
makes it easy to integrate the chili framework with Xen (see section 8.2.3).
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Some parts of the code were however found to be more convenient imple-
menting in the C-language, as it allows for low-level pointer arithmetics to be per-
formed. To make the C-parts of the code integrate smoothly with the rest of the
framework, each C-module was wrapped in Python code (see below).
8.4.1 SWIG
The wrapping of the C code was done by utilizing the Simplified Wrapper and
Interface Generator (SWIG) tool [19]. This tool uses special files called interface
files to describe how the Python wrapper codetool should be generated. SWIG does
the work of creating the relatively complex Python module required to seamlessly
use the functionality defined in the C files. The generated Python module can
be used like any regular Python module, thereby making the methods and data
structures of the original C file available in a Python-native way.
8.5 XenAccess
The XenAccess library is an open source project trying to simplify the way in which
the hardware state of guest domains can be viewed by a privileged domain. The
project is still in its early stages, but the authors found that it greatly helped to raise
the abstraction level when accessing machine memory using the virtual addresses
of kernel of the guest domain. The project is frequently adding new features, mak-
ing it likely to be of great help in a future version of the Chili prototype supporting
multiple operating systems. The XenAccess library is used extensively by the tar-
gets described in section 8.2.4. XenAccess is written purely in C, and this made C
the natural choice of language for the targets as well.
8.5.1 Limitiations of XenAccess
While the XenAccess library was of great help, its support for the memory map-
ping of areas spanning multiple page frames was somewhat limited. The memory
paradigms employed by Xen (see 6.2.3) necessitates each and every page frame as-
sociated with a virtual address range to be looked up. As the functions provided by
the XenAccess library only map a single page frame per invocation, the overhead
of mapping areas spanning multiple frames would quickly add up. To solve this,
some convenience functions for effectively mapping multiple page frames were de-
veloped using both XenAccess and the Xen C library itself. These functions were
gathered in the library libca, and the source code can be viewed in Appendix E.36.
An example of the use of this library can be found in the C implementation of the
kernel text target (see Appendix E.29).
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8.6 Use of the chili framework
This section shows the general use of the Chili framework. The chili framework
runs on a privileged domain (dom0) while monitoring the kernel in a user domain
(domU). The framework is controlled through a text based interface in a console
window (see figure 8.3). The available commands are:
setdom Tells Chili which domain to monitor. The domain ID (see chapter 6) of
the desired domain is given as an argument.
listPolicies Lists all available policies. Given the option active, this command lists
only the policies that have been activated.
listTargets Lists all the targets that are registered within the framework.
listDomains Lists the status of all domains currently running in Xen.
activate Activates a policy. The input to this command is either the name of the
policy to be activated, or the special keyword “all”, meaning all of the avail-
able policies. When activated, the policies are registered with the scheduler.
The sensitivity level of a policy can be set upon activation by supplying the
parameter “LOW” or “HIGH”
deactivate Deactivates a policy. The input to this command is either the name
of the policy to be deactivated, or the special keyword “all”, meaning all of
the active policies. Upon deactivation, the policies are removed from the
scheduler, causing the monitoring activities started by that policy to stop.
unpause Unpauses a domain. The domain ID of the desired domain is given as
an argument. The unpause command is of use when a policy has paused a
domain due to a policy breach.
setLogLevel Set the log level of Chili. If given the argument “file”, Chili will only
record events in the log file. Given the argument “stdout”, Chili will output
the log both to the log file and the console window.
help Lists all the available commands. If the help command is given a command
name as parameter, it prints the help string of that command.
quit Quits Chili.
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Figure 8.3: Chili initialization
8.6.1 Initialization
The Chili prototype and its dependencies are all initialized when the console starts
up, as shown in figure 8.3:
If the initial start up command (./console.py) is given a number as its first
argument, the framework registers the user domain with the corresponding domain
ID as the current working domain. If “-v” or “-verbose” is given as a parameter,
the console starts in verbose mode, printing all log info to the console window
also. If “-a” or “–activateAll” is given as a parameter, the framework starts with all
available policies activated. Figure 8.4 shows the initialization process with all the
optional parameters given.
Figure 8.4: Chili initialization
8.6.2 Setting the user domain
To make chili aware of which user domain the activated policies should monitor,
the domain id of the user domain must be set in chili. This can be done with the
command setdom as shown in figure 8.5 below or as described in section 8.6.1.
80 CHAPTER 8. CHILI - AN INTEGRITY CHECKING FRAMEWORK
Figure 8.5: Setting the active user domain
8.6.3 List domains
Figure 8.6 shows how to get a list of the currently running domains with the
listDomains command.
Figure 8.6: Chili listing domains
8.6.4 Targets
To see what targets the framework supports, the command listTargets can be
used, as shown in figure 8.7, where the framework lists the targets Proc, Syscalls,
IDT and KernelText as registered with the framework.
Figure 8.7: List of targets
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8.6.5 Policies
The command listPolicies lists the policies that are available. If given the
option active, it shows only the active policies.
Figure 8.8: List of policies and (de)activation of policy
Figure 8.8 shows thatKernelTextPolicy, ProcMonitor, SyscallsMonitor and IDT-
Monitor are loaded by the framework. The figure also shows how to activate a
policy with the activate command, as well as how to deactivate a policy with
the deactivate command.
Unpausing paused domain
When a domain has been paused by Chili, it can be unpaused with the command
unpause <domID>, as can be seen in figure 8.9.
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Figure 8.9: Un-pausing a paused domain
Chapter 9
Constructing targets and policies
This chapter describes the example targets and policies constructed for use with
the Chili framework. Section 9.1 presents the kernel structures chosen as example
targets for integrity checking, while section 9.2 presents the policies making use of
the targets.
9.1 Example targets
In the terminology used in Chili, the different parts of the kernel to be monitored are
called targets (see section 8.6.4). This section describes the different targets cur-
rently implemented and available for use by the policy modules. Each target were
developed to monitor one or more internal kernel structures in the guest system’s
memory. The choice of data structures was motivated by the attack techniques used
by today’s rootkits (described in chapter 4).
The reader is encouraged to consult the source code listed in appendix E to get
a more detailed understanding of each target. When referring to the source code
files, their location within the appendix will be given in the parenthesis following
them.
9.1.1 KernelText
Figure 3.2 on page 21 shows the kernel as it is represented in memory. The area
in the figure marked as kernel code is commonly referred to as the text part of the
kernel. By modifying the kernel text, malicious code may add its own hooks to
common kernel functions.
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The kernel text is represented by the kernel text target in Chili. This target
stores a checksum computation of the kernel code, enabling the detection of any
changes made to it.
The target is implemented in the python module KernelText.py (E.28), and in
the file kernel_text_target_data.c (E.29). The SWIG interface file can be found in
the file kernel_text_target_data.i (E.31).
9.1.2 SysCallTable
A popular attack point amongst malware authors is the system call table described
in section 3.3.6. As depicted in figure 3.4 on page 23, the system call table contains
function pointers to the service routines implementing the system calls.
A target representing the system call table has been constructed, allowing for
the detection of changes made to the table. The target stores a checksum of the
entire table, together with the individual entries comprising the table. It is thus
able to determine which entries that have changed.
The python implementation of this target can be found in the file SysCallTab-
le.py (E.12), and the C-implementation in the file sct_target_data.c (E.13). The
SWIG interface file is in the file sct_target_data.i (E.15).
9.1.3 ServiceRoutineArray
A target representing the service routines that implement the system calls was also
created. It contains a checksum for each of the service routines, as well as a sin-
gle checksum computed from the individual checksums, thus allowing for quick
comparison between instances of this target.
The current implementation of this target is far from ideal as it just checks the
first 31 bytes of each service routine. In a non-prototype version of this target
this is not sufficient as it will not detect modifications after the 31st byte. A more
complete implementation of this target would have to be given information about
the length of each of the service routines, making digests based on those.
The python implementation of this target can be found in the file ServiceRou-
tineArray.py (E.16), and the C-implementation in the file sr_target_data.c (E.17).
The SWIG interface file is in the file sr_target_data.i (E.19).
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9.1.4 IDT
As described in section 3.3.5, the interrupt descriptor table contains the mappings
between the various interrupts and the functions that handle them. A target repre-
senting the IDT was therefore deemed useful.
In a non-virtualized Linux system, the address of the IDT resides in the idtr
CPU register. Xen provides each domain with a virtual IDT, which can be accessed
and modified through hypercalls. Malicious code would thus need to be Xen-aware
when trying to modify the IDT.
The entries in the virtual IDT are data structures containing information about
each trap vector (see the file idt_target_data.h E.22). The implementation of this
target maintains an object representing all of the entries in the IDT, as well as a
checksum computed from the entire IDT. The Python and C implementations can
be found in the files IDT.py (E.20) and idt_target_data.c (E.21) respectively. The
SWIG interface file is in idt_target_data.i (E.23).
9.1.5 Proc
The /proc file system described in section 3.4.2 provides information about the
processes running on the system. Being able to check the integrity of the /proc file
system is thus highly desirable, and a target enabling the monitoring of some of
the key parts of the /proc file system has been created. The structures containing
the function pointers to the methods that the kernel can invoke in the /proc file
system are represented in the target. In addition, the target contains a digest of
these function pointers.
The implementation can be found in the files Proc.py (E.24) and proc_tar-
get_data.c (E.25). The data structures can be found in proc_target_data.h (E.26).
The SWIG interface is in the file proc_target_data.i listed in E.27.
9.1.6 MemoryArea
A generic target capable of representing any area of kernel memory was also de-
veloped. By providing this target with either a memory address or a kernel symbol,
together with the size of the area to be represented, a checksum of the memory
area is computed. While the MemoryArea is flexible in the way that it can be used
to represent any memory area within the kernel, the representation of the area is
limited to a checkum.
The implementation can be found in the filesMemoryArea.py (E.32) and mem-
ory_area_target_data.c (E.33). The data structures can be found in memory_area-
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_target_data.h (E.34). The SWIG interface is in the file memory_area_target_da-
ta.i listed in E.35.
9.2 Example policy modules
The mechanisms provided by the Chili framework made several approaches to in-
tegrity analysis viable. Rather than opting for the familiar signature detection ap-
proach used by virus scanners, an approach based on run-time code attestation (as
described in section 2.4.1) was chosen in this thesis. Directly monitoring the in-
tegrity of important kernel segments, allows their integrity to be validated against
both known and unknown threats.
The currently implemented policies handle policy breaches in two different
ways, depending on the sensitivity set in the policy. If the sensitivity is set to
“HIGH” the module pauses the affected user domain. If the sensitivity is set to
“LOW”, the event is just noted in the log file and the user domain is allowed to
continue its execution.
9.2.1 The __kernel_vsyscall policy
As shown in section 3.3.6, the __kernel_vsyscall function is called by the
standard library when invoking a system call, causing the execution of either the
int $0x80 or the sysenter assembly language instructions. By modifying
the __kernel_vsyscall function, an attacker may be able to hijack the system
call invocation.
This policy module is able to detect modifications of the __kernel_vsys-
call function. It uses the generic MemoryArea target described in 9.1.6 to ob-
tain a digest of the __kernel_vsyscall function and compare it to a previ-
ously known good state. The implementation of this policy can be found in Ker-
nelVsyscall.py (E.10).
9.2.2 The IDT policy
As shown in section 4.4.2, some kernel-level malware modify the entry in the IDT
that contains the address for the system_call_function (this technique is for exam-
ple used by the SucKIT rootkit (see appendix D.2)). This policy module is able to
detect this kind of modifications of the IDT. It uses the IDT target, described in sec-
tion 9.1.4, to get information about the state of the IDT and to compare this with its
previously known good state. The implementation can be found in IDTMonitor.py
(E.7).
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9.2.3 The kernel text policy
This policy monitors the static text part of the kernel code by regulary polling the
kernel text target described in section 9.1.1. The implementation of the kernel text
policy can be found in the file KernelText.py (E.28).
9.2.4 The system call policy
As described in chapter 4.4.2, manipulating system calls is a common technique
used by malicious code. This policy monitors not only the system call table for
changes, but also the service routines implementing the system calls.
The sys_call_table, which contains the mapping between the system
calls and the service routines implementing them, is represented by the SysCallTable
target. The service routines are represented by the ServiceRoutineArray target. The
implementation of the system call policy can be found in the file SyscallMonitor.py
(E.8).
9.2.5 The proc policy
A policy module has also been written to ensure the integrity of the /proc file sys-
tem, using the Proc target. The implementation is listed in ProcMonitor.py E.9).
9.3 System calls - a case study
The targets and policies developed were chosen based on the kernel functionality
they implement. For example, the system call mechanism of the kernel was iden-
tified at an early stage as being crucial for the integrity of the kernel. The system
call mechanism is a favorite target of malware authors, and it can be attacked at
various places.
The following will use the system call mechanism, all the way from the invo-
cation of a system call to the service routine implementing the system call, as an
illustration of the complexity faced when trying to verify the integrity of a given
kernel functionality. Figure 9.1 shows both the call chain of the system call pro-
cess, as well as the policies used to protect it.
In section 3.3.6, it was described how system calls can be invoked by using
either the int $0x80 assembly instruction or the sysenter assembly instruc-
tion. The wrapper functions in the libc standard library make use of the sysenter
instruction if this is supported by the CPU. This is made transparent for the libc li-
brary by letting its routines call the __kernel_vsyscall function, which in
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turn invokes either the int $0x80 or the sysenter instruction, depending on
the capabilities of the CPU. As the __kernel_vsyscall function presents it-
self as a target for hijacking the system call process, the __kernel_vsyscall policy
was created for protecting it.
The IDT, which contains the mapping between the int $0x80 assembly in-
struction and the system_call function, is protected by the IDT policy.
The code for both the system_call and the sysenter_entry functions
is contained within the text segment of the kernel, and are thus protected by the
kernel text policy.
Both sys_call_table, mapping the system calls to the service routines
implementing them, and the service routines themselves are covered by the system
call policy. While the system call table are fully protected, the service routines are
only partially protected, as dicussed in section 9.1.3.
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Figure 9.1: The system call mechanism and the policies protecting it. The policies
are: (1) the __kernel_vsyscall policy, (2) the IDT policy, (3) the kernel text policy
and (4) the system call policy.
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Chapter 10
Testing the framework
This chapter presents the testing of the integrity policies described in chapter 9. The
tests explore the effectiveness of the Chili prototype and of the example policies
and targets, against some common attack methods. This was done to ensure that
the framework with example policies and example targets would work in practice.
Our test system was composed of a Pentium IV 2.0 GHz computer with 512
MB of memory. The virtual machine monitor was an unmodified Xen hypervi-
sor, version 3.0.4. The set up and installation of the Xen system are described in
appendix C. The privileged domain was running the stock XenLinux 2.6.16 ker-
nel on top of Debian Etch. The user domain, which kernel was to be deliberately
subverted, was running the same kernel.
The suite of sample attacks was chosen from some of the most popular rootkits
running on the Linux 2.6 kernel. These were: Adore-ng, Override, eNYeLKM
and Mood-NT. Additionally, a self-made rootkit, named Chilirootkit, was used.
Chilirootkit is a loadable kernel module written by the authors to better understand
the way rootkits operate.
The rootkits are described in appendix D, and the implementation of the Chili-
rootkit is outlined in Appendix A.
Section 10.1 shows how the Chili framework was set up prior to the testing,
while section 10.2 describes the actual tests. A summary of the test results is given
in section 10.3.
91
92 CHAPTER 10. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK
10.1 Preparing the Chili framework
Before each test, the chili framework, with the previously described example tar-
gets and policies, was initialized from the command line with the command: console.py
1 -v -a. The first argument gives the domain ID of the guest domain running
on the Xen hypervisor. The -v option puts the chili framework in verbose mode so
that everything that happens gets printed to both the console and the log. The -a
option activates all available policy modules right away. This can be seen in figure
10.1. This figure also shows the currently running domains.
Figure 10.1: Initialization of Chili
10.2 Test results
10.2.1 Chilirootkit
The Chilirootkit was made as part of the learning process while studying the tech-
niques used by rootkits. It is implemented as a kernel module, capable of modi-
fying the system call table. More specifically, it replaces the service function for
the sys_nanosleep system call with its own malicious version (see Appendix A for
details).
Changing the system call table is a very common form of attack. Of the 12
rootkits used in the paper Copilot - a Coprocessor-based Kernel Runtime Integrity
Monitor [57], 10 of them used this technique (see figure 4.1). This is therefore a
very significant test of the practical capabilities of the system.
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After initializing the Chili framework as described in section 10.1, the Chili-
rootkit was inserted into the guest kernel by issuing the command insmod chi-
li_rootkit.ko. The output from the guest system’s console can be viewed in
figure 10.2.
Figure 10.2: Guest domain loading the chilirootkit
Figure 10.3 shows how Chili reacted to the insertion of the Chilirootkit. The
change to the system call table was detected, and both the original and current
addresses of the the sys_nanosleep function were displayed.
Figure 10.3: Chili responding to chilirootkit
The integrity system reports that it has paused the affected domain. This can be
verified by running the listDomains command. The “p” on domain 1 indicates
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that the domain is currently paused. The domain can then be un-paused by issuing
the command unpause 1. This can bee seen in figure 10.4.
Figure 10.4: Chili un-pausing paused domain
10.2.2 Adore-ng
Next, Chili was tested against the Adore-ng rootkit. This rootkit targets, amongst
other things, the Proc virtual file system (see section 3.4). Adore-ng uses this to be
able to hide its existence without using the more common technique of overwriting
system call jumps.
Adore-ng was installed by issuing the command insmod adore-ng-2.6-
.ko in the guest domain. As expected, Chili responded almost immediately with a
message from the ProcMonitor policy module saying that the kernel was subverted.
The output can be viewed in figure 10.5.
10.2.3 Override
The third scenario used the rootkit Override [13], which employs the technique of
system call interception described in section 4.4.2. Override’s own functions act
as wrappers for the original ones, filtering the output to avoid detection of certain
files and processes.
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Figure 10.5: Chili reacting to Adore-ng
The Override rootkit would not compile without some slight modifications to
its source code. For the sake of completeness, the diff between the patched and
the original version is found in Appendix E, listing E.36.3. While Override did not
crash when it was inserted into the kernel, it however crashed upon user interaction
with the guest os’ console.
The SyscallMonitor policy detected five changes made to the system call table.
The addresses of the system calls sys_read, sys_chdir, sys_getuid16,
sys_geteuid16 and sys_getdents64 all changed, as shown in figure 10.6.
After inspecting the source code of Override, it was indeed confirmed that these
five system calls are the ones intercepted by Override (see appendix D.4).
10.2.4 eNYeLKM
The next rootkit of the testing suite was eNYeLKM [6], another LKM rootkit.
This rootkit does not modify the system call table nor the interrupt descriptor ta-
ble, but instead modifies the system_call and sysenter_entry handlers. The __ker-
nel_vsyscall policy should be able to detect this. Unfortunately the rootkit caused
several oopses1 in the guest kernel when inserted, and could not be made to work
properly. No results were therefore obtained from this test.
1An oops occurs when some programming defect or otherwise unexpected event interferes with
the normal operation of the Linux kernel. It is named for the error message displayed on the system
console (or seen in the system log files) When this happens the currently active task (or process) is
terminated and the kernel makes a best-effort attempt to continue operation. [23]
96 CHAPTER 10. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK
Figure 10.6: Chili reacting to Override
10.2.5 mood-nt
In the last test, the mood-nt rootkit was used. mood-nt patches the kernel through
/dev/kmem, as described in section 4.4.2. Similiar to override, mood-nt makes
modifications to the system call table.
Running mood-nt also caused several kernel oopses in the guest kernel, and the
mood-nt binary crashed with a segmentation fault. Before the crash of mood-nt,
Chili did however detect a change to the system call table, as shown in figure 10.7.
10.3 Summary
Of the five rootkits in our test suite, four were run succesfully. Chili was able to
detect all four, due to their modifications of key kernel structures. It is worth noting
that, with the exception of adore-ng, the rootkits all modified the system call table.
As adore-ng modified the proc file system, the only two targets triggering detection
were the Proc target and the SysCallTable target.
While testing the Override rootkit, some interesting observations were made,
resulting in several changes to the SyscallMonitor policy and its targets. In an early
version of the SyscallMonitor policy, each system call was checksummed by fol-
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Figure 10.7: Chili reacting to mood-nt
lowing the function pointers of the system call table. As described above, Override
substitutes five of the system call table entries with pointers to its own functions.
However, due to Override not running correctly in Xen, following the pointers
would result in segmentation faults, causing Chili to crash. Although not an in-
tended feature of Override, the incident clearly demonstrated that great caution
is required when dealing with the data acquired from the guest operating system.
When treating data from the guest as input for Chili functions, sanity checks must
be applied.
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Chapter 11
Discussion and evaluation
The results from chapter 10 show that virtualization is well-suited as a platform for
performing integrity analysis. Based on the test results and available literature, this
chapter will discuss the advantages and the limitations when using virtualization
as a platform for integrity checking. The first section will focus on the use of vir-
tualization as a platform for doing integrity analysis, while the second section will
look at the challenges still remaining in the analysis of the integrity of a running
kernel.
11.1 Virtualization as a platform for integrity analysis
This section will discuss the suitability of virtualization as a platform for doing
integrity analysis. The platform will be assessed with regards to its visibility, iso-
lation and performance properties. In addition, possible vulnerabilities of the plat-
form will be discussed.
11.1.1 Visibility
The use of virtualization allows for the direct inspection of both memory and CPU
state. All the parts comprising the kernel, whether code or data, static or dynamic,
are thus made available to the integrity analyser. This ensures the completeness
of the data set used for the analysis. In addition, the trustworthiness of the data
set is greatly increased, because the acquisition of data is no longer reliant on the
subverted kernel.
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11.1.2 Isolation
Keeping the integrity analyser separated from the monitored system is important
for two reasons: keeping the analyser’s view of the monitored host independent
of the host itself and keeping the analyser safe from attacks. While the former
is accomplished through the visibility property already discussed, the latter is the
topic for this section.
Isolation provided by Xen
Xen provides a high degree of isolation between the virtual machines. However, as
the virtual machines are all running on the same physical hardware, full isolation
is difficult to achieve. In section 6.5, it was pointed out how the isolation property
could possibly be threatened due to limitations in current hardware devices. This
presupposes that the virtual machine is given direct access to the hardware device
in question, which would not be the case for the monitored host.
As described in chapter 6, Xen provides mechanisms for the sharing of memory
between domains. The split device driver model of Xen is implemented using this
mechanism. While the use of memory sharing makes for very efficient device
access, it severely weakens the isolation between domains.
11.1.3 Performance
The performance costs of the integrity analysing framework presented in this thesis
are comprised of the overhead caused by the virtualization solution and the costs
of doing integrity measurements and analysis.
Virtualization costs
As noted in section 6.4, running a paravirtualized Linux on Xen is claimed to of-
fer near-native performance. Benchmarking of virtualization solutions is however
a complex process, and the agendas of those performing the benchmarks should
always be taken into account. However, most of the benchmarks referred to in sec-
tion 6.4 suggests that the paravirtualization approach of Xen provides significant
performance benefits. While the exact numbers are debatable, there is little doubt
that the performance penalty related to virtualization has been steadily decreasing
the last few years.
The costs of integrity analysis
Although the performance costs imposed by the Chili prototype have not been
measured, some reflections on the subject can still be made.
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The integrity measurements taken, only involve memory reads. Accessing
memory is a cheap operation, especially when compared to accessing disk stor-
age media. The checksumming function uses an existing C-implementation of the
highly efficient MD5 algorithm. The surrounding framework, which manages and
analyses the integrity measurements, is written in Python, a high level language
prioritizing readibiliy over speed. Being a prototype, the Chili implementation is
far from optimized with regards to efficiency, leaving a substantial potential for
increasing performance.
As our implementation works by polling the hardware state at regular intervals,
the frequency of integrity measurements will be a deciding factor for the costs to
performance imposed by the system. A low polling interval will decrease the time
between the occurence of an integrity compromise and its detection, but at the cost
of increasing the overall workload. When deciding the polling interval, a trade-off
between the immediacy of detection and the performance of the system must be
made.
Immediate detection has not been set as a requirement, as an assumption has
been that the system is already compromised, with the attacker having gained full
administrative access to the operating system. The polling intervals used by the
example policies have thus been in the range of 5 to 10 seconds, not causing any
noticeable slowdowns in performance.
11.1.4 Weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attack surfaces
The history of computer security shows that attackers are quick to adapt to new
technologies. It is thus imperative to look at the presented system from the angle
of the attacker, trying to identify the potential weaknesses of the system.
A naive approach would be to try to hide the fact that the system is running
in a virtualized environment. The motivations for hiding the use of virtualization
could be both to hide the fact that the system contains an integrity checker, and to
minimize the information about the environment the attacker operates in.
It has been argued that the timing properties of virtual machines makes it infea-
sible to effectively hide their presence [50]. In addition, by using paravirtualization,
changes must be made to the guest operating system, making it extremely difficult
to hide the use of virtualization. As a result, the presence of virtualization must be
regarded to be known to the attacker.
The assumption that the use of virtualization makes attackers suspect the pres-
ence of additional security mechanisms is discussed and rejected in section 7.3.1.
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Minimizing the attacker’s knowledge of the environment in which he operates, is a
reasonable goal though. While the security of the system should not be dependent
on the attacker not realizing that virtualization is employed, all measures that add
to the attacker’s workload are of interest. However, hiding the use of virtualization
would add a level of complexity to the system disproportional to the very limited
amount of security gained.
Taking the virtualization environment into considerations, the attack surfaces
of the system include the hypervisor, the privileged domain and the integrity anal-
yser running inside the privileged domain.
Hypervisor
The security of the virtual environment depends on the security of the hypervisor.
The hypervisor, being software, thus presents itself as a natural target for hackers
to exploit.
Already in 1973, Madnick argued that the security in a virtual machine en-
vironment is very much better than that of a conventional operating system [52].
Madnick sees the operating systems as being too comprehensive, and thus more
vulnerable to error. A similar argument is made by Goldberg in his 1974 survey
of virtual machine research [39]. The increase in both complexity and size of the
operating systems of today, compared to the operating systems of the mid 1970s,
only strenghtens the arguments made by Madnick and Goldberg. An illustrative
example is given in figure 11.1, depicting the increase of lines of code in the Win-
dows family of operating systems from 1990 to 2002. In their book “Exploiting
Software”, from where the figure originates, Hoglund and McGraw observe that
the number of code lines might be the only reasonable metric for predicting the
number of software flaws [41].
Domain 0
The security of the Chili prototype is entirely dependent on the security of domain
0, the privileged domain in which it runs. As domain 0 runs Linux, it presents a
well-known attack surface. Minimizing the exposure of domain 0 to both the other
domains and the outside world is thus a key to ensuring its security. Domain 0
should provide no services except those required for running Xen, and it should not
be remotely accessible. In addition, it should be stripped for unnecessary software,
and its configuration should be scrutinized. Physical access should be restricted to
only authorized personnel.
The above is some of the best practices mentioned in section 2.2.4, aimed
at preventing a system from being compromised. As stated in that section, no
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Figure 11.1: Windows complexity as measured by lines of code [41].
guarantees of the security of domain 0 can be given. However, the limited exposure
of domain 0, together with the limited functionality it provides, makes the securing
of the domain more feasible.
The integrity analyser
As the integrity analyser uses data from the subverted domain as input, the question
must be asked of whether that input can cause the integrity analyser to fail in any
way. The experiences made when testing the Chili prototype answered the ques-
tion affirmatively, as following invalid pointers provided by the monitored domain
caused Chili to crash (see section 10.3).
Rather than attacking the integrity analyser, a subverted domain may try evad-
ing it. As each integrity measurement applies to the state of the machine at a single
point in time, the state of the machine between measurements is in fact unknown.
It is thus theoretically possible that the machine enters an invalid state after a mea-
surement, but gets restored to a valid state before the next measurement. For this
to be exploited, the interval of measurements must be known to the attacker. By
adding some randomness to the polling intervals, this threat may be made infeasi-
ble.
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11.1.5 Generality
Although the prototype developed in this thesis uses a specific virtualization imple-
mentation, the techniques used are generic enough to work on most virtual machine
environments. The implementation could be adapted to work in a full-virtualized
environment, it is not dependent of the paravirtualization paradigm currently used.
The x86 architecture extensions described in section 5.3.3 have greatly increased
the number of open source virtulization solutions, and using one of them as a plat-
form for an implementation of the framework presented in this thesis should not
pose any fundamental issues.
11.1.6 Summarizing the virtualization platform
This discussion has shown that using virtualization as a platform for integrity anal-
ysis has real and practical benefits. By executing on the same physical piece of
hardware as the monitored system, a high degree of visibility into the state of the
monitored system can be achieved. The isolation provided by the virtualization
environment helps in making the security of the integrity analyser plausible.
The drawbacks imposed by virtualization are first and foremost the perfor-
mance overhead, but also the added complexity of the system.
11.2 Integrity analysis
The previous section argued that virtualization is beneficial both for providing iso-
lation for the analyser, and for ensuring the completeness and correctness of the
data acquired. A foundation for analysing the data is thus provided.
Assuming that the data acquired are both complete and correct, and that the
integrity analyser functions correctly, the second question posed in section 1.2.1 are
not fully answered: Can the integrity of an operating system’s kernel be verified?
This section will try to provide some answers to that question, identifying some
of the key issues that still remain.
11.2.1 Integrity verification
The ultimate goal of our integrity analysis is to verify the integrity of the oper-
ating system’s kernel. Using familiar techniques such as signature detection and
anomality detection are not sufficient. These techniques look for positive proof
of compromises. When such proof is detected, it can only be deduced that the
integrity of the system is broken. In other words, the integrity of the system is
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falsified. The lack of such proof may indicate that the system is not compromised,
but the integrity of the system has not been verified. For the integrity to be verified,
it must be shown that the detection mechanism will detect all integrity breaches.
Rather than scan for signatures, the approach taken in this thesis is to monitor
key parts of the kernel for modifications. By being able to attest that code and
data structures have not changed, the integrity of the functionality they implement
can be verified. A key assumption is that it is possible to partition the kernel into
managable pieces of functionality, which can be verified independently.
11.2.2 What to check
The most naive approach to integrity checking of the kernel memory, is to make a
checksum of the entire memory area allocated to the kernel. While this approach
is not feasible, it provides a starting point for the discussion.
The kernel, as represented in memory, is a mix of executable code and data.
While the code segments are not expected to change, large part of the data segments
are.
Identifying which parts of the kernel that need to be checked in order to verify a
given functionality is challenging. The system call functionality of Linux provides
an illustrative example. The system call table is the key data structure for manag-
ing system calls, containing a mapping between the system calls, represented by
their numbers, and the code implementing them, represented by function pointers.
Assuming any changes to the system call table will be detected, the integrity of
the system call table can be verified. But, on its own, this verification is of quite
limited value. The only thing that can be deduced is that the content of this specific
part of memory has not been changed. It still needs to be verified that this part of
memory actually serves as the system call table. If malicious code has been able
to redefine the memory area used for the system call table, the observation that the
original area haven’t been modified is of no value at all.
The above example highlights some of the difficulties of verifying the kernel’s
integrity. To verify a key functionality of the kernel, the verification needs not only
concern itself with the individual segments of code and/or data; the entire code
path needs to be verified. Special care is needed when dealing with parts of the
kernel that allow for dynamic registering of function callbacks, as they are prone
to hooking by malicious code.
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11.2.3 Dynamic data structures
The dynamic data structures used by the kernel pose a big challenge to the integrity
analysis.
Petroni et al. [58] describe how the integrity of the kernel can be compromised
by manipulating dynamic data structures, without redirecting the code flow of the
kernel at all. Their example deals with a common objective for kernel-level mal-
ware; the hiding of processes from the view of the system’s administrators.
Typically, process hiding has been achieved through the hooking of the normal
code path, either by replacing the relevant system call or, as Adore-ng (see ap-
pendix D.1) does, by replacing the function pointers used by the proc filesystem.
Given a thorough review of the possible code paths, the relevant function pointers
can be identified and monitored for changes (as is done in section 9.2.4 for system
calls and in section 9.2.5 for the proc filesystem).
As stated above, the approach taken by Petroni et al. does not involve func-
tion pointers at all. Instead, the attack relies only on the internal representation of
processes in the kernel. A process is represented by the task_struct data struc-
ture, also known as the process descriptor, containing all the information related to
the process. The kernel maintains a doubly linked list of all the process descriptors,
the task-list, with each process descriptor containing a pointer to the next and pre-
vious process descriptor. The various kernel functions needing access to all tasks
can traverse the list and be sure that each process descriptor will be encountered
exactly once. Linux uses a set of lists to implement a per-cpu runqueue for the
scheduling of processes, and at any given time, each process descriptor belongs to
exactly one of these run-lists.
The attack exploits the fact that the standard way of accessing process descrip-
tors is through the task-list, while the scheduler uses the run-lists. The process
descriptor can be removed from the task-list simply by modifying the list pointers
of the previous and next process descriptors. By doing so, the process will in effect
be invisible to all the kernel functions except those of the scheduler.
A variant of the technique described above is already known in kernel-level
malware. The Adore-ng rootkit is implemented as a kernel module, and since the
kernel maintains a list of all loaded kernel modules, Adore-ng removes itself from
this list to avoid detection.
It is difficult to find a single detection technique for detecting hidden data struc-
tures. The common structure of kernel modules makes scanning memory for what
appears to be hidden kernel modules a viable option. KSTAT, an anti-rootkit utility
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for the Linux 2.4 kernel series, is known to use this technique [17]. However, as
this technique uses the module structure as a basis, it could be defeated by making
modifications to the structure of the hidden kernel module (see [4] for a claim of
success in hiding from KSTAT).
As the attack on the process lists descibed by Petroni et al. breaks an invariant
of the kernel (the process descriptors in the scheduler’s run-lists should exist in the
task-list), a possible counter-measure could be to regularly check if the invariant
are broken. By comparing the scheduler’s run-lists with the task-list of the kernel,
hidden processes could be identified. However, this strategy is not without its chal-
lenges. As the lists are constantly changing, it must be ensured that no updates are
in progress when inspecting the lists. Another issue would be that of performance,
as affirming the kernel invariants would require lots of list traversals at frequent
intervals.
11.2.4 Kernel modules
Most modern operating systems allow for the loading of additional functionality
into the kernel. In section 3.3.1, the loadable kernel modules of Linux were dis-
cussed. While the run-time insertion of modules into the kernel provides for great
flexibility, it also raises several security issues.
The integrity policy needs to address the fact that the functionality of the kernel
is allowed to change at run-time. There are several possible approaches:
Disabling kernel modules. While this might be feasible for a special-purpose
system, the use of kernel modules seems fairly entrenched in the Linux community,
and the consensus seems to be that the benefits of kernel modules far outweighs any
perceived risks.
Allowing kernel modules, but with run-time restrictions. Allow kernel mod-
ules, but do not allow them to change code/data that is deemed immutable. This is
the approach taken in this thesis.
Allowing kernel modules, without run-time restrictions. This is the most per-
missive approach, giving the kernel modules free rein in extending and modifying
the kernel. The safety of this approach depends entirely on the trustworthiness of
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the kernel modules, necessitating mechanisms for detecting and restricting mali-
cious kernel modules from loading. See section 4.5.1 for an example using this
approach .
11.2.5 False positives and false negatives
Checksumming kernel components only reveals if the components have been mod-
ified. The integrity policies that have been made are thus rather crude, in that they
see any modification as an integrity violation. Modifications that are done for le-
gitimate reasons, causing the functionality of the system to be altered in desired
ways, are thus flagged as integrity violations. This can be seen as false positives,
as the changes made are in fact both known and wanted.
Likewise, the ability to manipulate data structures in malicious ways without
being detected constitutes false negatives. As seen in the example above, vital
kernel data can be hidden from view without using the kernel in illegal ways.
The amount of false positives will thus depend on which areas of the kernel
are to be checked. By restricting the integrity checking to those parts that under no
conceivable circumstances should be changed, a low rate of false positives could
be ensured. However, it would increase the likelihood of false negatives, as less of
the kernel would be protected against malicious modifications. Finding the right
balance between the propabilities of getting false positivies or false negativies is
challenging, requiring both the frequency and costs involveld to be considered.
11.2.6 Summarizing the integrity analysis
The discussion above shows that the integrity of parts of the kernel may be verified.
There are however difficulties both in identifying all of the parts involved in the
implementation of a given functionality, and their set of valid states. Furthermore,
the code paths taken when executing that functionality may be difficult to foresee,
due to the complexity and the dynamic nature of the kernel.
11.3 Future work
This section describes some possible topics for future work, including several en-
hancement proposals for the Chili prototype presented in this thesis.
11.3.1 Enhancing the prototype
Increase the number of policies and targets. The few policies and targets cur-
rently implemented are sufficient to illustrate most of the capabilities of the system.
11.3. FUTURE WORK 109
In our view, constructing more targets and policies would not only broaden the pro-
tected areas of the kernel, it would most likely also provide valuable insights into
the possibilities and limitations of the system.
Using multiple detection techniques. The prototype can be used to scan for
malware signatures, hidden modules and other data structures of interest.
Monitor implementation. The current implementation not efficient. As of now,
each policy does the monitoring by pulling the state of its targets. Targets used in
multiple policies will thus be pulled once for each policy. An event-based monitor-
ing mechanism should be implemented, delegating the monitoring of targets to the
framework, allowing policies to register for notifications when the targets change.
This is also discussed in section 8.2.6.
Hooking the hypervisor. By modifying the hypervisor, it could be made to no-
tify Chili when the monitored domain attempts to write to certain memory areas,
not allowing the write to take place before it has been deemed safe by Chili. As a
result, Chili would not only be able to detect changes to memory areas, but also to
prevent the changes from being made. It would also help efficiency, enabling no-
tifications to be made when memory areas change, instead of the periodic pulling
and checksumming of those areas.
This technique is called interposition by Garfinkel and Rosenblum, and is said
to be implemented in their Livewire prototype implementation [37].
11.3.2 Attacks
The attack resistance of the system is hard to assess without actual trying to attack
the system. Some possible venues of attack are identified in this thesis.
11.3.3 Performance
The performance overhead induced by virtualization needs to be examined through
benchmarks that are entirely independent of the virtualization vendors. The addi-
tional performance penalties caused by the integrity analysis itself need also be
examined.
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11.3.4 Kernel synchronization
The synchronization primitives used by the kernel ensures that access to data struc-
tures is granted in a safe and controlled manner. Consider a situation where a data
structure may contain several related variables, for example, a buffer and an integer
containing the length of the buffer. The kernel can ensure that no thread or pro-
cess may read the variables while another is in the process of updating them. The
memory reads performed by our prototype are not controlled by the monitored ker-
nel, and the possibility therefore exists that the prototype will read related memory
areas as they are being updated.
11.3.5 Boot process
As part of ensuring the integrity of the virtualization environment, the bootstrap-
ping of the system needs to be considered. A possible solution could be to make
use of a trusted platform module (TPM) for verifying the bootstrapping code.
sHype is a hypervisor security architecture developed by IBM research [8]. Part
of the research includes an implementation of a virtual trusted platform module
(TPM) architecure for the Xen hypervisor [9].
Combining the use of a TPM with the run-time integrity monitoring described
in this thesis, could prove fruitful. The two technologies are complementory, TPM
focusing on load-time and this thesis’ system focusing on run-time verification.
11.3.6 Placing integrity agents within the monitored host
As shown in figure 11.2, the detection and verifying mechanisms of our system are
located outside the monitored system, the rationale being that the integrity of these
mechanisms could not be asserted from within the monitored system.
Xen Hypervisor
of kernel
Integrity verification system Verified part
Dom0
Kernel
DomU
Figure 11.2: Integrity monitoring from dom0
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Given that a sufficient root of trust can be established inside the kernel, the
system can be augmented by placing additional mechanism inside the monitored
kernel itself, as shown in figure 11.3. In other words, integrity verifying mecha-
nisms can be placed inside the monitored host if the integrity of the functionality
the mechanisms depends on can be verified. Already existing security mechanisms
that are dependent on the integrity of the kernel, may again be trusted, provided
that their dependencies are surveyed and verified.
within DomU
Dom0 DomU
Integrity verification system
Kernel
Verification agent
Verified from
Dom0
Xen Hypervisor
Verified from
Figure 11.3: Integrity agent placed inside domU
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
This chapter provides the conclusion of the thesis. First a summary of the work
conducted in this thesis is given, and then the results of the work are presented.
12.1 Summary of the work conducted
The topic of this thesis has been to explore if and how the integrity of a operating
system’s kernel can be verified, and to show how virtualization technology can be
used as a platform for the integrity analysis. As part of the research, a prototype
integrity checker was also to be implemented.
The main research question from section 1.2.1 was: How can virtualization aid
in the verification of the integrity of the memory of an operating system’s kernel?
This led to these two subquestions:
1. How can virtualization provide a platform for integrity analysis?
2. Can the integrity of an operating system’s kernel be verified?
To be able to answer these research questions, several diverse topics had to be given
an in-depth study. First an exploration of the integrity property was conducted.
Then a deeper understanding of the Linux kernel and the kernel level threats had
to be acquired. In addition, the field of virtualization was studied. The outcome of
these studies is presented in part I of this thesis.
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Through the literature study, the key principles of a virtualization-based in-
tegrity analyser were identified, forming the basis for the design and implemen-
tation of a kernel integrity analyser prototype. This prototype provided the tool
needed to try out the theoretical aspects of the research question in practice.
The results of these experiments, combined with the theoretical knowledge
gained through the literature study, made a discussion of the research questions
posed at the outset of the thesis possible. This discussion is presented in chapter 11.
12.2 Results
The results presented in this section are compiled both from the discussions in
chapter 11 and the practical experiences with the prototype presented in chapter 10.
12.2.1 Research subquestion 1
The first of the research subquestions showed to be the easiest one to answer. The
work in this thesis has shown that virtualization is indeed a capable platform for in-
tegrity checking. Both the practical experiences and the theoretical studies support
this conclusion. As the discussion in section 11.1.4 points out, the Xen virtual-
ization solution is not completely free of security challenges. However, the same
section also showed that it should be possible to greatly improve many of the short-
comings.
The virtualization technology’s ability to combine high visibility into the mon-
itored kernel with strong protection against attacks from the outside, makes it a
very potent foundation for an integrity checking system.
12.2.2 Research subquestion 2
The second research subquestion proved to be more complex. The key issue turned
out to be the strong requirements needed for verification of integrity. To verify the
integrity of the kernel, it is not sufficient to detect only some of the way a kernel
can be compromised. Verification implies that the integrity system must be able
to detect all possible integrity breaches. This simply means that a precondition
for using the proposed prototype to verify a kernel’s integrity, would be to identify
all areas of the kernel that are not allowed to change (both code and data) with
absolute certainty.
As a result, it seems unlikely that the integrity of the kernel as a whole can
be verified. It should however be reasonable to assert that the integrity of many
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important parts of the kernel can be verified. The approach suggested in this thesis
may not be a silver bullet, but it will greatly increase the trustworthiness of the
kernel.
12.3 Final comments
This thesis has showed the potential of virtualization as a platform for kernel in-
tegrity analysis. Much of that potential has been realized through the prototype
developed, showing the practical implications and capabilities of the theories sup-
porting the implementation.
It must be emphasized, though, that the integrity analyser presented in this
thesis does not cover the integrity of the entire software stack of the system. Addi-
tional security mechanisms should be employed, as the presented prototype in no
way should be regarded as a replacement for IDS or anti-virus software. Rather, it
complements those solutions, enabling them to once again put trust in the operating
system’s kernel.
Since the work in this thesis has been solely based on open-source code, the
authors hope that this can help provide useful insight into the implementation of a
possible virtualization based integrity system, and thus making it easier for other
researcher to pick up where the authors left off.
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Appendix A
Loadable kernel modules
As described in chapter 3.3.1 about the Linux kernel, kernel modules are Linux’s
way of modifying the kernel code at run-time. In this way the kernel may be
extended without the need to reboot the system.
This chapter gives a short introduction to loadable kernel modules (LKMs),
and how they are made. This chapter is in no way meant to be a complete guide to
LKM programming, but it is included to show the reader how relatively easy it is
to change vital data structures of a running Linux kernel.
The following text only applies to the 2.6.x version of the Linux kernel, as the
way kernel modules are written and compiled was altered from the 2.4.x version
[69].
A.1 Making a module
Kernel modules are written in the C language. The compilation process and the
libraries available to the programmer, however differ slightly from the “normal”
C-programming. The usual libc-library is not available to the programmer when
programming in kernel mode. The programmer must rely only on the functions
available within the kernel code. Also most C-programs include a main() method.
This is not the case in kernel modules. Instead the module requires two other
methods to be present: void module_init(void *) and
void module_exit(void *). The first one is called during the installation
of the module, and the second is called when the module is removed. It is however
entirely up to the programmer to decide what these methods should contain.
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As an example of a kernel module, a very simple kernel module written by the
authors is presented below. The intention of this module is to mimic some of the
behaviour of a typical rootkit (see chapter 4).
1 # inc lude < l i n u x / module . h> / / Requ i r ed f o r a l l modules
# inc lude < l i n u x / k e r n e l . h> / / R equ i r e s f o r KERN_ALERT macro
# inc lude < l i n u x / t t y . h> / / For c on s o l e p r i n t
# inc lude < l i n u x / t ime . h> / / For t h e nano s l e ep t h i n g s
# inc lude < l i n u x / sched . h> / / Cur r en t p r o c e s s
6 # inc lude <asm / u n i s t d . h> / / S y s c a l l numbers
# inc lude < l i n u x / s y s c a l l s . h>
# de f i n e THIS_MODULE_AUTHOR "Mads Be rgda l <madsab@if i . u i o . no > , Trond A Sorby < t r o n d a s o@ i f i . u i o . no>"
# de f i n e THIS_MODULE_DESC "A s imp l e r o o t k i t t h a t mimics some r o o t k i t b e h av i ou r "
11
/ / Conven i en t macros
# de f i n e IPRINTK ( fmt , a r g s . . . ) \
p r i n t k (KERN_INFO " C h i l i _ r o o t k i t : " fmt , ## a r g s )
# de f i n e WPRINTK( fmt , a r g s . . . ) \
16 p r i n t k (KERN_WARNING " C h i l i _ r o o t k i t : " fmt , ## a r g s )
# de f i n e EPRINTK( fmt , a r g s . . . ) \
p r i n t k (KERN_ERR " C h i l i _ r o o t k i t : " fmt , ## a r g s )
/ / P r o t o t y p e s
21 s t a t i c unsigned long ** f i n d _ s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e ( void ) ;
/ / G loba l s
s t a t i c unsigned long ** s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e ;
s t a t i c i n t (* o r g_n ano s l e e p ) ( s t r u c t t ime sp e c * req ,
26 s t r u c t t ime sp e c * ) ;
s t a t i c i n t hacked_nano s l e ep ( s t r u c t t ime sp e c * req ,
s t r u c t t ime sp e c *rem ){
/ / Do no t h i n g bu t c a l l org nano s l e ep
31 re turn (* o r g_n ano s l e e p ) ( req , rem ) ;
}
s t a t i c unsigned long ** f i n d _ s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e ( void ) {
/ * Th i s i s a dumb method , bu t i t cou ld be changed t o f i n d
36 t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e s y s c a l l t a b l e more dynamic * /
/ / From " grep s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e / boo t / Sys tem . map"
re turn ( unsigned long **) 0 xc02f24a0 ;
}
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/ / The e n t r y p o i n t f o r t h e module
s t a t i c i n t _ _ i n i t c h i l i _ i n i t ( void ) {
s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e = f i n d _ s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e ( ) ;
IPRINTK ( " Loading c h i l i r o o t k i t , s y s c a l l t a b l e a t %p \ n " ,
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46 s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e ) ;
IPRINTK ( " Hacking t h e s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e . Nanos leep i s a t nbr %i \ n " ,
__NR_nanosleep ) ;
o r g _n ano s l e e p = ( void *) s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_nanosleep ] ;
IPRINTK ( "Org add r o f n ano s l e e p was : %p \ n " , o r g _n ano s l e e p ) ;
51 s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_nanosleep ] = ( void *) hacked_nano s l e ep ;
IPRINTK ( "New addr o f n ano s l e e p i s : %p \ n " ,
( void *) hacked_nano s l e ep ) ;
re turn 0 ;
56 }
s t a t i c vo id _ _ e x i t c h i l i _ c l e a n u p ( void ) {
IPRINTK ( " R e s t o r i n g s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e \ n " ) ;
s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_nanosleep ] = ( void *) o r g_n ano s l e e p ;
61 IPRINTK ( "Addr o f n ano s l e e p i s now %p \ n " ,
s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_nanosleep ] ) ;
}
modu l e _ i n i t ( c h i l i _ i n i t ) ;
66 modu l e_ex i t ( c h i l i _ c l e a n u p ) ;
/ / Get r i d o f t a i n t message by d e c l a r i n g code as GPL .
MODULE_LICENSE( "GPL" ) ;
/ * Who wro te t h i s module ? * /
71 MODULE_AUTHOR(THIS_MODULE_AUTHOR) ;
/ * What does t h i s module do * /
MODULE_DESCRIPTION(THIS_MODULE_DESC ) ;
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This module changes the system call table of the running kernel by swapping
the pointer to the original sys_nanosleep with the address of the hacked_nanosleep
function. The new function, in its current form, does nothing but call the original
function, but it could have done any number of things before returning.
The chili_init function starts of by saving the original address of the sys_nanosleep
function, and then simply inserts the address of its own function into the same po-
sition at the system call table. This is really all it takes to subvert a running kernel.
A.2 Compiling the module
Kernel modules need to be compiled a bit different than regular userspace appli-
cations. The kernel modules use the kernel’s own build mechanism kbuild This
only require the programmer to register the module as a kernel object of type mod-
ule. This is done in the second line in the makefile below:
1 LINUX_DIR = / r o o t / s r c / xen −3 .0 .4 _1−s r c / l i n ux −2.6.16.33− xen
2
obj−m += c h i l i _ r o o t k i t . o
a l l :
$ (MAKE) −C $ (LINUX_DIR ) M=$ (PWD) modules ;
7
c l e a n :
$ (MAKE) −C $ (LINUX_DIR ) M=$ (PWD) c l e a n
Note that the first line in the file above sets the location of the current linux
source code. It is necessary to have access to the source code of the current running
kernel to compile kernel modules.
Upon the execution of the make program from the same directory as this make-
file, the kenrel module will be built. The resulting object file will be given a “.ko”
extension.
A.3 Inserting the module
The program insmod is used to load modules into the kernel. It must be passed
the full path of the module to be inserted. The insmod program does not sort out
dependencies between modules. (If this is needed the more “intelligent” program
modprob may instead be used.)
When insmod is executed with the kernel module name as an argument, the
output in the log file should be something like:
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xenetch:~/chilirootkit# insmod chili_rootkit.ko
Chili_rootkit: Loading chili rootkit, sys call table at c02f24a0
Chili_rootkit: IDT at ff1d9a20 Limit: 2047
Chili_rootkit: Hacking the sys_call_table. Nanosleep is at nbr 162
Chili_rootkit: Org addr of nanosleep was: c01375d0
Chili_rootkit: New addr of nanosleep is: c5008000
To see that the module is indeed loaded into the kernel, one may list all the
currently running modules by executing the lsmod program:
debian:~/chili/trunk/resources/chilirootkit# lsmod | grep rootkit
chili_rootkit 5896 0
A.4 Removing the module
To remove a module currently loaded into the kernel, the program rmmod may be
used. When used like this:
debian:~/chili/trunk/resources/chilirootkit# rmmod chili_rootkit
The output in the kernel logfile would then be something like:
xenetch:~/chilirootkit# rmmod chili_rootkit.ko
Chili_rootkit: Restoring sys_call_table
Chili_rootkit: Addr of nanosleep is now c01375d0
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Appendix B
VFS objects
This chapter describes the four object types of the common file model used in
the Virtual File System Switch (VFS): the superblock object, the inode object, the
dentry object and the file object.
B.1 The Superblock Object
All file systems implement the superblock object, which is used to store informa-
tion describing that specific file system. For disk-based file system, the superblock
object usually corresponds to the filesystem control block stored on
disk [32].
The superblock object contains an operations object, s_op (of type super_-
operations), which contains the methods that the kernel can invoke on a spe-
cific file system. For example, if a file system needs to allocate space for a new
inode object, it would do so by invoking
sb->s_op->alloc_inode(inode);
where sb is a pointer to the file system’s superblock, s_op the superblock’s oper-
ations object and alloc_inode the desired function.
B.2 The Inode Object
The inode object represents all the information needed by the file system to handle
a file. For Unix-style file systems, the inodes are represented on-disk, while for file
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systems which do not have on-disk inodes, the inode objects must be constructed
in whatever manner is applicable to that file system [51].
The inode object contains a number of fields describing the file’s metadata. For
example, the inode contains fields which describes the file type, access mode, time
of the last file access and the number of blocks of the file.Each inode object has an
inode number, which uniquely identifies the file within the file system.
The inode object also contains the inode_operations object, describing
the functions that the VFS can invoke on an inode. This includes functions for
creating, looking up and renaming inodes.
B.3 The Dentry Object
The VFS treats each directory as a file, containing a list of files and other directo-
ries. Thus, in the path /bin/ls, both bin and ls are files. bin is the special
directory file and ls is a regular file. Since both are files, they each have an as-
sociated inode object. Files are most often reffered to with path names, and the
VFS needs an efficient mechanism for mapping the components of a path to their
corresponding inodes. This is achieved by using dentry objects, where each dentry
object represents a directory entry. The path above, /bin/ls, consists of three
dentry objects, one for the / root directory, one for the bin entry of the root direc-
tory and, finally, one for the ls entry of the bin directory.
While inodes and superblocks usually corresponds to a on-disk data structure,
the dentry object only exists in memory. It is created on the fly whenever a direc-
tory entry is read into memory. The dentry_operations object specifies the
methods associated with a dentry object.
Resolving each element in a path name into a dentry object requires consider-
able time, mostly because of the disk accesses required. Thus, the kernel maintains
a dentry cache, which uses a hash table to quicly resove a given path into the asso-
ciated dentry object [51].
B.4 The File Object
The file object is used to represent a file openend by a process. Because several
processes can access the same file at the same time, there can be multiple file
objects in existence for the same file. The f_pos field of the file object contains
the file pointer, the current position in the file from which the next read or write
operation will take place.
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The file object does not correspond to any on-disk data; it is the in-memory
representation of an open file, representing the process’s view of the file.
The file_operations object contains pointers to methods performing op-
erations such as reading and writing a file.
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Appendix C
Installation of Xen
This appendix is a description of how to install the Xen hypervisor.
C.1 Base system
Firstly one have to have a linux distribution to start from. The authors have devel-
oped an affection for Debian, so we first installed a standard version of Debian Etch
using a recent debian-installer (available form http://wwww.debian.org/distrib).
C.2 Xen hypervisor
Before the compilation of Xen starts, there is a need for some prerequisites. To
install these, do this as root from the debian console:
apt-get install zlib1g-dev python-dev libncurses-dev bridge-utils
iproute bzip2 libc6-xen libssl-dev libx11-dev
Then do:
wget http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release \
/3.0.4-1/src.tgz/xen-3.0.4_1-src.tgz
tar zxf xen-3.0.4_1-src.tgz
to download and unpack the xen system.
Then start the compilation by doing:
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cd xen-3.0.4_1-src
make world
This builds a standard xen kernel (pluss tools) that can be used both in Dom0 and
DomU. Hopefully all goes well and one will end up with a warning saying that
latex must be installed to build the manual. (Ignore this for now).
Then continue with:
make install
which, amongst other things, copies the kernel and the needed tools (xend, xm etc)
to their "correct" directories. The next thing to do is to make an initial ramdisk:
update-initramfs -c -k 2.6.16.33-xen
C.2.1 Grub configuration
Now Grub (the bootloader) needs to be set up propperly. Edit the Grub configura-
tion to allow the system to boot from the new kernel. Do this:
nano /boot/grub/menu.lst
and add:
title Xen 3.0 / XenLinux 2.6
kernel /boot/xen-3.0.gz dom0\_mem=262144
module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.16.33-xen \
root=/dev/hdb1 ro console=tty0
module /boot/initrd.img-2.6.16.33-xen
before the other kernel entries.
C.2.2 Booting Xen dom0
Now it is time to reboot the system. Hopefully one now ends up in a new system
running on the xen-kernel just made. When the system comes up one can do:
xend start; xm list
and this should produce something like this:
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Name ID Mem(MiB) VCPUs State Time(s)
Domain-0 0 256 1 r----- 34.8
This shows the dom0 kernel running.
C.3 User domain
To get another domain up and running, first install the debian package xen-tools to
help install and configure new user domains. Do this:
apt-get install xen-tools
Then create a directory to contain the domU files:
mkdir /home/xen
Next, edit these fields in the file /etc/xen-tools/xen-tools.conf :
dir = /home/xen
debootstrap = 1
size = 4Gb
memory = 128Mb
swap = 128Mb
fs = ext3
dist = etch
image = sparse
gateway = 192.168.2.1 # replace with your own settings
netmask = 255.255.255.0
passwd = 1
kernel = /boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xen
initrd = /boot/initrd.img-2.6.16.33-xen
mirror = http://ftp.no.debian.org/debian/
Now, one can create the guest image by doing:
xen-create-image --hostname=xenetch --ip=192.168.2.201
When the image is created, it is started by doing:
xm create xenetch.cfg -c
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This automatically connects to the console of the new domain. To avoid this; start
without the “-c” option. To connect to the console of a domain, use the xm tool
like this: xm console <domID>
From dom0 one can now list the domains again (xm list). Two domains
should now be seen running.
C.4 Documentation
To install the documentation, do the following:
apt-get install tetex-base tetex-extra
apt-get install doxygen
apt-get install gs-common
apt-get install transfig
make dev-docs
make install-docs
This creates and installs the man pages of xm, xend etc.
Appendix D
Description of some rootkits
This appendix gives a brief description of the main attack techniques and capabili-
ties of some of the kernel level rootkits mentioned in this thesis. This must not be
seen as an exhaustive list of these rootkit’s capabilities. Most of these rootkits are
undocumented, and to get a full understanding of the inner workings of them, one
has to carefully read their source code. The authors have only superficially done
this for most of the mentioned rootkits.
D.1 Adore-ng
Adore-ng [1] is one of the most sophisticated kernel mode rootkits known today.
It uses manipulation of the Virtual File System to return false information to the
user mode tools depending on the kernel. This means that it does not alter the
system call table in any way, and is therefor not detected by most kernel level
malware detection tools. Adore-ng also filters all information written to e.g syslog
and lastlog. It contains an advanced mechanism to hide that the network interface
is in promiscuous mode. The rootkit also supports the ability to infect an already
installed kernel module, making it able to get itself re-loaded as the kernel reboots.
Some of the more common rootkit-features like process- and file hiding, and the
ability to promote the privileges of a normal user, is also implemented. Adore-ng
can be controlled both through a user mode program called Ava, or through a set
of echo and cat commands. This rootkit has also proved to be able to run on a
grate variety of linux kernels, making it highly portable.
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D.2 SucKIT
The SucKIT or “Super User Control Kit” [18] is a rootkit that implements much of
the same functionality as Adore-ng does. Two interesting and important differences
should however be pointed out. Firstly, SucKIT is not a loadable kernel module
rootkit. This rootkit inserts itself through the use of /proc/kmem (see section 4.4.2).
This means that it writes itself directly into the running kernel’s memory. Second,
this rootkit uses a parallell system call table (see section 4.4.2) to be able to filter
information that is requested from the kernel, meaning that it, by altering the inter-
rupt descriptor table (IDT), is able to redirect all system calls to a new version of
the system_call function. In this way, SucKIT, as Adore-ng does, avoids all rootkit
detection tools looking for changes in the original system call table.
D.3 mood-nt
mood-nt [12] is also a rootkit that installs itself via /proc/kmem. This rootkit
changes some of the system call pointers in the system call table (e.g the sys_uname
system call). As most other rootkits this rootkit also implements the ability to hide
files, processes, open connections etc. Although it achieves this in a less elegant
manner than Adore-ng and SucKIT as it relies on making changes to the system
call table.
D.4 Override
Override [13] also relies on changes to the system call table to keep itself hidden.
The override rootkit was written by a computer science student for demonstra-
tion purposes only. It does not implement any surprising functionality besides the
normal hide and privilege-granting mechanisms of most other rootkits. Below is a
snippet from the source code of this rootkit, showing which system calls this rootkit
replaces. As shown the intercepted system calls are: getuid, geteuid, getdents64,
chdir and read.
int intercept_syscalls () {
#ifdef DEBUG
printk (KERN_INFO"Intercepting Syscalls\n");
#endif
INTERCEPT(getuid);
INTERCEPT(geteuid);
INTERCEPT(getdents64);
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INTERCEPT(chdir);
INTERCEPT(read);
// get pointers to some needed functions
org_write = (void *) sys_call_table[__NR_write];
org_open = (void *) sys_call_table[__NR_open];
org_stat = (void *) sys_call_table[__NR_stat];
org_brk = (void *) sys_call_table[__NR_brk];
return 1;
}
D.5 eNYeLKM
The eNYeLKM is a loadable kernel module rootkit that utilizes yet another attack
technique. It does not modify the system call table nor the interrupt descriptor
table, but instead modifies the system_call and sysenter_entry handlers (see section
3.3.6) to change the behavior of the kernel. It is then able to hide files, directories,
processes, parts of files, connections, modules etc. It also has the ability to give a
unprivileged user privileged access.
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Appendix E
Chili source code
This appendix contains the relevant source code that was written during the work
with this thesis. Below is a list of the files that are listet in detail throughout this
appendix.
E.1 core/console.py
E.2 core/engine.py
E.3 core/admin.py
E.4 core/oslibrary.py
E.5 core/inspector.py
E.6 core/policy.py
E.7 policies/IDTMonitor.py
E.8 policies/SyscallMonitor.py
E.9 policies/ProcMonitor.py
E.10 policies/KernelVsyscall.py
E.11 core/target.py
E.12 targets/SysCallTable.py
E.13 src/targets_data/sct_target_data/sct_target_data.c
E.14 src/targets_data/sct_target_data/sct_target_data.h
E.15 src/targets_data/sct_target_data/swig/sct_target_data.i
E.16 targets/ServiceRoutineArray.py
E.17 src/targets_data/sr_target_data/sr_target_data.c
E.18 src/targets_data/sr_target_data/sr_target_data.h
E.19 src/targets_data/sr_target_data/swig/sr_target_data.i
E.20 targets/IDT.py
E.21 src/targets_data/idt_target_data/idt_target_data.c
135
136 APPENDIX E. CHILI SOURCE CODE
E.22 src/targets_data/idt_target_data/idt_target_data.h
E.23 src/targets_data/idt_target_data/swig/idt_target_data.i
E.24 targets/Proc.py
E.25 src/targets_data/syscall_table_target_data/proc_target_data.c
E.26 src/targets_data/syscall_table_target_data/proc_target_data.h
E.27 src/targets_data/syscall_table_target_data/swig/proc_target_data.i
E.28 targets/KernelText.py
E.29 src/targets_data/kernel_text_target_data/kernel_text_target_data.c
E.30 src/targets_data/kernel_text_target_data/kernel_text_target_data.h
E.31 src/targets_data/kernel_text_target_data/swig/kernel_text_target_data.i
E.32 targets/MemoryArea.py
E.33 src/targets_data/memory_area_target_data/memory_area_target_data.c
E.34 src/targets_data/memory_area_target_data/memory_area_target_data.h
E.35 src/targets_data/memory_area_target_data/swig/memory_area_target_data.i
E.36.1 libca.c
E.36.2 libca.h
E.36.3 override.diff
E.1 console.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e u s e r i n t e r f a c e o f t h e
4 # c h i l i f ramework . I t u s e s t h e cmd module t o hand l e i n p u t
# parame t e r s t o t h e g i v e n commands , d i s p l a y i n g he l p e t c . The
# con s o l e i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e eng ine , and b a s i c a l l y l e t s
# t h e eng i n e do a l l t h e work .
9 # Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
import sys , cmd , s t r i n g , s o c k e t
from c h i l i . c o r e . eng i n e import Engine
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
14 from c h i l i . c o r e import admin
from t h r e a d i n g import Thread
import t h r e a d i n g
c l a s s Conso le ( cmd .Cmd, Thread ) :
19
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , t h r e adFuncAr r ay ) :
i f t h r e adFuncAr r ay == None :
cmd .Cmd . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
Thread . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
24 s e l f . e ng i n e = Engine ( )
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s e l f . prompt = ’> ’
v e r s i o n = ’ 0 . 1 . 1 ’
s e l f . i n t r o = ’ C h i l i (%s ) , r unn i ng a t %s ’ % ( ve r s i o n , s o c k e t . g e t ho s t name ( ) )
29 # S e t domain d i r e c t l y i f domain ID i s p ro v i d ed
i f l e n ( sy s . a rgv ) > 1 and sy s . a rgv [ 1 ] . i s d i g i t ( ) :
s e l f . do_setdom ( sy s . a rgv [ 1 ] )
s e l f . i n t r o = s e l f . i n t r o + ’ \ nMon i t o r i ng dom ’ + sy s . a rgv [ 1 ]
f o r param in sy s . a rgv :
34 i f param == ’−v ’ or param == ’−−ve r bo s e ’ :
s e l f . do_se tLogLeve l ( ’ s t d o u t ’ )
i f param == ’−a ’ or param == ’−−a c t i v a t e A l l ’ :
s e l f . d o _ a c t i v a t e ( ’ a l l ’ )
39 e l s e :
Thread . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
s e l f . admin = admin . Admin ( )
s e l f . f u n c t i o n = t h r e adFuncAr r ay [ 0 ]
s e l f . f u n c t i o nPa r ams = t h r e adFuncAr r ay [ 1 : ]
44
#Run method f o r a new t h r e ad
def run ( s e l f ) :
i f s e l f . f u n c t i o n == " l i s tDoma i n s " :
49 s e l f . admin . l i s tDoma i n s ( )
e l i f s e l f . f u n c t i o n == " unpause " :
s e l f . admin . unpauseDomain ( s e l f . f u n c t i o nPa r ams [ 0 ] )
def do_qu i t ( s e l f , a r g ) :
54 s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o ( " S h u t t i n g down . . . " )
s y s . e x i t ( 1 )
def h e l p _ q u i t ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " Syn tax : q u i t "
59 pr in t " Te rm ina t e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n "
def do_se tLogLeve l ( s e l f , a r g ) :
i f a rg == ’ f i l e ’ :
s e l f . e ng i n e . s e tLogLeve l (LOGONLY)
64 pr in t ’ Verbose mode o f f ’
e l i f a rg == ’ s t d o u t ’ :
s e l f . e ng i n e . s e tLogLeve l (LOGANDPRINT)
pr in t ’ Verbose mode on ’
e l s e :
69 s e l f . h e l p _ s e tLogLeve l ( )
def he l p_ s e tLogLeve l ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " Syn tax : s e tLogLeve l < l e v e l >"
pr in t " l e v e l can be ’ f i l e ’ which l o g s t o f i l e on ly "
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74 pr in t " o r ’ s t d o u t ’ which l o g s t o f i l e and p r i n t s t o s t d o u t . "
def d o _ l i s t P o l i c i e s ( s e l f , a r g ) :
i f a rg == ’ a c t i v e ’ :
r e t u r n L i s t = s e l f . e ng i n e . l i s t A c t i v e P o l i c i e s ( )
79 i f l e n ( r e t u r n L i s t ) == 0 :
pr in t "No a c t i v e p o l i c i e s ! "
e l s e :
pr in t ’ Ac t i v e p o l i c i e s : ’
f o r p in r e t u r n L i s t :
84 pr in t p
e l s e :
s e l f . e ng i n e . l i s t A v a i l a b l e P o l i c i e s ( )
def h e l p _ l i s t P o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) :
89 pr in t " Syn tax : l i s t [MODIFIER] "
pr in t " L i s t p o l i c i e s ( a l l a v a i l a b l e p o l i c i e s by d e f a u l t ) "
pr in t " "
pr in t " Mod i f i e r s : "
pr in t " a c t i v e − l i s t on ly a c t i v e p o l i c i e s "
94
def do_ l i s tDoma i n s ( s e l f , a r g ) :
#Run t h i s on a s e p a r a t e t h r e ad
t h r = Conso le ( [ " l i s tDoma i n s " , None ] )
t h r . s t a r t ( )
99 t h r . j o i n ( )
def h e l p _ l i s tDoma i n s ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " L i s t s a l l t h e c u r r e n t r unn i ng domains "
104 def d o _ l i s t T a r g e t s ( s e l f , a r g ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . l i s t T a r g e t s ( )
def h e l p _ l i s t T a r g e t s ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " L i s t s a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e t a r g e t s "
109
def do_setdom ( s e l f , a r g ) :
domID = i n t ( a r g )
s e l f . e ng i n e . setDomID ( domID )
114 def he lp_se tdom ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " Syn tax : setdom <domID>"
pr in t " S e t s t h e a c t i v e Xen domain "
def d o _ a c t i v a t e ( s e l f , a r g ) :
119 s e l f . e ng i n e . a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( a rg )
def h e l p _ a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " Syn tax : a c t i v a t e < po l i c y > , o r a c t i v a t e a l l "
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pr in t " A c t i v a t e s one p o l i c y o r a l l p o l i c i e s \ n i f t h e argument ’ a l l ’ i s g i ven "
124
def d o _ d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f , a r g ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . d e a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( a rg )
def h e l p _ d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
129 pr in t " Syn tax : d e a c t i v a t e < po l i c y > or d e a c t i v a t e a l l "
pr in t " D e a c t i v a t e s one p o l i c y o r a l l p o l i c i e s \ n i f t h e argument ’ a l l ’ i s g i ven "
def do_unpause ( s e l f , a r g ) :
t h r = Conso le ( [ " unpause " , a r g ] )
134 t h r . s t a r t ( )
t h r . j o i n ( )
def he lp_unpause ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " Syn tax : unpause <domID>"
139 pr in t " Unpauses a paused domain "
# s h o r t c u t s
do_q = do_qu i t
144 i f __name__ == ’ __main__ ’ :
con = Conso le ( None )
con . cmdloop ( con . i n t r o )
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E.2 engine.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
2
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code o f t h e eng i n e t h a t makes up
# t h e core o f t h e c h i l i f ramework . The eng i n e l oad s a l l
# a v a i l a b l e p o l i c i e s ( bu t does no t a u t om a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e them ) .
# I t s e t s up t h e l o gg i n g mechanism which makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r
7 # a l l t h e p o l i c i e s t o w r i t e t h e i r o u t p u t t o t h e l og
# f i l e . I t a l s o s e t s up t h e s c h e d u l e r which are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
# s c h e d u l i n g each o f t h e p o l i c i e s method o f c ho i c e i n a round
rob i n
# f a s h i o n . I t a l s o i n s t a n t i a t e s an i n s p e c t o r o b j e c t t h rough which
i t can
# s upp l y i n f o rma t i o n abou t t a r g e t s t o t h e r e q u e s t i n g p o l i c i e s , and
an
12 # a dm i n i s t r a t o r o b j e c t t h rough which i t can send commands t o t h e
Xen
# h y p e r v i s o r . The eng i n e i s a l s o t h e one t h a t does t h e a c t u a l work
on
# r e q u e s t s from t h e c on s o l e module .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
17
import os , sys , re , t ime
import l o g g i n g
from c h i l i . c o r e import i n s p e c t o r , o s l i b r a r y , admin
22 import c h i l i . p o l i c i e s
from c h i l i . t a s k k i t import Schedu l e r , Task
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
c l a s s Engine ( o b j e c t ) :
27
c l a s s Ch i l i T a s k ( Task . Task ) :
" " " Ch i l i T a s k s a r e s c h edu l e d by t h e e ng i n e s s c h e d u l e r . For
now i t
i s on ly used by t h e p o l i c y modules .
32 " " "
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , method ) :
s e l f . _method = method
def run ( s e l f ) :
37 s e l f . _method ( )
## I n i t ##
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f ) :
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42 s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s = {}
s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r = None
s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r = None
s e l f . admin = None
s e l f . l o gLeve l = None
47 s e l f . _ s e t u p ( )
def _ s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
## l o gg i n g ##
l o g g i n g . b a s i cCon f i g ( l e v e l = l o gg i n g .DEBUG,
52 f o rma t = ’%( a s c t ime ) s %(name )−12s %(
l eve lname )−8s %(message ) s ’ ,
d a t e fm t = ’%m−%d %H:%M:%S ’ ,
f i l e n ame= ’ / r o o t / c h i l i . l og ’ ,
f i l emode = ’ a ’ )
57 s e l f . l o g g e r = l o gg i n g . ge tLogge r ( )
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( " I n i t i a l i z i n g a p p l i c a t i o n . . . " )
s e l f . s e tLogLeve l (LOGONLY)
62
s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r = i n s p e c t o r . I n s p e c t o r ( )
s e l f . admin = admin . Admin ( )
67 s e l f . _ l o a d P o l i c i e s ( c h i l i . p o l i c i e s . __pa th__ [ 0 ] )
s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r = Sch edu l e r . S ch edu l e r ( )
s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r . s t a r t ( )
72 s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( " Ap p l i c a t i o n i n i t i a l i z e d . . . " )
## Adm i n i s t r a t o r methods ##
def s e tLogLeve l ( s e l f , l e v e l ) :
77 " " " S e t s t h e a c t i v e l o g l e v e l " " "
i f l e v e l == LOGONLY:
s e l f . l o gLeve l = l e v e l
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( "Log l e v e l i s : l og t o f i l e on ly " )
e l i f l e v e l == LOGANDPRINT:
82 s e l f . l o gLeve l = l e v e l
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( "Log l e v e l i s : l og a l l and p r i n t t o
s t d o u t " )
e l s e :
pr in t "Unknown l o g l e v e l "
87 def l i s tDoma i n s ( s e l f ) :
" " " L i s t s t h e c u r r e n t r unn i ng domains " " "
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s e l f . admin . l i s tDoma i n s ( )
def pauseDomain ( s e l f , dom) :
92 " " " Suspends t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a r unn i ng domain , and pu t s
i t i n a paused s t a t e " " "
s e l f . admin . pauseDomain ( dom)
def unpauseDomain ( s e l f , dom) :
97 " " " Unpauses a p r e v i o u s l y paused domain " " "
s e l f . admin . unpauseDomain ( dom)
i f s e l f . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( "Domain %i unpaused " % dom)
102 ## I n s p e c t o r methods ##
def setDomID ( s e l f , domID ) :
s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r . setDomID ( domID )
def i n s p e c t ( s e l f , t a r g e t ) :
107 re turn s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r . i n s p e c t T a r g e t ( t a r g e t )
## Sch edu l e r methods ##
112 def s c h e d u l e P e r i o d i c ( s e l f , s t a r t , p e r i od , method , name ) :
" " " Schedu l e a t a s k t o be run a t < s t a r t > , and t h en eve ry <
pe r i od >
seconds .
" " "
117 t a s k = s e l f . Ch i l i T a s k ( method )
s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r . a d dP e r i o d i cAc t i o n ( t ime . t ime ( ) , p e r i od ,
t a sk , name )
def s c h e d u l eDa i l y ( s e l f , hour , minute , method , name ) :
" " " Schedu l e a t a s k t o be run d a i l y a t t h e s p e c i f i e d t ime .
122
" " "
t a s k = s e l f . Ch i l i T a s k ( method )
s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r . a ddDa i l yAc t i on ( hour , minute , t a sk , name )
127 def schedu leOnce ( s e l f , t ime , method , name ) :
" " " Schedu l e a t a s k t o be run once , a t t h e s p e c i f i e d t ime .
" " "
t a s k = s e l f . Ch i l i T a s k ( method )
132 s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r . addTimedAct ion ( t ime , t a sk , name )
def un s chedu l e ( s e l f , name ) :
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s e l f . _ s c h e d u l e r . u n r e g i s t e r T a s k ( name )
137
## Po l i c y methods ##
def l i s t A v a i l a b l e P o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) :
142 " " " L i s t s a v a i l a b l e p o l i c i e s " " "
f o r p o l i c y in s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . keys ( ) :
pr in t p o l i c y
147 def l i s t A c t i v e P o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) :
" " " L i s t s a c t i v e p o l i c i e s " " "
l i s t O f A c t i v e = [ ]
f o r p o l i c y in s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . keys ( ) :
i f s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s [ p o l i c y ] [ ’ a c t i v e ’ ] == True :
152 l i s t O f A c t i v e . append ( p o l i c y )
re turn l i s t O f A c t i v e
def a c t i v a t e A l l P o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) :
" " " A c t i v a t e s a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e p o l i c i e s " " "
157 i f s e l f . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
pr in t ’ A c t i v a t i n g a l l p o l i c i e s ’
f o r p o l i c y in s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . keys ( ) :
s e l f . a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( p o l i c y )
162 def a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( s e l f , a r g ) :
" " " A c t i v a t e s a p o l i c y . " " "
p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y = None
i f a rg == ’ a l l ’ :
s e l f . a c t i v a t e A l l P o l i c i e s ( )
167 e l s e :
a r g s = a rg . s p l i t ( )
po l i cy_name = a r g s [ 0 ]
i f l e n ( a r g s ) > 1 :
p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y = a r g s [ 1 ]
172
i f s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . has_key ( po l i cy_name ) :
p o l i c y = s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s [ po l i cy_name ]
i f not p o l i c y [ ’ a c t i v e ’ ] :
p o l i c y [ ’ a c t i v e ’ ] = True
177 p o l i c y [ ’ o b j e c t ’ ] . a c t i v a t e ( )
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( " P o l i c y ’%s ’ a c t i v a t e d " %
pol i cy_name )
i f s e l f . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
pr in t ( " P o l i c y ’%s ’ a c t i v a t e d " %
pol i cy_name )
i f p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y i s not None :
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182 i f p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y == HIGH or
p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y == LOW:
p o l i c y [ ’ o b j e c t ’ ] . s e t S e n s i t i v i t y (
p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y )
e l s e :
r a i s e Excep t ion , ’%s i s unknown
s e n s i t i v i t y l e v e l ’ %
p o l i c y _ s e n s i t i v i t y
e l s e :
187 r a i s e KeyError , ’%s i s no t a v a l i d key ’ %
pol i cy_name
def d e a c t i v a t e A l l P o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) :
f o r p o l i c y in s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . keys ( ) :
s e l f . d e a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( p o l i c y )
192
def d e a c t i v a t e P o l i c y ( s e l f , a r g ) :
" " " D e a c t i v a t e s t h e p o l i c y . " " "
i f a rg == ’ a l l ’ :
s e l f . d e a c t i v a t e A l l P o l i c i e s ( )
197 e l s e :
i f s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s . has_key ( a rg ) :
p o l i c y = s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s [ a r g ]
p o l i c y [ ’ a c t i v e ’ ] = F a l s e
p o l i c y [ ’ o b j e c t ’ ] . d e a c t i v a t e ( )
202 s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( " P o l i c y ’%s ’ d e a c t i v a t e d " % a rg )
i f s e l f . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
pr in t ( " P o l i c y ’%s ’ d e a c t i v a t e d " % a rg )
e l s e :
r a i s e KeyError , ’%s i s no t a v a l i d key ’ %
pol i cy_name
207
def _ l o a d P o l i c i e s ( s e l f , d i r ) :
" " " Loads p o l i c i e s from t h e g iven d i r e c t o r y . P o l i c i e s a r e
no t
a c t i v a t e d upon l oad i ng , bu t most be e x p l i c i t l y a c t i v i a t e d .
212 " " "
t ry :
f i l e s = os . l i s t d i r ( d i r )
excep t Excep t ion , message :
217 pr in t message
sy s . e x i t ( 1 )
f o r f i l e n ame in f i l e s :
i f f i l e n ame . end sw i t h ( " . py " ) and not f i l e n ame == ’
_ _ i n i t _ _ . py ’ and not f i l e n ame . s t a r t s w i t h ( " . " ) :
222
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module_basename = r e . sub ( ’ . py$ ’ , ’ ’ , f i l e n ame )
modu le_ fu l lname = ’ c h i l i . p o l i c i e s . ’ +
module_basename
i f module_ fu l lname not in sy s . modules :
227 __ impor t__ ( modu le_ fu l lname )
s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( "Module %s l oaded " %
modu le_ fu l lname )
exec " p o l i c y = sy s . modules [ modu le_ fu l lname ].% s
( s e l f ) " % module_basename
i f i s s u b c l a s s ( p o l i c y . __c l a s s__ , c h i l i . c o r e .
p o l i c y . P o l i c y ) :
232 p d i c t = {}
name = module_basename
p d i c t [ ’ o b j e c t ’ ] = p o l i c y
p d i c t [ ’ a c t i v e ’ ] = F a l s e
s e l f . _ p o l i c i e s [ name ] = p d i c t
237 s e l f . l o g g e r . i n f o ( "A new po l i c y i s
a v a i l a b l e : ’%s ’ " % name )
# L i b r a r y methods
def l i s t T a r g e t s ( s e l f ) :
242 t a r g e t s = s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r . _ o s l i b r a r y . l i s t T a r g e t s ( )
pr in t t a r g e t s
def g e t L i b r a r yH e l p e r ( s e l f , h e l p e r ) :
re turn s e l f . _ i n s p e c t o r . _ o s l i b r a r y . g e tHe l p e r ( h e l p e r )
247
## T e s t ##
i f __name__ == ’ __main__ ’ :
252 pr in t " T e s t i n g eng i n e "
eng i n e = Engine ( )
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E.3 admin.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
3 # Th i s module makes heavy use o f t h e xm t o o l from xen . Th i s module
# a c t s as a wrapper t o t h e xm t o o l . Th i s way we can u t i l i z e t h e xm
# t o o l bu t make our own method names and i n p u t check s .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
8
import sy s
import os
sy s . p a t h . append ( ’ / u s r / l i b / py thon ’ )
13 sy s . p a t h . append ( ’ / u s r / l i b 6 4 / py thon ’ )
from xen . xm import main
c l a s s Admin ( o b j e c t ) :
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f ) :
18 pass
def l i s tDoma i n s ( s e l f ) :
" " " L i s t s t h e c u r r e n t r unn i ng domains " " "
main . main ( [ ’xm ’ , ’ l i s t ’ ] )
23
def pauseDomain ( s e l f , dom) :
" " " Suspends t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a r unn i ng domain , and pu t s
i t i n a paused s t a t e " " "
main . main ( [ ’xm ’ , ’ pause ’ , dom ] )
28
def unpauseDomain ( s e l f , dom) :
" " " Unpauses a p r e v i o u s l y paused domain " " "
main . main ( [ ’xm ’ , ’ unpause ’ , dom ] )
33 # T e s t
i f __name__ == ’ __main__ ’ :
pr in t " Te s t r u n f o r t h e c h i l i admin module ! "
admin = Admin ( )
admin . l i s tDoma i n s ( )
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E.4 oslibrary..py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
3 # Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e OS L i b r a r y o b j e c t . The OS
# l i b r a r y s e r v e s as a wrapper f o r a l l t h e d i f f e r e n t t a r g e t s i n t h e
# framework . I t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n s t a n t i a t i n g and r e t u r n i n g a
f r e s h
# t a r g e t ( as i t i s i n memory now ) when r e q u e s t e d . As t h e t a r g e t s
are
# h i g h l y o p e r a t i n g s y s t em dependen t , t h i s would be t h e r i g h t p l a c e
t o
8 # imp lemen t s u ppo r t f o r o p e r a t i n g s y s t em meta da ta . C u r r e n t l y t h e
OS
# L i b r a r y i s on l y used by t h e i n s p e c t o r o b j e c t .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
13 import c h i l i . t a r g e t s
import os
c l a s s OSLibrary ( o b j e c t ) :
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f ) :
18 s e l f . _ t a r g e t s = c h i l i . t a r g e t s . _ _ a l l _ _
s e l f . domID = None
s e l f . h e l p e r s = {}
s e l f . _ i n i t _ h e l p e r s ( )
23
def _ i n i t _ h e l p e r s ( s e l f ) :
" " " I n i t i a l i z e t h e h e l p e r s d i c t i o n a r y o f t h e OSLibrary .
Data t h a t may be of use f o r s e v e r a l t a r g e t s may be p l a c e d
he r e .
28 " " "
s e l f . _ h e l p e r _ s y s c a l l s ( )
def _ h e l p e r _ s y s c a l l s ( s e l f ) :
33 s y s c a l l s = [ ]
# s y s c a l l _ t a b l e . S c o n t a i n s t h e names o f a l l t h e s y s c a l l s
f i l e n ame = os . p a t h . j o i n ( c h i l i . t a r g e t s . __pa th__ [ 0 ] , ’
s y s c a l l _ t a b l e . S ’ )
38 i n f i l e = open ( f i l ename , ’ r ’ )
# throw away
i n f i l e . r e a d l i n e ( )
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43 f o r l i n e in i n f i l e :
s y s c a l l = l i n e . s p l i t ( ) [ 1 ]
s y s c a l l s . append ( s y s c a l l )
s e l f . h e l p e r s [ ’ s y s c a l l s ’ ] = s y s c a l l s
48
def g e tHe l p e r ( s e l f , h e l p e r ) :
i f s e l f . h e l p e r s . has_key ( h e l p e r ) :
re turn s e l f . h e l p e r s [ h e l p e r ]
53 e l s e :
r a i s e ValueEr ro r , ’%s i s no t i n t h e h e l p e r s d i c t i o n a r y
’ % h e l p e r
def setDomID ( s e l f , domID ) :
58 s e l f . domID = domID
def g e t T a r g e t ( s e l f , t a r g e t T y p e ) :
" " " Re t u r n s a t a r g e t o b j e c t o f t h e g iven t ype " " "
63 i f s e l f . domID i s None :
r a i s e ValueEr ro r , ’DomID i s no t s e t ’
e l s e :
i f t a r g e t T y p e in s e l f . _ t a r g e t s :
__ impor t__ ( ’ c h i l i . t a r g e t s . ’ + t a r g e t T y p e )
68
exec " t a r g e t = c h i l i . t a r g e t s .% s .%s ( ’ a_name ’ , s e l f .
domID ) " % ( t a r g e tType , t a r g e t T y p e )
re turn t a r g e t
e l s e :
r a i s e ValueEr ro r , ’%s i s no t a v a l i d t a r g e t ’ %
t a r g e t T y p e
73
def l i s t T a r g e t s ( s e l f ) :
" " " Re t u r n s a l i s t c o n t a i n i n g t h e a v a i l a b l e t a r g e t t y p e s " " "
re turn s e l f . _ t a r g e t s
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E.5 inspector.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
2
# The i n s p e c t o r o b j e c t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e t u r n i n g a c u r r e n t
# r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from memory o f a g i v e n t a r g e t . I t u s e s t h e
# OS L i b r a r y t o i n s t a n t i a t e a new t a r g e t o b j e c t o f t h e g i v e n t y p e .
7 # Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
import o s l i b r a r y
c l a s s I n s p e c t o r ( o b j e c t ) :
12 def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . _ o s l i b r a r y = o s l i b r a r y . OSLibrary ( )
def setDomID ( s e l f , domID ) :
s e l f . _ o s l i b r a r y . setDomID ( domID )
17
def i n s p e c t T a r g e t ( s e l f , t a r g e t ) :
re turn s e l f . _ o s l i b r a r y . g e t T a r g e t ( t a r g e t )
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E.6 policy.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
# Th i s f i l e i s t h e i n t e r f a c e f o r t h e p o l i c i e s we are u s i ng i n
# t h e c h i l i f ramework .
5
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
10 c l a s s Po l i c y ( o b j e c t ) :
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , e ng i n e ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e = eng i ne
s e l f . s e t u p ( )
15 # De f a u l t t o HIGH f o r a l l
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = HIGH
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
pr in t " I ’m t h e p o l i c y base c l a s s . . . "
20
def a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " method no t implemented by
s u b c l a s s ! "
def d e a c t i v a e ( s e l f ) :
25 r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " method no t implemented by
s u b c l a s s ! "
def doMyStuff ( s e l f ) :
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " method no t implemented by
s u b c l a s s ! "
30 def s e t S e n s i t i v i t y ( s e l f , s e n s i t i v i t y ) :
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " method no t implemented by
s u b c l a s s ! "
def l og ( s e l f , msg ) :
35 i f s e l f . e ng i n e . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
s e l f . _ l o g _ a n d _ p r i n t (msg )
e l s e :
s e l f . _ l og_on l y (msg )
40
def _ l og_on l y ( s e l f , msg ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o (msg )
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def _ l o g _ a n d _ p r i n t ( s e l f , msg ) :
45 s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o (msg )
pr in t ( msg )
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E.7 IDTMonitor.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
3 # Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e I n t e r u p t D e s c r i p t o r Tab le (
IDT )
# p o l i c y mon i t o r . I t u s e s t h e IDT t a r g e t t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n abou t
t h e c u r r e n t
# IDT o f t h e domU . When t h e checksum o f t h e t a b l e
# i s changed t h e p o l i c y s i g n a l s t h e eng i n e t o pause t h e u s e r
domain .
8 # Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
import t ime
import c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
13
c l a s s IDTMonitor ( c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y . P o l i c y ) :
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
# S e t s t h e s econds be tween each p o l l
18 s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l = 5
def s e t S e n s i t i v i t y ( s e l f , s e n s i t i v i t y ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = s e n s i t i v i t y
23 def a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = LOW
s e l f . t a r g e t _ o l d = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " IDT" )
s e l f . e ng i n e . s c h e d u l e P e r i o d i c ( t ime . t ime ( ) ,
s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l ,
28 s e l f . doMyStuff ,
’ IDTMonitor_doMyStuff ’ )
def d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . un s ch edu l e ( ’ IDTMonitor_doMyStuff ’ )
33
def decideWhatToDo ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . l og ( ’ ’ )
s e l f . l og ( ’ IDTMonitor : IDT t a b l e has changed ! ’ )
s e l f . l og ( ’ IDTMonitor : MD5 was : %s ’ % s e l f . d i g e s t _ o l d )
38 s e l f . l og ( ’ IDTMonitor : MD5 i s : %s ’ % s e l f . d i g e s t _new )
# Check log l e v e l i f t h e domain shou l d be paused
i f s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y == HIGH :
s e l f . l og ( ’ IDTMonitor : Domain %s was paused a c c o r d i n g
t o p o l i c y ’ %
43 s e l f . t a r g e t _ o l d . domID )
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s e l f . e ng i n e . pauseDomain ( s e l f . t a r g e t _ o l d . domID )
def doMyStuff ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . t a r g e t _ n ew = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " IDT" )
48
s e l f . s t a t e _n ew = s e l f . t a r g e t _ n ew . g e t S t a t e ( )
s e l f . s t a t e _ o l d = s e l f . t a r g e t _ o l d . g e t S t a t e ( )
s e l f . d i g e s t _new = s e l f . s t a t e _n ew . g e tD i g e s t ( )
53 s e l f . d i g e s t _ o l d = s e l f . s t a t e _ o l d . g e tD i g e s t ( )
i f not s e l f . d i g e s t _new == s e l f . d i g e s t _ o l d :
# The IDT has changed
s e l f . decideWhatToDo ( )
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E.8 SyscallMonitor.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
2
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e S y s c a l l s p o l i c y mon i t o r . I t
u s e s
# t h e S y s c a l l s t a r g e t t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n abou t t h e c u r r e n t S y s c a l l
# p ro c edu r e s o f t h e domU . When one o f t h e a dd r e s s e s i n t h e s y s c a l l
t a b l e
# i s changed , t h e d i g e s t o f t h e a r ray o f S y s c a l l s t r u c t s w i l l
change . I f
7 # t h e d i g e s t o f one o f t h e s e r v i c e r o u t i n e s p o i n t e d t o by t h e s e
# add r e s s e s changes t h e p o l i c y w i l l n o t i c e t h i s t oo . Depending on
t h e
# l o g l e v e l d e f i n e d by t h e eng ine , t h e p o l i c y w i l l s i g n a l s t h e
eng i n e t o
# pause t h e u s e r domain . I n f o rma t i o n abou t which s y s t em c a l l
s t r u c t u r e
# was changed i s w r i t t e n t o t h e l og .
12
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
import t ime
import c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y
17 import sy s
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
c l a s s Sy s c a l lMon i t o r ( c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y . P o l i c y ) :
22 def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
pass
def a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = LOW
27
# Sys tem c a l l t a b l e t a r g e t s
s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " Sy sCa l lT ab l e "
)
s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r = s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g
32 s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ s i z e = s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( ) .
s i z e
s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ t a b l e = s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( )
. t a b l e
# S e r v i c e r o u t i n e s t a r g e t s
s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ o r g = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( "
S e r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y " )
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37 s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ o r g . setSCT ( s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g .
g e t S t a t e ( ) . t a b l e , s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ s i z e )
s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ c u r = s e l f .
s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ o r g
s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e _ n ame s = s e l f . e ng i n e . g e t L i b r a r yH e l p e r ( ’
s y s c a l l s ’ )
42 s e l f . e ng i n e . s c h e d u l e P e r i o d i c ( t ime . t ime ( ) ,
5 ,
s e l f . doMyStuff ,
’ Sy s c a l lMon i t o r _doMyS tu f f ’ )
47
def d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . un s ch edu l e ( ’ Sy s c a l lMon i t o r _doMyS tu f f ’ )
52 ### Helper f u n c t i o n s ###
def l ogDe t a i l sSCT ( s e l f ) :
s t a t e _ o r g = s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( )
s t a t e _ c u r = s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r . g e t S t a t e ( )
57 f o r i in r ange ( 0 , s t a t e _ c u r . s i z e ) :
s c_o rg = s t a t e _ o r g . ge tA t ( i )
s c _ cu r = s t a t e _ c u r . g e tA t ( i )
i f s c_o rg != s c _ cu r :
s e l f . l og ( ’ S y s c a l lMon i t o r : The a d d r e s s o f s y s c a l l %
s changed ’ % s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e _ n ame s [ i ] )
62 s e l f . l og ( ’ O r i g i n a l a d d r e s s : %x ’ %
sc_o rg )
s e l f . l og ( ’ Cu r r e n t a d d r e s s : %x ’ %
sc_ cu r )
def l ogDe ta i l sSRA ( s e l f ) :
67 f o r i in r ange ( 0 , s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ s i z e ) :
s r _ o r g = s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( ) . g e tA t
( i ) . g e tD i g e s t ( )
s r _ c u r = s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ c u r . g e t S t a t e ( ) . g e tA t
( i ) . g e tD i g e s t ( )
i f s r _ o r g != s r _ c u r :
72 s e l f . l og ( ’ ’ )
s e l f . l og ( ’ S y s c a l lMon i t o r : The hash o f t h e s e r v i c e
f u n c t i o n f o r %s changed ’ % s e l f .
s e r v i c e r o u t i n e _ n ame s [ i ] )
s e l f . l og ( ’ O r i g i n a l hash : %x ’ % s r _ o r g )
s e l f . l og ( ’ Cu r r e n t hash : %x ’ % s r _ c u r )
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77
def decideWhatToDo ( s e l f , e r r o r , o u t p u t =None ) :
i f e r r o r == ’SCT_CHANGED’ :
s e l f . l og ( ’ ’ )
82 s e l f . l og ( ’ S y s c a l lMon i t o r : The sys tem c a l l t a b l e has
changed . ’ )
s e l f . l ogDe t a i l sSCT ( )
i f e r r o r == ’SR_ARRAY_CHANGED’ :
s e l f . l og ( ’ ’ )
87 s e l f . l og ( ’ S y s c a l lMon i t o r : A s e r v i c e r o u t i n e has been
mod i f i ed . ’ )
s e l f . l og (msg )
s e l f . l ogDe ta i l sSRA ( )
92 # Check i f t h e domain shou l d be paused
i f s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y == HIGH :
msg = ’ Sy s c a l lMon i t o r : Domain %s was paused a c c o r d i n g
t o p o l i c y ’ % s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r . domID
s e l f . l og (msg )
s e l f . e ng i n e . pauseDomain ( s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r . domID )
97
def doMyStuff ( s e l f ) :
# Gets a new sy s t em c a l l t a b l e
s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " Sy sCa l lT ab l e "
)
102
i f s e l f . s y s c a l l t a b l e _ c u r . g e t S t a t e ( ) . d i g e s t != s e l f .
s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( ) . d i g e s t :
s e l f . decideWhatToDo ( ’SCT_CHANGED’ )
e l s e :
s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ c u r = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( "
S e r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y " )
107 s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ c u r . setSCT ( s e l f .
s y s c a l l t a b l e _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( ) . t a b l e , s e l f .
s y s c a l l t a b l e _ s i z e )
d i g e s t _ c u r = s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ c u r . g e t S t a t e ( ) .
g e tD i g e s t ( )
d i g e s t _ o r g = s e l f . s e r v i c e r o u t i n e a r r a y _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( ) .
g e tD i g e s t ( )
i f d i g e s t _ c u r != d i g e s t _ o r g :
112 s e l f . decideWhatToDo ( ’SR_ARRAY_CHANGED’ )
E.9. PROCMONITOR.PY 157
E.9 ProcMonitor.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e Proc f i l e s y s t em p o l i c y
mon i t o r .
# I t u s e s t h e Proc t a r g e t t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n abou t t h e c u r r e n t
# Proc f i l e s y s t em o f t h e domU . When t h e checksum o f t h e p a r t o f
proc
6 # t h a t i s supposed t o be s t a t i c i s changed t h e p o l i c y s i g n a l s t h e
# eng i n e t o pause t h e u s e r domain .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
11 import t ime
import c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y
from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
c l a s s ProcMon i to r ( c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y . P o l i c y ) :
16
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
# S e t s t h e secounds be tween p o l l
s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l = 5
21 def s e t S e n s i t i v i t y ( s e l f , s e n s i t i v i t y ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = s e n s i t i v i t y
def a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = LOW
26 s e l f . p r o c_ba s e = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " Proc " )
s e l f . s t a t e _ b a s e = s e l f . p r o c_ba s e . g e t S t a t e ( )
s e l f . e ng i n e . s c h e d u l e P e r i o d i c ( t ime . t ime ( ) ,
s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l ,
s e l f . doMyStuff ,
31 ’ P rocMoni to r_doMyStuf f ’ )
def d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . un s ch edu l e ( ’ ProcMoni to r_doMyStuf f ’ )
36 def doMyStuff ( s e l f ) :
p r i n t A l s o = 0
i f s e l f . e ng i n e . l o gLeve l == LOGANDPRINT:
p r i n t A l s o = 1
41 s e l f . p r o c _ c u r r e n t = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( " Proc " )
s t a t e _ c u r r e n t = s e l f . p r o c _ c u r r e n t . g e t S t a t e ( )
i f not s t a t e _ c u r r e n t . d i g e s t == s e l f . s t a t e _ b a s e . d i g e s t :
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s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o ( ’ P rocMon i to r : Proc has changed
! ’ )
46 s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o ( ’ P rocMon i to r : MD5 of base p roc
: %s ’ % s e l f . s t a t e _ b a s e . d i g e s t )
s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o ( ’ P rocMon i to r : MD5 of c u r r e n t
p roc : %s ’ % s t a t e _ c u r r e n t . d i g e s t )
i f p r i n t A l s o :
pr in t ( ’ P rocMon i to r : Proc has changed ! ’ )
pr in t ( ’ P rocMon i to r : MD5 of base p roc : %s ’ % s e l f .
s t a t e _ b a s e . d i g e s t )
51 pr in t ( ’ P rocMon i to r : MD5 of c u r r e n t p roc : %s ’ %
s t a t e _ c u r r e n t . d i g e s t )
#Check log l e v e l i f t h e domain shou l d be paused
i f s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y == HIGH :
s e l f . e ng i n e . l o g g e r . i n f o ( ’ P rocMon i to r : Domain %s
was paused a c c o r d i n g t o p o l i c y ’ % s e l f .
p r o c_ba s e . domID )
56 i f p r i n t A l s o :
pr in t ( ’ P rocMon i to r : Domain %s was paused
a c c o r d i n g t o p o l i c y ’ % s e l f . p r o c_ba s e .
domID )
s e l f . e ng i n e . pauseDomain ( s e l f . p r o c_ba s e . domID )
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E.10 KernelVsyscall.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
2
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
import t ime
import c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y
7 from c h i l i . c o r e . c o n s t a n t s import *
c l a s s Ke r n e lV s y s c a l l ( c h i l i . c o r e . p o l i c y . P o l i c y ) :
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
12 # S e t s t h e secounds be tween each p o l l
s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l = 10
def s e t S e n s i t i v i t y ( s e l f , s e n s i t i v i t y ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = s e n s i t i v i t y
17
def a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y = LOW
s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ o r g = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( "MemoryArea
" )
22 s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ o r g . setMemoryArea ( 0 , ’
_ _ k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l ’ , 10 )
s e l f . e ng i n e . s c h e d u l e P e r i o d i c ( t ime . t ime ( ) ,
s e l f . p o l l i n g I n t e r v a l ,
27 s e l f . doMyStuff ,
’ Ke rne lVsy s c a l l _doMyS tu f f ’ )
def d e a c t i v a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . e ng i n e . un s ch edu l e ( ’ Ke rne lVsy s c a l l _doMyS tu f f ’ )
32
def doMyStuff ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ c u r = s e l f . e ng i n e . i n s p e c t ( "MemoryArea
" )
s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ c u r . setMemoryArea ( 0 , ’
_ _ k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l ’ , 10 )
s t a t e _ c u r = s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ c u r . g e t S t a t e ( )
37 s t a t e _ o r g = s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ o r g . g e t S t a t e ( )
i f not s t a t e _ c u r . d i g e s t == s t a t e _ o r g . d i g e s t :
s e l f . l og ( ’ K e r n e lV s y s c a l l : The _ _ k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l
f u n c t i o n has changed ! ’ )
s e l f . l og ( ’ K e r n e lV s y s c a l l : MD5 of f u n c t i o n was : %s ’
% s t a t e _ o r g . d i g e s t )
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42 s e l f . l og ( ’ K e r n e lV s y s c a l l : MD5 of f u n c t i o n i s now : %s ’
% s t a t e _ c u r . d i g e s t )
#Check log l e v e l i f t h e domain shou l d be paused
i f s e l f . s e n s i t i v i t y == HIGH :
s e l f . l og ( ’ K e r n e lV s y s c a l l : Domain %s was paused
a c c o r d i n g t o p o l i c y ’ %
47 s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ o r g .
domID )
s e l f . e ng i n e . pauseDomain ( s e l f . k e r n e l _ v s y s c a l l _ o r g .
domID )
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E.11 target.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
2
# Th i s f i l e i s t h e i n t e r f a c e f o r t h e t a r g e t s we are u s i ng i n t h e
c h i l i f ramework .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
7 c l a s s Ta r g e t ( o b j e c t ) :
def _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , name , domID ) :
s e l f . _name = name
s e l f . domID = domID
12 s e l f . s e t u p ( )
def s e t u p ( s e l f , x a i ) :
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " Se tup method no t implemented by
s u b c l a s s ! "
17 def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " s h ow_ s t a t e method no t
implemented by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.12 SysCallTable.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
" " " Keeps t r a c k o f p r o c e s s e s " " "
from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
5 import sys , os , c t y p e s
import s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s Sy sCa l lT ab l e ( T a r g e t ) :
10
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s c t _ d a t a = s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . Sy sCa l lT ab l e ( )
s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t _ s t a t e ( s e l f . domID , s e l f . s c t _ d a t a )
15
def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
20
re turn s e l f . s c t _ d a t a
def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
25 " " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " upda t e method no t implemented
by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.13 sct_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e c imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e s y s c a l l s t a r g e t .
I t
2 u s e s a s t r u c t t h a t c o n t i a n s an ar ray o f S y s c a l l s t r u c t s , and a MD5
d i g e s t o f t h i s a r ray . The S y s c a l l s t r u c t s c o n t a i n t h e o r i g i n a l
add r e s s o f
t h e p rocedure imp l emen t i ng t h i s s y s c a l l and t h e d i g e s t o f t h i s
p rocedure
as i t i s i n memory now . Th i s f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y
f u n c t i o n s
t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n from domU . * /
7
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
12 # inc lude < e r r n o . h>
# inc lude < sys /mman . h>
# inc lude <asm / u n i s t d . h>
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s . h>
17 # inc lude < x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < l i b c a . h>
# inc lude < s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
22
void make_d ige s t ( s t r u c t Sy sCa l lT ab l e * s , ca_mmap_t* m) {
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
i n t d i ;
27 char * hex_ou t pu t ;
char ou t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
32
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) m−>s t a r t _ a d d r ,
NR_sy s c a l l s * s i z e o f ( s−> t a b l e [ 0 ] ) ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , d i g e s t ) ;
37
f o r ( d i = 0 ; d i < 16 ; ++ d i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + d i * 2 , "%02x " , d i g e s t [ d i ] ) ;
}
}
42
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void map_sct ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , ca_mmap_t* m,
s t r u c t Sy sCa l lT ab l e * s ) {
47 char s c t _ symbo l [ ] = " s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e " ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t t a b l e _ s t a r t ;
s i z e _ t e n t r y _ s i z e = s i z e o f ( s−> t a b l e [ 0 ] ) ;
i n t i ;
52
/ * g e t t h e vaddr o f t h e s t a r t o f t h e s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e * /
l i nux_ sy s t em_map_symbo l_ t o_add r e s s ( i n s t a n c e , sc t_symbol ,
&t a b l e _ s t a r t ) ;
57
ca_map_add re s s_ r ange ( i n s t a n c e , t a b l e _ s t a r t ,
t a b l e _ s t a r t + NR_sy s c a l l s * e n t r y _ s i z e , m) ;
/ * copy t h e t a b l e e n t r i e s * /
62 f o r ( i =0 ; i <NR_sy s c a l l s ; i ++) {
memcpy(&s−> t a b l e [ i ] , m−>s t a r t _ a d d r + i * e n t r y _ s i z e ,
e n t r y _ s i z e ) ;
}
}
67 void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Sy sCa l lT ab l e * s c t ) {
x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
ca_mmap_t map ;
72 / * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
77
map_sct (&xa i , &map , s c t ) ;
make_d ige s t ( s c t , &map ) ;
s c t−>s i z e = NR_sy s c a l l s ;
82 ca_unmap(&map ) ;
e r r o r _ e x i t :
/ * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
87
}
E.14. SCT_TARGET_DATA.H 165
E.14 sct_target_data.h
1 # inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
s t r u c t Sy sCa l lT ab l e {
5 i n t s i z e ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t t a b l e [ NR_sy s c a l l s ] ;
char d i g e s t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
} ;
10
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Sy sCa l lT ab l e * ) ;
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E.15 sct_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
2 i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
f i l e . * /
%module s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
7 %{
# inc lude < s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
%}
12 %ex t end Sy sCa l lT ab l e {
u i n t 3 2 _ t ge tA t ( i n t i ndex ) {
re turn s e l f −> t a b l e [ i ndex ] ;
}
}
17
%in c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / s c t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.16 ServiceRoutineArray.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
" " " Keeps t r a c k o f p r o c e s s e s " " "
from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
5 import sys , os , c t y p e s
import s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s Se r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y ( Ta r g e t ) :
10
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s r _ d a t a = s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . S e r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y ( )
15
def setSCT ( s e l f , t a b l e , l e n ) :
s e l f . _ t a b l e _ s e t = True
s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t _ s t a t e ( s e l f . domID , s e l f . s r _ d a t a , t a b l e ,
l e n )
20
def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
25
i f s e l f . _ t a b l e _ s e t :
re turn s e l f . s r _ d a t a
e l s e :
re turn None
30
def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
35 " " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " upda t e method no t implemented
by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.17 sr_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e c imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e s y s c a l l s t a r g e t .
I t
2 u s e s a s t r u c t t h a t c o n t i a n s an ar ray o f S y s c a l l s t r u c t s , and a MD5
d i g e s t o f t h i s a r ray . The S y s c a l l s t r u c t s c o n t a i n t h e o r i g i n a l
add r e s s o f
t h e p rocedure imp l emen t i ng t h i s s y s c a l l and t h e d i g e s t o f t h i s
p rocedure
as i t i s i n memory now . Th i s f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y
f u n c t i o n s
t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n from domU . * /
7
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
12 # inc lude < e r r n o . h>
# inc lude < sys /mman . h>
# inc lude <asm / u n i s t d . h>
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s . h>
17 # inc lude < x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < l i b c a . h>
# inc lude < s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
22
void h a s h_ s r ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e * s r )
{
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
ca_mmap_t map ;
27
ca_map_add re s s_ r ange ( i n s t a n c e , s r−>addr ,
s r−>addr + s r−>l eng t h , &map ) ;
32 md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) map . s t a r t _ a d d r , s r−>
l e n g t h ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , s r−>d i g e s t ) ;
ca_unmap(&map ) ;
37 }
void h a s h_ s r a ( s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y * s r a , i n t s c t _ s i z e ) {
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
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42 md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) s r a−>r o u t i n e s ,
s c t _ s i z e * s i z e o f ( s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e ) ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , s r a−>d i g e s t ) ;
}
47
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y * s r a , u i n t 3 2 _ t
s c t [ ] , i n t s c t _ s i z e ) {
x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
52 i n t i ;
/ * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
57 goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e * s r ;
62 f o r ( i =0 ; i < s c t _ s i z e ; i ++) {
s r = &s ra−>r o u t i n e s [ i ] ;
s r−>addr = s c t [ i ] ;
s r−>l e n g t h = SR_LENGTH;
h a s h_ s r (&xa i , s r ) ;
67
}
h a s h_ s r a ( s r a , s c t _ s i z e ) ;
72 e r r o r _ e x i t :
/ * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
77 }
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E.18 sr_target_data.h
1 # inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
2
# de f i n e SR_LENGTH 31
s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e {
u i n t 3 2 _ t add r ;
7 i n t l e n g t h ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
} ;
s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y {
12 s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e r o u t i n e s [ NR_sy s c a l l s ] ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
} ;
17 void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y * , u i n t 3 2 _ t [ ] ,
i n t ) ;
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E.19 sr_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
f i l e . * /
6 %module s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
%{
# inc lude < s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
%}
11 %ex t end S e r v i c eRou t i n e {
char * g e tD i g e s t ( ) {
s t a t i c char hex_ou t pu t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
i n t i = 0 ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 16 ; ++ i ) {
16 s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + i * 2 , "%02x " , s e l f −>d i g e s t [ i ] ) ;
}
re turn hex_ou t pu t ;
}
}
21
%ex t end S e r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y {
char * g e tD i g e s t ( ) {
s t a t i c char hex_ou t pu t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
i n t i = 0 ;
26 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 16 ; ++ i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + i * 2 , "%02x " , s e l f −>d i g e s t [ i ] ) ;
}
re turn hex_ou t pu t ;
}
31 }
%ex t end S e r v i c eRou t i n eA r r a y {
s t r u c t Se r v i c eRou t i n e ge tA t ( i n t i ndex ) {
re turn s e l f −>r o u t i n e s [ i ndex ] ;
36 }
}
41 %in c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / s r _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.20 IDT.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
2
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e I n t e r r u p t d e s c r i p t o r t a b l e (
IDT )
# t a r g e t . I t impo r t s t h e py thon module i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a , which i s
t h e py thon
# wrapper f o r t h e C−imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h i s t a r g e t . The s e l f . t a b l e
i s an
# o b j e c t which r e p r e s e n t s a s t r u c t i c . Th i s s t r u c t c o n t a i n s an
ar ray o f
7 # t r a p _ i n f o _ t s t r u c t s ( Which c o n t a i n s i n f o abou t each t r a p v e c t o r )
and a d i g e s t
# o f t h i s a r ray .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
12 from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
import sys , os , c t y p e s
import i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s IDT ( Ta r g e t ) :
17 def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . t a b l e = i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . IDT_ t ab l e ( )
i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t S t a t e ( s e l f . domID , s e l f . t a b l e )
def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
22 " " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
re turn s e l f . t a b l e
def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
27 " " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " upda t e method no t implemented
by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.21 idt_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e c imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r r u p t
d e s c r i p t o r t a b l e ( IDT ) t a r g e t . I t u s e s a s t r u c t t h a t c o n t a i n s
an ar ray o f t r a p _ i n f o _ t s t r u c t s ( Which c o n t a i n s i n f o abou t
each t r a p v e c t o r ) and a d i g e s t o f t h i s a r ray as i t i s i n memory
5 now . Th i s f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y f u n c t i o n s t o g e t
i n f o rma t i o n from domU . * /
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
10 # inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude < e r r n o . h>
# inc lude < sys /mman . h>
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
15 # inc lude "md5 . h "
# inc lude <xena c c e s s / x e n a c c e s s . h>
# inc lude " l i b c a . h "
# inc lude < i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
20 void h a s h _ i d t _ t a b l e ( u i n t 3 2 _ t t a b l e _ s t a r t ,
IDT_ t ab l e * r e t u r n _ s t r u c t ,
x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * x a i ) {
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
25 u i n t 3 2 _ t end_addr ;
t r a p _ i n f o _ t tmp_ t r a p _ i n f o ;
i n t i = 0 ;
end_addr = t a b l e _ s t a r t +(NR_IDT_ENTRIES* s i z e o f ( t r a p _ i n f o _ t ) ) ;
30
/ / Copy t h e i d t e n t r i e s
f o r ( i =0 ; i <NR_IDT_ENTRIES ; i ++) {
memcpy(& tmp_ t r a p_ i n f o ,
( void *) t a b l e _ s t a r t + i * s i z e o f ( t r a p _ i n f o _ t ) , s i z e o f (
t r a p _ i n f o _ t ) ) ;
35 r e t u r n _ s t r u c t −> i d t _ e n t r i e s [ i ] = tmp_ t r a p _ i n f o ;
}
md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) ( ( void *) t a b l e _ s t a r t ) ,
40 NR_IDT_ENTRIES* s i z e o f ( t r a p _ i n f o _ t ) ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , r e t u r n _ s t r u c t −>d i g e s t ) ;
}
void g e t S t a t e ( i n t dom , IDT_ t ab l e * i d t _ t a b l e ) {
45 x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
v c p u _ g u e s t _ c o n t e x t _ t c t x t ;
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/ * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
50 p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
/ / Get t h e add r e s s o f t h e v c p u _ c o n t e x t which c o n t a i n s t h e i d t
t a b l e
55 i f ( x c _ v c pu_g e t c o n t e x t ( x a i . xc_hand le , x a i . domain_id , 0 , &c t x t )
< 0 ) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o g e t vcpu c o n t e x t " ) ;
goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
} ;
60 h a s h _ i d t _ t a b l e ( ( u i n t 3 2 _ t )&c t x t . t r a p _ c t x t , i d t _ t a b l e , &xa i ) ;
e r r o r _ e x i t :
/ * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
65 }
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E.22 idt_target_data.h
1 # inc lude <xena c c e s s / x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
# de f i n e SYSCALL_VECTOR 128
5 # de f i n e NR_IDT_ENTRIES 256
/ / P rov ided as a r e f e r e n c e . O r i g i n a l l y d e f i n e d i n xen .
/ / s t r u c t t r a p _ i n f o {
10 / / u i n t 8 _ t v e c t o r ; / * e x c e p t i o n v e c t o r * /
/ / u i n t 8 _ t f l a g s ; / * 0−3: p r i v i l e g e l e v e l * /
/ / u i n t 1 6 _ t c s ; / * code s e l e c t o r * /
/ / un s i gned long add r e s s ; / * code o f f s e t * /
/ / } ;
15 / / t y p e d e f s t r u c t t r a p _ i n f o t r a p _ i n f o _ t ;
t ypede f s t r u c t IDT_ t ab l e {
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ; / * The hash o f a l l IDT e n t r i e s * /
t r a p _ i n f o _ t i d t _ e n t r i e s [NR_IDT_ENTRIES ] ;
20 } IDT_ t ab l e ;
void g e t S t a t e ( i n t dom , IDT_ t ab l e * t a b l e ) ;
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E.23 idt_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
3 Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
f i l e s as we l l as t h e f u n c t i o n s d e f i n e d i n t h i s f i l e . * /
%module i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
%{
8 # inc lude < i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
%}
%ex t end IDT_ t ab l e {
u i n t 3 2 _ t ge tAdd r e s sA t ( i n t i ndex ) {
13 re turn s e l f −> i d t _ e n t r i e s [ i ndex ] . a d d r e s s ;
}
char * g e tD i g e s t ( ) {
s t a t i c char hex_ou t pu t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
18 i n t i = 0 ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 16 ; ++ i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + i * 2 , "%02x " , s e l f −>d i g e s t [ i ] ) ;
}
re turn hex_ou t pu t ;
23 }
}
%i n c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / i d t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.24 Proc.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
3 # Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e Proc f i l e s y s t e m t a r g e t .
# I t impo r t s t h e py thon module p r o c _ t a r g e t _ da t a , which i s t h e
py thon
# wrapper f o r t h e C−imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h i s t a r g e t . The s e l f .
p roc_da ta
# i s an o b j e c t which r e p r e s e n t s a s t r u c t i c . Th i s s t r u c t
c o n t a t i n s t h r e e
# o t h e r s t r u c t s : p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y , i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s and
f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s
8 # ( which a l l r e p r e s e n t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e Proc f i l e
s y s t em )
# and a d i g e s t o f t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s as t h e y are i n c u r r e n t memory .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
13 from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
import sys , os , c t y p e s
import p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s Proc ( Ta r g e t ) :
18
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . p r o c _ d a t a = p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . Proc ( )
p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t _ s t a t e ( s e l f . domID , s e l f . p r o c _ d a t a )
23 def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
re turn s e l f . p r o c _ d a t a
28
def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
33 r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " upda t e method no t implemented
by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.25 proc_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e c imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e proc f i l e s y s t e m
t a r g e t . I t u s e s a s t r u c t t h a t c o n t a t i n s t h r e e o t h e r s t r u c t s :
p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y , i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s and f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s ( which a l l
r e p r e s e n t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e Proc f i l e s y s t em ) and a
d i g e s t
o f t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s as t h e y are i n c u r r e n t memory . Th i s f i l e
c o n t a i n s
6 methods t o f i l l t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s and t o make a d i g e s t o f them .
Th i s
f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y f u n c t i o n s t o g e t i n f o rma t i o n from
domU . * /
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
11
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude < e r r n o . h>
# inc lude < sys /mman . h>
16 # inc lude < s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s / x e n a c c e s s . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s / x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < l i b c a . h>
# inc lude < p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
21
void make_d ige s t ( s t r u c t Proc *p ) {
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
i n t d i ;
26
char * hex_ou t pu t = p−>d i g e s t ;
md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
31 md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) &p−>pde . p ro c_ i op s ,
s i z e o f ( s t r u c t i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s * ) ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) &p−>pde . p roc_ fops ,
s i z e o f ( s t r u c t f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s * ) ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) &p−>iops ,
36 s i z e o f ( s t r u c t i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s ) ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) &p−>fops ,
s i z e o f ( s t r u c t f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s ) ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , d i g e s t ) ;
41
f o r ( d i = 0 ; d i < 16 ; ++ d i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + d i * 2 , "%02x " , d i g e s t [ d i ] ) ;
}
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}
46
void f i l l _ p d e ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , s t r u c t Proc *p ) {
ca_mmap_t map ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t s t a r t , end ;
51 / * g e t t h e vaddr o f p r o c_ r oo t * /
l i nux_ sy s t em_map_symbo l_ t o_add r e s s ( i n s t a n c e , " p r o c _ r o o t " , &
s t a r t ) ;
end = s t a r t + s i z e o f ( s t r u c t p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y ) ;
c a_map_add re s s_ r ange ( i n s t a n c e , s t a r t , end , &map ) ;
56 memcpy(&p−>pde , map . s t a r t _ a d d r , s i z e o f ( s t r u c t p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y ) )
;
ca_unmap(&map ) ;
}
61
void f i l l _ i o p s ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , s t r u c t Proc *p ) {
char *memory ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t o f f s e t ;
66 memory = x a _ a c c e s s _ v i r t u a l _ a d d r e s s ( i n s t a n c e ,
( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) p−>pde . p ro c_ i op s
,
&o f f s e t ) ;
memcpy(&p−>iops , memory + o f f s e t , s i z e o f ( s t r u c t
i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s ) ) ;
71
/ * s a n i t y check t o unmap shared pages * /
i f ( memory ) munmap (memory , XA_PAGE_SIZE ) ;
}
76 void f i l l _ f o p s ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , s t r u c t Proc *p ) {
char *memory ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t o f f s e t ;
memory = x a _ a c c e s s _ v i r t u a l _ a d d r e s s ( i n s t a n c e ,
81 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) p−>pde . p roc_ fops
,
&o f f s e t ) ;
memcpy(&p−>fops , memory + o f f s e t , s i z e o f ( s t r u c t
f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s ) ) ;
86 / * s a n i t y check t o unmap shared pages * /
i f ( memory ) munmap (memory , XA_PAGE_SIZE ) ;
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}
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Proc * p roc ) {
91 x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
/ * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
96 goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
/ * pu t t h e p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y i n t o proc * /
f i l l _ p d e (&xai , p roc ) ;
101
f i l l _ i o p s (&xai , p roc ) ;
f i l l _ f o p s (&xa i , p roc ) ;
106 # i f d e f DEBUG
p r i n t f ( " p r o c _ i o p s : 0x%.8x \ n " , ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) proc−>pde . p r o c _ i o p s ) ;
p r i n t f ( " p r o c_ f op s : 0x%.8x \ n " , ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) proc−>pde . p r o c_ f op s ) ;
p r i n t _ h e x ( ( unsigned char *) &proc−>pde , s i z e o f ( proc−>pde ) ) ;
111 p r i n t f ( " p r o c_ i op s _ l ookup : 0x%.8x \ n " , ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) proc−>i o p s .
lookup ) ;
p r i n t _ h e x ( ( unsigned char *) &proc−>iops , s i z e o f ( proc−>i o p s ) ) ;
p r i n t _ h e x ( ( unsigned char *) &proc−>fops , s i z e o f ( proc−>fop s ) ) ;
# end i f
116 / * c a l c u l a t e t h e md5 hash f o r t h e immutab le f i e l d s * /
make_d ige s t ( p roc ) ;
/ * # d e f i n e DEBUG * /
121 # i f d e f DEBUG
p r i n t f ( "%s \ n " , proc−>d i g e s t ) ;
# end i f
e r r o r _ e x i t :
126 / * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
}
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E.26 proc_target_data.h
1 # inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
2 # inc lude < l i n u x / t y p e s . h>
t ypede f s t r u c t { v o l a t i l e i n t c o u n t e r ; } a t om i c _ t ;
s t r u c t p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y {
7 unsigned i n t low_ino ;
unsigned shor t namelen ;
cons t char *name ;
/ * mode_t mode ; * /
/ * n l i n k _ t n l i n k ; * /
12 __ke rne l_mode_ t mode ;
_ _ k e r n e l _ n l i n k _ t n l i n k ;
u i d _ t u i d ;
g i d _ t g i d ;
unsigned long s i z e ;
17 s t r u c t i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s * p r o c _ i o p s ;
s t r u c t f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s * p r o c_ f op s ;
/ * g e t _ i n f o _ t * g e t _ i n f o ; * /
void * g e t _ i n f o ;
s t r u c t module *owner ;
22 s t r u c t p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y * next , * p a r e n t , * s u b d i r ;
void * d a t a ;
/ * r e ad_p ro c_ t * read_proc ; * /
/ * w r i t e _ p r o c _ t * w r i t e _ p r o c ; * /
void * r e a d_p r o c ;
27 void * w r i t e _ p r o c ;
a t om i c _ t coun t ; / * use coun t * /
i n t d e l e t e d ; / * d e l e t e f l a g * /
void * s e t ;
} ;
32
s t r u c t i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s {
i n t (* c r e a t e ) ( void * , void * , i n t , void *) ;
void * (* lookup ) ( void * , void * , void *) ;
i n t (* l i n k ) ( void * , void * , void *) ;
37 i n t (* u n l i n k ) ( void * , void *) ;
i n t (* syml ink ) ( void * , void * , cons t char *) ;
i n t (* mkdir ) ( void * , void * , i n t ) ;
i n t (* rmd i r ) ( void * , void *) ;
i n t (*mknod ) ( void * , void * , i n t , d ev_ t ) ;
42 i n t (* rename ) ( void * , void * ,
void * , void *) ;
i n t (* r e a d l i n k ) ( void * , char * , i n t ) ;
void * (* f o l l ow _ l i n k ) ( void * , void *) ;
void (* p u t _ l i n k ) ( void * , void * , void *) ;
47 void (* t r u n c a t e ) ( void *) ;
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i n t (* p e rm i s s i o n ) ( void * , i n t , void *) ;
i n t (* s e t a t t r ) ( void * , void *) ;
i n t (* g e t a t t r ) ( void * , void * , void *) ;
i n t (* s e t x a t t r ) ( void * , cons t char * , void * , s i z e _ t , i n t ) ;
52 s s i z e _ t (* g e t x a t t r ) ( void * , cons t char * , void * , s i z e _ t )
;
s s i z e _ t (* l i s t x a t t r ) ( void * , char * , s i z e _ t ) ;
i n t (* r emov ex a t t r ) ( void * , cons t char *) ;
void (* t r u n c a t e _ r a n g e ) ( void * , l o f f _ t , l o f f _ t ) ;
} ;
57
s t r u c t f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s {
void *owner ;
l o f f _ t (* l l s e e k ) ( void * , l o f f _ t , i n t ) ;
s s i z e _ t (* r e ad ) ( void * , void * , s i z e _ t , l o f f _ t * ) ;
62 s s i z e _ t (* a i o _ r e a d ) ( void * , void * , s i z e _ t , l o f f _ t ) ;
s s i z e _ t (* w r i t e ) ( void * , void * , s i z e _ t , l o f f _ t * ) ;
s s i z e _ t (* a i o _w r i t e ) ( void * , void * , s i z e _ t , l o f f _ t ) ;
i n t (* r e a d d i r ) ( void * , void * , i n t ) ;
unsigned i n t (* p o l l ) ( void * , void *) ;
67 i n t (* i o c t l ) ( void * , void * , unsigned in t , unsigned long )
;
long (* u n l o c k e d _ i o c t l ) ( void * , unsigned in t , unsigned
long ) ;
long (* c omp a t _ i o c t l ) ( void * , unsigned in t , unsigned long )
;
i n t (*mmap) ( void * , void *) ;
i n t (* open ) ( void * , void *) ;
72 i n t (* f l u s h ) ( void *) ;
i n t (* r e l e a s e ) ( void * , void *) ;
i n t (* f s yn c ) ( void * , void * , i n t d a t a s y n c ) ;
i n t (* a i o _ f s y n c ) ( void * , i n t d a t a s y n c ) ;
i n t (* f a s yn c ) ( i n t , void * , i n t ) ;
77 i n t (* l o ck ) ( void * , i n t , void *) ;
s s i z e _ t (* r e adv ) ( void * , void * , unsigned long , l o f f _ t * )
;
s s i z e _ t (* w r i t e v ) ( void * , void * , unsigned long , l o f f _ t
* ) ;
s s i z e _ t (* s e n d f i l e ) ( void * , l o f f _ t * , s i z e _ t , i n t , void
*) ;
s s i z e _ t (* sendpage ) ( void * , void * , i n t , s i z e _ t , l o f f _ t
* , i n t ) ;
82 unsigned long (* ge t_unmapped_area ) ( void * , unsigned long ,
unsigned long , unsigned long , unsigned long ) ;
i n t (* c h e c k _ f l a g s ) ( i n t ) ;
i n t (* d i r _ n o t i f y ) ( void * f i l p , unsigned long a rg ) ;
i n t (* f l o c k ) ( void * , i n t , void *) ;
} ;
87
E.26. PROC_TARGET_DATA.H 183
s t r u c t Proc {
char d i g e s t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
s t r u c t p r o c _ d i r _ e n t r y pde ;
92 s t r u c t i n o d e _ o p e r a t i o n s i o p s ;
s t r u c t f i l e _ o p e r a t i o n s f op s ;
} ;
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Proc * ) ;
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E.27 proc_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
4 f i l e . * /
%module p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
%{
# inc lude < p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
9 %}
%i n c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / p r o c _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.28 KernelText.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
2
# Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e code f o r t h e Kerne l t e x t t a r g e t . I t
impo r t s
# t h e py thon module k e r n e l _ t a r g e t _ d a t a , which i s t h e py thon
wrapper
# f o r t h e C−imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h i s t a r g e t . The s e l f .
k e r n e l T e x tDa t a i s
# an o b j e c t which r e p r e s e n t a s t r u c t i n C . Th i s s t r u c t c o n t a i n s a
7 # d i g e s t o f t h e t e x t area o f t h e k e r n e l , and t h e s t a r t and end
add r e s s
# o f t h i s area i n memory .
# Author ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l
12 from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
import sys , os , c t y p e s
import k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s Kerne lTex t ( T a r g e t ) :
17
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . k e r n e lT e x tDa t a = k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . Ke rne lTex t ( )
k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t _ s t a t e ( s e l f . domID ,
s e l f . k e r n e lT e x tDa t a )
22
def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
re turn s e l f . k e r n e lT e x tDa t a
27
def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
r a i s e ( No t Implemen tedEr ro r ,
32 " upda t e method no t implemented by s u b c l a s s ! " )
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E.29 kernel_text_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e c imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e k e r n e l t e x t
t a r g e t .
I t u s e s a s t r u c t , Ke rne lTex t , t h a t c o n t a i n s a d i g e s t o f t h e t e x t
are
3 o f t h e k e r n e l , and t h e s t a r t and end add r e s s o f t h i s area i n
memory . Th i s f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y f u n c t i o n s t o g e t
i n f o rma t i o n from domU . * /
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
8
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude < e r r n o . h>
13 # inc lude < sys /mman . h>
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s / x e n a c c e s s . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s / x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < l i b c a . h>
18 # inc lude < k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
void map_ke r n e l _ t e x t ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , ca_mmap_t* m,
s t r u c t Kerne lTex t * k ) {
23
char k t e x t _ s t a r t _ s ymb o l [ ] = " _ t e x t " ;
char k t ex t_end_symbo l [ ] = " _ e t e x t " ;
/ * f i n d s t a r t and end add r e s s e s o f k e r n e l t e x t * /
28 l i nux_ sy s t em_map_symbo l_ t o_add r e s s ( i n s t a n c e ,
k t e x t _ s t a r t _ s ymbo l ,
&k−>k t e x t _ s t a r t ) ;
l i nux_ sy s t em_map_symbo l_ t o_add r e s s ( i n s t a n c e ,
33 k tex t_end_symbo l ,
&k−>k t e x t _ e n d ) ;
c a_map_add re s s_ r ange ( i n s t a n c e , k−>k t e x t _ s t a r t , k−>k t ex t _ end , m
) ;
38 }
void make_d ige s t ( s t r u c t Kerne lTex t * kt , ca_mmap_t* m) {
md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
43 i n t d i ;
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char * hex_ou t pu t = kt−>d i g e s t ;
md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
48
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) m−>s t a r t _ a d d r ,
k t−>k t e x t _ e n d − kt−>k t e x t _ s t a r t ) ;
md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , d i g e s t ) ;
53
f o r ( d i = 0 ; d i < 16 ; ++ d i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + d i * 2 , "%02x " , d i g e s t [ d i ] ) ;
}
}
58
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Kerne lTex t * k t e x t ) {
x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
ca_mmap_t map ;
63
/ * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
68 goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
map_k e r n e l _ t e x t (&xa i , &map , k t e x t ) ;
73
make_d ige s t ( k t e x t , &map ) ;
# i f d e f DEBUG
p r i n t f ( "%s \ n " , k t e x t −>d i g e s t ) ;
78 # end i f
ca_unmap(&map ) ;
e r r o r _ e x i t :
83 / * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
}
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E.30 kernel_text_target_data.h
1 # inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
s t r u c t Kerne lTex t {
4 char d i g e s t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t k t e x t _ s t a r t ;
u i n t 3 2 _ t k t e x t _ e n d ;
} ;
9 void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t Kerne lTex t * ) ;
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E.31 kernel_text_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
f i l e . * /
6 %module k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
%{
# inc lude < k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
%}
11
%in c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / k e r n e l _ t e x t _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.32 MemoryArea.py
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env / py thon
" " " Keeps t r a c k o f p r o c e s s e s " " "
from c h i l i . c o r e . t a r g e t import Ta r g e t
5 import sys , os , c t y p e s
import memo ry_a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
c l a s s MemoryArea ( Ta r g e t ) :
10
def s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . _ a r e a _ s e t = F a l s e
s e l f . memory_data = memo ry_ a r e a_ t a r g e t _ d a t a . MemoryArea ( )
15
def setMemoryArea ( s e l f , s t a r t _ a d d r , s t a r t _ s ymbo l , l e n ) :
s e l f . _ a r e a _ s e t = True
memo ry_ a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . g e t _ s t a t e ( s e l f . domID , s e l f .
memory_data , s t a r t _ a d d r , s t a r t _ s ymbo l , l e n )
20
def g e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Shows t h e i n t e r n a l s t a t e o f t h i s t a r g e t
a s i t i s i n memory now" " "
25 i f s e l f . _ a r e a _ s e t :
re turn s e l f . memory_data
e l s e :
re turn None
30 def upda t e ( s e l f ) :
" " " Re s pon s i b l e f o r u pd a t i n g t h e i n n e r s t a t e o f
t h i s t a r g e t from t h e memory " " "
r a i s e Not Implemen tedEr ro r , " upda t e method no t implemented
by s u b c l a s s ! "
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E.33 memory_area_target_data.c
1 / * Th i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e C imp l emen t a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r i c memory
area
t a r g e t . Th i s f i l e u s e s t h e Xenacces s l i b r a r y f u n c t i o n s t o g e t
i n f o rma t i o n from domU . * /
/ * Au thor ( s ) : Trond A Soerby , Mads Bergda l * /
6
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude < e r r n o . h>
# inc lude < sys /mman . h>
11 # inc lude <asm / u n i s t d . h>
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <xena c c e s s . h>
# inc lude < x a _ p r i v a t e . h>
# inc lude < l i b c a . h>
16
# inc lude <memo ry_a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
void make_d ige s t ( s t r u c t MemoryArea* ma , ca_mmap_t* m) {
21 md5_ s t a t e _ t s t a t e ;
md5_byte_ t d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
i n t d i ;
char * hex_ou t pu t = ma−>d i g e s t ;
26
md5_ in i t (& s t a t e ) ;
md5_append(& s t a t e , ( cons t md5_byte_ t * ) m−>s t a r t _ a d d r , ma−>
s i z e ) ;
31 md5_ f i n i s h (& s t a t e , d i g e s t ) ;
f o r ( d i = 0 ; d i < 16 ; ++ d i ) {
s p r i n t f ( h ex_ou t pu t + d i * 2 , "%02x " , d i g e s t [ d i ] ) ;
}
36 }
void map_ma ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e , ca_mmap_t* m,
u i n t 3 2 _ t s t a r t _ a d d r , s i z e _ t l e n ) {
41
ca_map_add re s s_ r ange ( i n s t a n c e , s t a r t _ a d d r ,
s t a r t _ a d d r + len , m) ;
}
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46 void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t MemoryArea* ma ,
u i n t 3 2 _ t s t a r t _ a d d r , char* s t a r t _ s ymbo l ,
s i z e _ t l e n ) {
x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t x a i ;
ca_mmap_t map ;
51
/ * i n i t i a l i z e t h e xen a c c e s s l i b r a r y * /
i f ( x a _ i n i t ( dom , &xa i ) == XA_FAILURE) {
p e r r o r ( " f a i l e d t o i n i t XenAccess l i b r a r y " ) ;
56 goto e r r o r _ e x i t ;
}
i f ( s t a r t _ a d d r == 0) {
/ * f i n d s t a r t add r e s s o f s t a r t _ s ymb o l t e x t * /
61 l i nux_ sy s t em_map_symbo l_ t o_add r e s s (&xa i ,
s t a r t _ s ymbo l ,
&s t a r t _ a d d r ) ;
}
66 map_ma(&xai , &map , s t a r t _ a d d r , l e n ) ;
ma−>s i z e = l e n ;
make_d ige s t (ma , &map ) ;
71 ca_unmap(&map ) ;
e r r o r _ e x i t :
/ * c l eanup any memory a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e XenAccess i n s t a n c e
* /
x a _d e s t r o y (& xa i ) ;
76
}
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E.34 memory_area_target_data.h
1 # inc lude < t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h>
s t r u c t MemoryArea {
i n t s i z e ;
6 char d i g e s t [16*2 + 1 ] ;
} ;
void g e t _ s t a t e ( i n t dom , s t r u c t MemoryArea * , u i n t 3 2 _ t , char * ,
s i z e _ t ) ;
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E.35 memory_area_target_data.i
1 / * Th i s i s t h e f i l e used by t h e swig s y s t em do t u r n c−code
2 i n t o py thon . Th i s f i l e t e l l s swig what we want t o wrap .
Here we t e l l swig t o wrap a l l t h e t h i n g s i n t h e header
f i l e . * /
%module memo ry_ a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a
7 %{
# inc lude <memo ry_a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h>
%}
12
%in c l u d e " . . / . . / t a r g e t s _ d a t a . h "
%i n c l u d e " . . / memo ry_ a r e a _ t a r g e t _ d a t a . h "
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E.36 Libca
This is the code files for the Libca library developed to make memory access of
guest memory spanning multiple page frames more manageable.
E.36.1 Libca.c
1 # inc lude " l i b c a . h "
/ * maps a pa r t o f memory from domU i n t o t h e add r e s s space o f dom0 .
* t h e p a r t mapped c o n t a i n s t h e pages t h a t c o n t a i n t h e v i r t u a l
add r e s s
5 * range d e f i n e d by v a d d r _ s t a r t and vaddr_end . t h e i n f o rma t i o n
needed f o r
* a c c e s s i n g t h e mapped memory i s pu t i n a ca_mmap s t r u c t .
* /
void ca_map_add re s s_ r ange ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e ,
u i n t 3 2 _ t v a d d r _ s t a r t ,
10 u i n t 3 2 _ t vaddr_end ,
ca_mmap_t *map ) {
xen_p fn_ t * p f n _ l i s t ;
s i z e _ t p f n _ s i z e = s i z e o f ( x en_p fn_ t ) ;
15
u i n t 3 2 _ t vaddr ;
/ * f i n d t h e add r e s s e s o f t h e pages c o n t a i n i n g t h e s t a r t
add r e s s
and t h e end add r e s s * /
u i n t 3 2 _ t p a g e _ s t a r t = v a d d r _ s t a r t & XC_PAGE_MASK;
20 u i n t 3 2 _ t page_end = vaddr_end & XC_PAGE_MASK;
/ * g e t t h e o f f s e t o f v a d d r _ s t a r t i n t h e page frame * /
u i n t 3 2 _ t o f f s e t = (XC_PAGE_SIZE−1) & v a d d r _ s t a r t ;
25 i n t i ;
/ * d e t e rm i n e t h e number o f pages t o be mapped * /
i n t pages = ( ( page_end − p a g e _ s t a r t ) / XC_PAGE_SIZE ) + 1 ;
/ * we need t o make a l i s t o f a l l t h e page f rames c o n t a i n i n g
t h e add r e s s
30 * range .
* /
p f n _ l i s t = ( x en_p fn_ t * ) ma l l oc ( pages * p f n _ s i z e ) ;
vaddr = p a g e _ s t a r t ;
35 f o r ( i =0 ; i <pages ; i ++) {
/ * f i n d t h e page frame number o f t h e v i r t u a l add r e s s vaddr
,
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and add i t t o our l i s t o f page f rames * /
p f n _ l i s t [ i ] = x c _ t r a n s l a t e _ f o r e i g n _ a d d r e s s ( i n s t a n c e −>
xc_hand le ,
i n s t a n c e −>
domain_id ,
40 0 ,
vaddr ) ;
vaddr += XC_PAGE_SIZE ;
}
45
/ * maps t h e page f rames i n t h e p f n _ l i s t i n t o a l o c a l add r e s s
range ,
* and r e co rd t h e p o i n t e r t o t h e f i r s t page frame
* /
map−>s t a r t _ p a g e = xc_map_ fo r e i gn_ba t ch ( i n s t a n c e −>xc_hand le ,
50 i n s t a n c e −>domain_id ,
PROT_READ,
&p f n _ l i s t [ 0 ] ,
pages ) ;
55 / * r e co rd t h e number o f pages t h a t has been mapped * /
map−>pages = pages ;
/ * r e co rd t h e p o i n t e r t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e r e q u e s t e d
* v i r t u a l add r e s s range
60 * /
map−>s t a r t _ a d d r = map−>s t a r t _ p a g e + o f f s e t ;
/ * c l eanup * /
f r e e ( p f n _ l i s t ) ;
65
}
/ * unmaps t h e p r e v i o u s l y mapped memory area r e f e r r e d t o by t h e
ca_mmap s t r u c t
70 * /
void ca_unmap ( ca_mmap_t *map ) {
i f (map−>s t a r t _ p a g e ) munmap (map−>s t a r t _ p a g e , XC_PAGE_SIZE*map
−>pages ) ;
}
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E.36.2 Libca.h
1 # inc lude " l i b c a . h "
/ * maps a pa r t o f memory from domU i n t o t h e add r e s s space o f dom0 .
* t h e p a r t mapped c o n t a i n s t h e pages t h a t c o n t a i n t h e v i r t u a l
add r e s s
* range d e f i n e d by v a d d r _ s t a r t and vaddr_end . t h e i n f o rma t i o n
needed f o r
6 * a c c e s s i n g t h e mapped memory i s pu t i n a ca_mmap s t r u c t .
* /
void ca_map_add re s s_ r ange ( x a _ i n s t a n c e _ t * i n s t a n c e ,
u i n t 3 2 _ t v a d d r _ s t a r t ,
u i n t 3 2 _ t vaddr_end ,
11 ca_mmap_t *map ) {
xen_p fn_ t * p f n _ l i s t ;
s i z e _ t p f n _ s i z e = s i z e o f ( x en_p fn_ t ) ;
16 u i n t 3 2 _ t vaddr ;
/ * f i n d t h e add r e s s e s o f t h e pages c o n t a i n i n g t h e s t a r t
add r e s s
and t h e end add r e s s * /
u i n t 3 2 _ t p a g e _ s t a r t = v a d d r _ s t a r t & XC_PAGE_MASK;
u i n t 3 2 _ t page_end = vaddr_end & XC_PAGE_MASK;
21
/ * g e t t h e o f f s e t o f v a d d r _ s t a r t i n t h e page frame * /
u i n t 3 2 _ t o f f s e t = (XC_PAGE_SIZE−1) & v a d d r _ s t a r t ;
i n t i ;
26 / * d e t e rm i n e t h e number o f pages t o be mapped * /
i n t pages = ( ( page_end − p a g e _ s t a r t ) / XC_PAGE_SIZE ) + 1 ;
/ * we need t o make a l i s t o f a l l t h e page f rames c o n t a i n i n g
t h e add r e s s
* range .
31 * /
p f n _ l i s t = ( x en_p fn_ t * ) ma l l oc ( pages * p f n _ s i z e ) ;
vaddr = p a g e _ s t a r t ;
f o r ( i =0 ; i <pages ; i ++) {
36 / * f i n d t h e page frame number o f t h e v i r t u a l add r e s s vaddr
,
and add i t t o our l i s t o f page f rames * /
p f n _ l i s t [ i ] = x c _ t r a n s l a t e _ f o r e i g n _ a d d r e s s ( i n s t a n c e −>
xc_hand le ,
i n s t a n c e −>
domain_id ,
0 ,
41 vaddr ) ;
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vaddr += XC_PAGE_SIZE ;
}
46 / * maps t h e page f rames i n t h e p f n _ l i s t i n t o a l o c a l add r e s s
range ,
* and r e co rd t h e p o i n t e r t o t h e f i r s t page frame
* /
map−>s t a r t _ p a g e = xc_map_ fo r e i gn_ba t ch ( i n s t a n c e −>xc_hand le ,
i n s t a n c e −>domain_id ,
51 PROT_READ,
&p f n _ l i s t [ 0 ] ,
pages ) ;
/ * r e co rd t h e number o f pages t h a t has been mapped * /
56 map−>pages = pages ;
/ * r e co rd t h e p o i n t e r t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e r e q u e s t e d
* v i r t u a l add r e s s range
* /
61 map−>s t a r t _ a d d r = map−>s t a r t _ p a g e + o f f s e t ;
/ * c l eanup * /
f r e e ( p f n _ l i s t ) ;
66 }
/ * unmaps t h e p r e v i o u s l y mapped memory area r e f e r r e d t o by t h e
ca_mmap s t r u c t
* /
71 void ca_unmap ( ca_mmap_t *map ) {
i f (map−>s t a r t _ p a g e ) munmap (map−>s t a r t _ p a g e , XC_PAGE_SIZE*map
−>pages ) ;
}
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E.36.3 override.diff
1 52 c52
< ( void *) s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_##x ] = ( void *) my_##x ; \
−−−
> s y s _ c a l l _ t a b l e [ __NR_##x ] = ( void *) my_##x ; \
59 ,60 c59 , 60
6 < void s t r u c t _modu l e ( s t r u c t module *mod ) { re turn ; }
< EXPORT_SYMBOL( s t r u c t _modu l e ) ;
−−−
> / * vo i d s t r u c t _modu l e ( s t r u c t module *mod ) { r e t u r n ; } * /
> / * EXPORT_SYMBOL( s t r u c t _modu l e ) ; * /
11 542 a543
>
559 a561
>
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